

Chapter 3

Dharmakīrti against the Self as the Basis of Brahmanical Soteriologies

3.1. THE DOCTRINES OF THE SELF AS SOTERIOLOGIES

In PV 2.220–256, Dharmakīrti engages in what appears to be the longest and most elaborate critique of Ātmavāda(s) found in his works. Here however, the subject of the discussion is neither ontological nor epistemological. These stanzas are not meant to demonstrate that the self does not exist, nor that it cannot be apprehended by any means of valid cognition. They address a soteriological issue and are aimed at showing that if there is a self, there can be no liberation (*mokṣa*) from a painful existence within the beginningless cycle of births and deaths (*saṃsāra*). This demonstration entails a detailed criticism of the way the Ātmavādins define liberation and what one should aspire to be liberated from, since Dharmakīrti's opponents consider that liberation can be obtained by discriminating the self from what is not the self (*anātman*) and by achieving detachment (*vairāgya*)¹ from what we wrongly take to belong to the self (*ātmīya*).

¹ Although there seems to be no perfect equivalent of the term *vairāgya* in European languages, it is often translated thus (as opposed to *rāga* understood as “attachment”). Admittedly, the word may sometimes mean “aversion,” “disgust,” “loathing” (see MW s.v.). In the present context, however, it rather denotes a perfect indifference or dispassion, i.e., a disposition contrary to *rāga* (which designates the fact of being “coloured,” i.e., affected by something, as well as passionate desire or love). As will be seen below, this state of dispassion excludes all passions, i.e., desire (sometimes expressed by the word *rāga*) but also hatred or aversion (*dveṣa*). It is often opposed to a state designated by words that literally mean something like “attachment”: *sneha* (which means “love,” but also designates the property of being sticky), *sakti* (which means “adherence,” “attachment” in the literal sense of the term, but also “addiction” for instance), *anurūpāñj-* (which refers to the act of clinging, adhering or being attached to), etc.

3.1.1. Sāṅkhya

Thus the Sāṅkhyas hold that bondage arises from the confusion between an unconscious and active primordial nature (*prakṛti*) or matter (*pradhāna*) and the Person (*puruṣa*) conceived as an inactive consciousness.² Thus according to the SK,

and because of the opposition [between the possession of the three qualities that characterizes matter and the Person's status], it is established that the Person is a witness, possesses isolation (*kaivalya*), neutrality (*mādhyaṣṭhya*), is the perceiver, and is not an agent. Therefore, due to association (*saṃyoga*) with this [Person], the unconscious subtle body (*liṅga*) seems to be endowed with consciousness; and in the same way, although agency belongs to the qualities [of matter, the Person, which] is indifferent (*udāsīna*), seems to be an agent.³

Individuals who are not liberated confuse matter with the Person inasmuch as they attribute agency to consciousness in spite of its being a purely contemplative entity. But they also wrongly ascribe consciousness to what is in fact a purely material entity (or rather, a collection of entities), namely the subtle body (*liṅga/liṅgaśarīra/sūkṣmaśarīra*). The latter is said to “go from the [evolute called] the Great to the subtle [elements].”⁴ In other words, it comprises, besides the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*),⁵ the “thirteenfold instrument,”⁶ i.e., the threefold internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) made up of the intellect (*buddhi*), the sense of ego (*ahankāra*) and the mind (*manas*), together with the five sense

² Although the SK for instance does not use the term *ātman* to designate this consciousness, Dharmakīrti calls it an *ātman* (see, e.g., below, PV 2.247–248) because it is defined by the Sāṅkhya as a lasting, unchanging entity that constitutes the very foundation of a person's empirical identity.

³ SK 19–20: *tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddham sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya / kaivalyaṃ mādhyaṣṭhyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaś ca // tasmāt tatsaṃyogād acetanaṃ cetanāvad iva liṅgam / guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteḥ bhavaty udāsīnaḥ //*.

⁴ *mahadādisūkṣmaparyantam* (SK 40).

⁵ I.e., sound (*śabda*), tactile form (*sparsa*), visual form (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*) and smell (*gandha*). On these see, e.g., GBh ad SK 3.

⁶ *karaṇaṃ trayodaśavidham* (SK 32).

organs (*buddhīndriya*) and the five organs of activity (*karmendriya*).⁷ According to the Sāṅkhyas, as long as the subtle body goes on transmigrating, the individual is bound to experience pain, but liberation can be achieved through a discriminative knowledge (*vijñāna*) that counteracts the confusion between matter and the Person. Thus SK 55 states:

In this [condition of living beings], pain, which is the result of ageing and death, accrues to the conscious Person, because the subtle body has not ceased; therefore [in this state], there is pain by nature.⁸

In his commentary, Gauḍapāda explains how liberation from this painful state can be achieved:

When the subtle body ceases, there is liberation; [and] when one obtains liberation, there is no [longer] pain. But how does the [subtle body] cease? [Answer:] When the knowledge of the twenty-five elements constituting reality (*tattva*) occurs. [This knowledge is] characterized by the perception (*khyāti*) of the distinction between [the quality of matter called] *sattva* and the Person [and takes such a form:] “This is primordial matter, this is the intellect, this is the sense of ego, these are the five great elements, [and] the Person is distinct from [all of] them.” The cessation of the subtle body is due to such a knowledge, [and] liberation is due to the [cessation of the subtle body].⁹

The subtle body can be eliminated through knowledge¹⁰ that consists in discriminating the Person from matter,¹¹ described in the SK in the following way:

⁷ See SK 26: the five sense organs are the ear (*śrotra*), skin (*tvac*), eye (*cakṣus*), tongue (*rasana*) and nose (*ghrāṇa*); the five organs of activity are speech (*vāc*), hand (*pāṇi*), foot (*pāda*), anus (*pāyu*) and genital organ (*upastha*).

⁸ SK 55: *tatra jarāmaraṇakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ / liṅgasyāvinivṛttes tasmād duḥkhaṃ svabhāvena //*.

⁹ GBh 50,23–51,3: *liṅganivṛttau mokṣaḥ / mokṣaprāptau nāsti duḥkham iti / tat punaḥ kena nivartate / yadā pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ syāt / sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātilakṣaṇam idaṃ pradhānam idaṃ buddhir ayam ahaṅkāra imāni pañca mahābhūtāni yebhyo 'nyaḥ puruṣo visadṛśa iti / evañjñānāl liṅganivṛttis tato mokṣa iti /*.

¹⁰ See, e.g., MV 53,21: *jñānena hi liṅgaṃ nivartate /*. “For knowledge makes the subtle body cease.”

Thus, through the repeated [meditation] (*abhyāsa*) on the elements constituting reality arises knowledge [in the form] “[I] am not [this, this] is not mine, [this is] not myself.” [This knowledge] is complete, stainless because it is devoid of doubt (*viparyaya*),¹² and pure (*kevala*).¹³

The commentaries diverge as to the meaning of the verse.¹⁴ However, in spite of these diverging interpretations, the gist is the same: as the MV puts it, the liberating knowledge “consists of the perception that

¹¹ JM 110,12–13: *tasya ca nivṛttiḥ pradhānapuruṣāntarajñānāt*. “And the cessation of this [subtle body occurs] thanks to the knowledge that primordial matter and the Person are distinct.”

¹² See GBh 58,16 (*aviparyayād asaṃśayāt*), MV 58,9 (*viparyayaḥ saṃśayas tadviparīto viparyayaḥ*) and JM 115,5 (*aviparyayād aham ity amānasamśayāt*).

¹³ SK 64: *evaṃ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham ity aparīṣeṣam / aviparyayād viśuddhaṃ kevalam utpadyate jñānam //*.

¹⁴ Thus GBh 58,14–15 interprets *nāsmi na me nāham iti* as “it is not me who exist; this is not my body; since I am one [thing and] the body is another, I am not [it]” (*nāsmi nāham eva bhavāmi / na me mama śarīraṃ tat / yato ’ham anyāḥ śarīraṃ anyan nāham iti* /), whereas MV 58,6–7 understands it as “I am not the elements constituting reality, the elements constituting reality do not belong to me, I do not belong to the elements constituting reality; rather, these are material” (*nāsmi tattvāni / na me tattvāni / nāham tattvānām / kiṃ tu prādhānikāny etāni* /). JM 115,2–4 comments: *yad etat sūkṣmaśarīraṃ bhautikaṃ ca tasmin na bhavāmy api tu prakṛtiḥ / na ma ityādi / na mamedam api tu prakṛteḥ / nāham iti / nāpy aham prakṛtir iti* / . “[I am not in this, i.e.,] I do not exist in that which is the subtle body and is material; rather, primordial nature does; ‘it is not mine, etc.’ [means]: it is not mine, but rather, the primordial nature’s; [it] is not myself, i.e., neither am I primordial nature.” (Contrary to the other commentaries mentioned here, the JM does not present the sentence as the expression of the liberating knowledge, but of the repeated meditation that must lead to it; see JM 115,4–5: *ity evaṃ tattvābhyāsāt*). The TK, for its part, relies on a grammatical analysis and explains that in the first element of the sentence, where the negation occurs with the verb “to be,” the speaker simply denies his agency (see TK 170,19–20: *nāsmīty ātmani kriyāmātraṃ niṣedhayati* / . “With ‘I am not,’ [the speaker] merely denies the action [of being] in himself.”). Vācaspatimiśra understands the third element of the sentence (where the subject occurs with the negation) as a denial that the self may be the substratum of agency (see TK 170,24: *aham iti kartṛpadam* / , “‘I’ is the word [designating] the agent,” and TK 170,25–26: *niṣkriyatve ca kartṛtvābhāvaḥ* / , “And if there is no action, there is no agency”). Finally, regarding the second element, TK 170,26–27 explains: *ata eva na me / kartā hi svāmitāṃ labhate* [...]/ . “For the same reason, it is not mine; for it is the agent that has the status of a possessor.”

the qualities [belonging to matter] and the Person are distinct.”¹⁵ In fact though, acquiring this discriminating knowledge does not lead to an immediate and full liberation. Someone who possesses it no longer performs acts that require a karmic retribution, but the merits and demerits accumulated prior to this knowledge subsist in the form of residual traces (*saṃskāra*) and must first be exhausted before the Person can be finally released from the body. Nonetheless, the cause of liberation remains discriminative knowledge, since transmigration can only be made to cease through it:

Although due to the attainment of correct knowledge, merit and so on have ceased to be causes, [the Person] remains trapped in a body due to the force of residual traces, just as the whirling of [the potter’s] wheel [that goes on because of the impulse given to it. But] when one has obtained separation from the body, [and] when matter has ceased [to be active] because it has reached its goal,¹⁶ one obtains an isolation (*kaivalya*) that is both complete and definitive.¹⁷

Thus according to the Sāṅkhya, liberation from pain consists of a state of perfect isolation in which the permanent, conscious and inactive entity that is the Person has severed all ties with unconscious and active matter by becoming fully aware of the radical difference that separates them.

3.1.2. Nyāya

The Naiyāyikas too contend that bondage stems from a wrong knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) primarily characterized as a confusion between the self and what is not the self. For bondage consists in being attached

¹⁵ MV 58,11: *guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhirūpam*.

¹⁶ I.e., enabling the Person to discriminate itself from the *prakṛti*. See, e.g., SK 56: *ity eṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣabhūtaparyantaḥ / pratipurūṣavimokṣārthaṃ svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ //*. “Therefore this, from [the evolute called] the Great to the various [gross] elements, is [all] done by primordial nature for the sake of each Person’s liberation (*vimokṣa*); this endeavour is for the benefit of another [i.e., the Person,] as for one’s own benefit.”

¹⁷ SK 67–68: *saṃyagjñānād hīgamād dharmādīnām akāraṇaprāptau / tiṣṭhati saṃskāraśāc cakrabhramivad dhṛtaśarīraḥ // prāpte śarīrabhede caritārthatvāt pradhānavinivṛttau / aikāntikam ātyantikam ubhayaṃ kaivalyam āpnoti //*.

(*virakta*) to pleasure (*sukha*) and the means of realizing pleasure (*sukhasādhana*),¹⁸ and this attachment, which necessarily leads to pain (*duḥkha*), cannot disappear as long as wrong knowledge remains. Thus while commenting on NSū 1.1.2, according to which “when wrong knowledge, defects (*doṣa*), activities (*pravṛtti*), [re-]births (*janman*) and pain disappear one after the other, liberation (*apavarga*) [occurs] immediately after their disappearance,”¹⁹ Pakṣilasvāmin specifies:

Wrong knowledge, which is of many kinds, occurs with respect to the [already stated] object of knowledge [the enumeration of which] starts with the self and ends with liberation. [I.e., wrong knowledge takes these forms]: first, with respect to the self, “it does not exist”; with respect to [what is] not the self, “[it is] a self”; with respect to pain, “[it is] pleasure”; with respect to [what is] impermanent, “[it is] permanent”; with respect to [what is] not safe, “[it is] safe”; with respect to [what is] dangerous, “[it is] not dangerous”; with respect to [what is] disgusting, “it is desirable”; with respect to [what] should be rejected, “[it] should not be rejected.”²⁰

The Naiyāyikas’ concise definition of wrong knowledge is even more telling:

But what is this wrong knowledge? It [consists in] apprehending as the self what is not the self.²¹

The following passage from the NBh makes clear that it is because we take the impermanent body, sense organs, mind, feelings and cognitions for their unchanging substratum that we suffer and transmigrate:

[Question:] But what is this wrong knowledge [said to be the cause of attachment]? [Answer:] It [consists in] apprehending as the self what is not the

¹⁸ See NBh 247,3–11, quoted below, fn. 78, p. 206.

¹⁹ *duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānam uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād apavargah* //. On the order in which the initial compound should be read according to the commentators, see below, fn. 23, p. 193.

²⁰ NBh 6,9–11: *tatrātmādyapavargaparyante prameye mithyājñānam anekaparakāra-kaṃ vartate / ātmani tāvan nāstīti / anātmāny ātmeti / duḥkhe sukham iti / anitye nityam iti / atrāṇe trāṇam iti / sabhaye nirbhayam iti / jugupsite ’bhimatam iti / hātavye ’pratihātavyam iti* /. Note the proximity of this description with the four Buddhist wrong notions (on these *viparyāsas* see above, fn. 35, p. 53).

²¹ NV 470,19–20: *kiṃ punas tan mithyājñānam / anātmāny ātmagraha iti* /.

self. The delusion [consisting in thinking] ‘I am’ [with respect to what is not the self] is [called] the sense of ego, since indeed, the [false] view of [someone] who sees what is not the self as ‘I am’ is the sense of ego. [Question:] But what is the group of objects with respect to which the sense of ego [arises]? [Answer:] The body, the sense organs, the mind, feelings and cognitions. [Question:] How is the sense of ego that [arises] with respect to them the seed of *saṃsāra*? [Answer:] Indeed, when the [sense of ego] has determined (*vyavasita*) the group [of objects] that are the body and so on as ‘I am,’ due to the annihilation of these [objects], one [wrongly] considers that the self is annihilated, [and being] overwhelmed by the craving (*ṭṣṇā*) for non-annihilation, one clings (*upādatte*) to them again and again. Clinging to them, one strives for [re-]birth and death. Therefore, because one is not free from a body, one is not entirely freed from pain.²²

According to the Naiyāyikas, bondage occurs because we desperately seek permanency in our body, sense organs, mind, feelings and cognitions, which are by nature transient, instead of acknowledging that permanence solely belongs to the substratum of subjectivity that alone can legitimately be denoted by the word “I” – namely, the self. As a consequence, the Naiyāyikas state that liberation is achieved by acquiring knowledge of reality or right knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) in which the self is no longer confused with any of its impermanent and contingent adjuncts,²³ and they claim that in the liberated state the self is free of all pain because it is free of all causes of perception:

²² NBh 258,10–15: *kiṃ punas tan mithyājñānam iti / anātmany ātmagrahaḥ / aham asmīti moho 'haṅkāra iti / anātmānam khalv aham asmīti paśyato dṛṣṭir ahaṅkāra iti / kiṃ punas tad arthajātaṃ yadvīṣayo 'haṅkāraḥ / śarīrendriyamanovedanābudhayaḥ / katham tadviṣayo 'haṅkāraḥ saṃsārabijam bhavati / ayam khalu śarīrādyanthajātaṃ aham asmīti vyavasitas taducchedād ātmocchedaṃ manyamāno 'nucchedatṣṇāyāḥ pariplutaḥ punaḥ punas tad upādatte / tad upādadāno janmamaraṇāya yatate / tena śarīreṇāvīyogān nātyantaṃ duḥkhād vimucyata iti /*

²³ See, e.g., NBh 7,12–14: *yadā tu tattvajñānān mithyājñānam apaiti tadā mithyājñānāpāye doṣā apayanti / doṣāpāye pravṛttir apaiti / pravṛttypāye janmāpaiti / janmāpāye duḥkham apaiti / duḥkhāpāye cātyantiko 'pavargo niḥśreyasaḥ iti /* “But when wrong knowledge disappears due to right knowledge, then the defects disappear upon the disappearance of wrong knowledge. Upon the disappearance of defects, activity disappears; upon the disappearance of activity, [re-]birth disappears; upon the disappearance of [re-]birth, pain disappears; and upon the disappearance of pain, ultimate liberation [occurs], which is the summum bonum (*niḥśreyasa*).” On *niḥśreyasa*, see Slaje 1986.

In liberation, there is no body, etc., which are causes of perception. Therefore liberation is the release from all pains. Because every seed of pain and pain [itself] are cut off in liberation, liberation is the release from all pain.²⁴

While commenting on NSū 4.2.45 (“And this is absent in liberation”),²⁵ Pakṣilasvāmin likewise emphasizes that the liberated state is devoid of all cognitions, specifying that “this [i.e.,] the substratum and cause of cognitions, [namely] the body and sense organs, is absent in liberation, because [in liberation] there is neither merit nor demerit,”²⁶ and he adds that as a consequence, liberation is free of all pain:

Therefore liberation is the release from all pain. Because the seed of all pain and the basis of all pain is cut off in liberation, liberation is the release from all pain, since pain cannot arise without [its] seed and [its] basis.²⁷

Uddyotakara, for his part, criticizes the Buddhist view that liberation does not consist in releasing the self but merely a series of momentary thoughts (*citta*):

Others [say] that [only] the mind is released, because desire and so on have power over it, since it is due to desire, etc., that the mind arises in different [transmigratory] destinies²⁸ and with different supports [i.e., objects]; whereas desire and so on have no power over the self. [We Naiyāyikas answer that] this is not [true], because [if it were, liberation] would be accomplished effortlessly: those who consider liberation to be the non-producing and cessation of mind, for those liberation would be attained without effort. Why? Because [its] arising means [nothing but its] destruction: since what is born [instantly] perishes, this is accomplished effortlessly. If [the Buddhist opponent replies] that liberation is the non-arising of the series [and not the mere non-arising of one single momentary thought, we reply that] this is not [true

²⁴ NV 495,2–4: *tasya śarīrāder upalabdihikāraṇasyābhāvo 'pavarga iti / tasmāt sarva-duḥkhamokṣo 'pavargaḥ / yasmāt sarvaṃ duḥkhabījāṃ duḥkhaṃ cāpavarge vicchidyate tasmāt sarveṇa duḥkhena vimuktir apavargaḥ /*.

²⁵ *tadabhāvaś cāpavarge /*.

²⁶ NBh 279,11: *tasya buddhinimittāśrayasya śarīrendriyasya dharmādharmābhāvād abhāvo 'pavarge /*.

²⁷ NBh 279,13–15: *tasmāt sarvaduḥkhavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ / yasmāt sarvaduḥkhabījaṃ sarvaduḥkhāyatanam cāpavarge vicchidyate tasmāt sarveṇa duḥkhena vimuktir apavargaḥ / na nirbijaṃ nirāyatanam ca duḥkham utpadyata iti /*.

²⁸ According to NVT 203,11 (*devamanuṣyādijātir gatis tatrotpattih*).

either,] because [the non-arising of the series] is impossible: the non-arising of the series cannot be produced, because the series consists of a stream of entities [existing] as causes and effects [that must go on producing new effects and causes, etc.]. If [the Buddhist opponent replies] that what is produced is the non-arising of [thoughts that] have not appeared yet, [then] since the non-production of [thoughts that] have not appeared yet is [already] present [for the very reason that they have not been produced yet], what could be produced [in liberation]? Therefore the release of [mere] thought is absolutely unestablished.²⁹

3.1.3. *Vaiśeṣika*

The case of the *Vaiśeṣika* is somewhat obscure, as one of the vexed problems with respect to the history of this system regards the actual antiquity of its soteriological aspects. Thus modern scholarship has often presented the passages in the *VSū* related to *yoga* and liberation as later additions to an original text exclusively devoted to a physico-ontological enquiry. This is, for instance, Faddegon's opinion:

It is not the wish to discriminate soul from that which is not soul, ego from non-ego, as conceived by later scholiasts, but it is the theoretical desire for a correct classification and system of definition which has been the starting-point of the *Vaiśeṣika* system.³⁰

Several other scholars have more or less adopted this opinion,³¹ among whom Frauwallner, who has argued in particular that the sentence "Now, from here we shall explain *dharma*" (*athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyā-*

²⁹ NV 83,5–12: *cittaṃ vimucyata ity anye / rāgādīnāṃ tatra sāmāthyād yasmād rāgādivaśaṃ cittam ālambanānantaragatyantareṣūtpadyate / na punar ātmani rāgādīnāṃ sāmāthyam iti / na / ayatnatas tatsiddheḥ / ye cittasyānutpādanaṃ nirodhaṃ cāpavargam icchanti teṣāṃ ayatnasiddho mokṣaḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam / janmano vināśārthatvāt / jātaṃ vinaśyatīty ayatnena siddham etat / santater anutpādo 'pavarga iti cet / na / tasyāśakyatvāt / santater anutpādo na śakyaḥ kartum / kāryakāraṇabhāvavapravāhasya santatibhāvāt / anāgatānutpādaḥ kriyata iti cet / anāgatānutpādasya vidyamānatvāt kiṃ kriyata iti sarvathā na cittasyāpavargaḥ sidhyatīti /*

³⁰ Faddegon 1969: 12.

³¹ See Ui 1917: 73–74, Frauwallner 1956: 90, Halbfass 1991: 314–315 and 311, Wezler 1982: 647 and Wezler 1983: 57. For a synthetic presentation of these scholars' respective positions, see Houben 1994: 712–721.

syāmah) at the beginning of the VSū must have been a later addition probably dating from Praśastapāda's time.³² Engaging in a detailed examination of the complicated issue of the historical development of the Vaiśeṣika's soteriological aspects is of course far beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say here that, as noted by Halbfass and Houben, the passage suspected by Frauwallner was already quoted by Bhartṛhari in this form,³³ and that several scholars have convincingly argued that, as Houben puts it, "the Vaiśeṣika's concern with liberation was [...] original in the system as it arose in a context in which Jainism and Buddhism were challenging the Brahmanic society," and that "the sixth chapter (dealing with Vedas, *dharma* and liberation) formed the very heart of the system."³⁴

With respect to this Vaiśeṣika view of liberation, it is worth noting here that the VSū too considers that "desire comes from pleasure,"³⁵ that this desire is "due to [the] craving"³⁶ that arises from the experience of pleasure as well as "from the unseen [force]"³⁷ of merit and demerit, and that the "activity" resulting from it, which binds the individual in *saṃsāra*³⁸ because it produces merit and demerit in turn, "presupposes desire (*icchā*) and aversion, [whether it is aimed] at merit or demerit."³⁹ Candrānanda, commenting on VSū 6.2.18, "from this [arise] contact and separation,"⁴⁰ explains:

When merit and demerit have accumulated, then there is a contact [of the self] with the body and sense organs called birth. And when they have been exhausted, at the time of death there is a separation. But again, through merit

³² See Frauwallner 1956: 339, n. 387, and Frauwallner 1984.

³³ See Halbfass 1986: 857 and Houben 1994: 717–719.

³⁴ Houben 1994: 732; see also, e.g., Biarreau 1964: 242–243, fn. 3 (cf. Biarreau 1968: 111), Bronkhorst 1993a and Isaacson 1993 (which focuses on the antiquity of yogic perception in early Vaiśeṣika).

³⁵ VSū 6.2.12: *sukhād rāgaḥ* /.

³⁶ VSū 6.2.14: *tr̥pteḥ* /.

³⁷ VSū 6.2.15: *adr̥ṣṭāt* /.

³⁸ On the binding role of effort/activity in the Vaiśeṣika, see, e.g., Bronkhorst 1986: 55.

³⁹ VSū 6.2.17: *icchādvēṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ* /.

⁴⁰ VSū 6.2.18: *tataḥ saṃyogo vibhāgaś ca* /.

and demerit, there is [another] contact with [another] body and [other sense organs] and [then] a separation [from them]: thus this beginningless living being keeps coming back, just as the buckets of a well [that keep being emptied and filled again].⁴¹

Similarly, Bhāviveka describes in the following way the Vaiśeṣika view of bondage:

By acting for what are characterized thus as *dharma* and *adharma*, there arise pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), and attachment [to the former] and aversion [from the latter]. Being affected by these [attachment and aversion], man is born again [in another world] as in this world and undergoes transmigration.⁴²

However, according to Bhāviveka, the Vaiśeṣikas consider that liberation can be achieved through the realization that the self is distinct from the body, sense organs and mental organ, a realization thanks to which one achieves detachment from them:

When the soul (*ātman*), which is different from body (*śarīra*), sense organs (*indriya*) and mind (*manas*) is perceived, pleasure [or pain, which causes attachment or aversion] does not arise, and by the complete abandonment of the causes (*sādhana*), the future [*dharma* and *adharma*] also will not ensue. The accumulated [*dharma* and *adharma*] are also discarded. On apprehending the true nature of the body, man will not begin to form attachment to it. When man definitely apprehends the real soul and firmly understands the true nature of the six *padārthas*, *dharma* [and *adharma*] also become extinct. On this point it is affirmatively stated as follows: “By completely abandoning the body and the false notions formed by the mind, one attains the pure, perfect deliverance. [This state is] just like fire whose fuel is burnt up.”⁴³

⁴¹ VSV 51,1–3: *sañcitau yadā dharmādharmāu bhavatas tadā śarīrendriyaiḥ saṃyogo janmākhyo bhavati / kṣīṇayoś ca tayor maraṇakāle viyogaḥ / punar apy ābhyāṃ dharmādharmābhyāṃ śarīrādīsaṃyogo vibhāgaś cety evam anādir ayaṃ ghaṭī-yantravad āvartate jantuh /*.

⁴² TJ D243b6–7/P274a5–6 (as edited in Hattori 1994: 703): *de lta bu'i chos dan chos ma yin pa'i mtshan ñid la 'jug pa las bde ba dan sdug bsñal yin la / de dag la chags pa dan sdañ pa'o // des byas pas 'di ltañ skye žiñ 'khor bar 'gyur te //*. Translation Hattori 1994: 705.

⁴³ TJ D244a3–5/P274b2–5 (as edited in Hattori 1994: 703): *gal te chos dan chos ma yin pa med par ji ltañ 'gyur ze na / ma 'oñs pa mi 'byuñ žiñ bsags pa 'gog pa ste / de la*

As noted by Hattori,⁴⁴ the above-mentioned passage bears close resemblances to Praśastapāda's PDhS:

However, when someone, thanks to his activity preceded by knowledge [and performed] without desiring a [particular] result, is born in a virtuous family and wishes to know the means of getting rid of pain, he approaches a master [and thus] receives the right knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) of the six [Vaiśeṣika] categories; upon the cessation of ignorance, he becomes detached (*virakta*). Because [he] no [longer] has desire, aversion, etc., merit and demerit, which are born from these, no [longer] arise, and the previously accumulated [merit and demerit] cease due to the experience [that is their retribution]. And having brought about satisfaction and pleasure [and] the separation from the body, since desire, etc., have ceased, only a merit consisting in the cessation [of activity] remains while producing a pleasure born from the perception of the ultimate reality. Then, [since this] self is devoid of seeds due to [their] annihilation, it ceases to be endowed with a body, etc. When the body, etc., no longer arise, there is liberation [i.e.] a cessation (*upaśama*) similar to [that of] a fire the fuel of which has been burnt.⁴⁵

Liberation (once more) involves the separation of the self from what is not the self. This separation can be obtained, at least partially and/or momentarily, in yogic states (where, "due to a particular contact of the self and mental organ in the self, there is a perception of the self"⁴⁶)

lus dan / dbaṅ po dan / yid las tha dad pa'i bdag mthoṅ ba na dge ba skye bar mi 'gyur la / de sgrub par byed pa yoṅs su spaṅs pas ma 'oṅs pa yaṅ mi skye ba ste / bsags pa 'gog pa yaṅ lus kyi de kho na ṅid la rtogs par byed pa na chags par mi rtsom pa'o // don dam pa'i bdag ṅes par rtogs ṣiṅ tshig gi don drug gi de kho na ṅid ṅes par ṣes pa na / chos kyaṅ med par 'gyur ba yin te / 'dir lus dan yid kyi rnam rtog ni // thams cad spaṅs nas dri med pa'i // yoṅs su 'da' bar de 'gro ste // ṣiṅ zad pa yi me bzīn no //. Translation Hattori 1994: 705–706.

⁴⁴ Hattori 1994: 706.

⁴⁵ PDhS 66,2–10: *jñānapūrvakāt tu kṛtād asaṅkalpitaphalād viśuddhe kule jātasya duḥkhavigamo pāyajijñāsor ācāryam upasaṅgamyotpannaṣaṭpadārthatattvajñāna-syājñānanivṛttau viraktasya rāga dveṣādyabhāvāt tajjayor dharmādharmayor anut-pattau pūrvasañcitayoś copabhogān nirodhe santoṣasukhaṃ śarīraparicchedaṃ cot-pādyā rāgādinivṛttau nivṛttilakṣaṇaḥ kevalo dharmāḥ paramārthadarśanaṃ su-khaṃ kṛtvā nivartate / tadā nirodhān nirbījasyātmanaḥ śarīrādinivṛttiḥ / punaḥ-śarīrādyanutpattau dagdhendhanānalavad upaśamo mokṣa iti /*. Translation (modified) Bronkhorst 1986: 56–57.

⁴⁶ VSū 9.13: *ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam /*.

and becomes definitive at death when all karmic residues have disappeared:

Pleasure and pain are due to the contact between the self, a sense organ, the internal organ and an object. When there is no production of this [contact] since the internal organ remains within the self, the absence of pleasure and pain for the embodied [self] is *yoga*.⁴⁷ [...] Liberation is the absence of contact whereas the [unseen force] no [longer] exists, [and] the non-manifestation [of a new body].⁴⁸

Dharmakīrti's non-Buddhist opponents – whether Sāṅkhya, Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika – thus consider that liberation consists in getting rid of what we wrongly take to be the self or to belong to it in some essential way. As for Dharmakīrti, he sets out to show that on the contrary, liberation can only consist in getting rid of the self itself, since the wrong belief in the existence of a permanent subjective entity is the root cause of pain and transmigration.

3.2. DHARMAKĪRTI'S MAIN TARGET: THE NYĀYA'S SOTERIOLOGY

Dharmakīrti criticizes in passing the Sāṅkhya view on liberation, but obviously this is not his main target. Dharmakīrti's commentators often ascribe the position of the main opponent in these stanzas to someone belonging to the so-called Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (as modern scholarship usually designates it), or more precisely, to the "Vaiśeṣika, etc." (*vaiśeṣikādī*), i.e., to a doctrine admitted by both Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas share many views on liberation, so that it is often difficult to determine whether a stanza is specifically aimed at one of them only. However, it seems to us that Vetter is right to consider that on the whole, Dharmakīrti's main opponent defends a Naiyāyika doctrine.⁴⁹

Thus, much like Pakṣilasvāmin or Uddyotakara, this opponent contends that the cause of *saṃsāra* is attachment to that which is wrongly

⁴⁷ VSū 5.2.16–17: *ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe tadanārambha ātma-
sthe manasi saśarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ* /. See Wezler 1982: 660–663
and Nozawa 1996: 928.

⁴⁸ VSū 5.2.20: *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ* /.

⁴⁹ Vetter 1990: 120, fn. 1.

considered to belong to the self and enables one to realize pleasure (*sukhasādhana*).⁵⁰ According to this opponent, while the self is free of defects (*nirdoṣa*), the attachment to these means of realizing pleasure is defective (*sadoṣa*) insofar as it is in fact the basis of pain.⁵¹ Due to it one craves (*tṛṣṇā-/paritṛṣṇāvat*) pleasure and thus clings (*upā√dā-*) to *saṃsāra*.⁵² Similarly, the Naiyāyikas consider that confusing the self with the impermanent elements that are means of realizing pleasure leads to a painful craving, which in turn leads to clinging to *saṃsāra*.⁵³

According to Dharmakīrti's opponent, liberation therefore consists in achieving a state (which once again closely resembles final release as described by the Naiyāyikas)⁵⁴ where the self is isolated (*kevala*, *vinā*)⁵⁵ from all the elements wrongly attributed to the self,⁵⁶ and as a

⁵⁰ On the role of attachment to *sukhasādhana*s in bondage according to Dharmakīrti's opponent, see PVV 87,19–21 (quoted below, fn. 82–83, p. 208), PVV 89,2 (quoted below, fn. 111, p. 216), PVP D99a1/P114a4–5 and PVT *Ñe* D140b4–5/P173b6–7 (quoted below, fn. 126, p. 220), PVV 89,24–25 (quoted below, fn. 131, p. 221), PVV 91,15–16 (quoted below, fn. 179, p. 233), PVV 92,16 (quoted below, fn. 212, p. 243), PVP 93,21–22 (quoted below, fn. 253, p. 253), PVP D108a7–b2/ P125b4–6 (quoted below, fn. 339, p. 273). Compare, e.g., with NBh 15,11–15 (quoted below, fn. 64, p. 202), NBh 245,9–14 (quoted below, fn. 74, p. 205), and NBh 247,3–11 (quoted below, fn. 78, p. 206).

⁵¹ See PV 2.224. On the opponent's definition of what is defective (*sadoṣa*) as the basis of pain see, e.g., PVP D104b5/P121a4 (quoted below, fn. 257, p. 253).

⁵² See, e.g., PVP D97b4/P112b4–5 (quoted below, fn. 110, p. 215).

⁵³ On this craving and the subsequent clinging (either to *saṃsāra* or to the objects that bind to *saṃsāra*) in Nyāya, see, e.g., NBh 245,9–14 (quoted below, fn. 74, p. 205), NBh 258,10–15 (quoted above, fn. 22, p. 193) and NV 59,18–60,6 (quoted below, fn. 73, p. 205).

⁵⁴ See below, §§3.3.2ff.

⁵⁵ See PV 2.225.

⁵⁶ According to PVP D98a2–3/P113a2–3 (see below, fn. 115, p. 217), Dharmakīrti's opponent has in mind “attachment, cognitions and sense organs, etc.” The Naiyāyikas consider that these elements are “the body, the sense organs, the mind, feelings and cognitions” (see NBh 258,10–15, quoted above, fn. 22, p. 193). Besides (*ātma*)*sneha*, *buddhi* and *indriya*, other factors appear in Prajñākaragupta's and Śākyabuddhi's commentaries: thus, the self is a cause of pain when accompanied (*sahāya*) by merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*) and residual traces (*saṃskāra*) in PVA 148,32–33; *dharma* and *adharma* recur in PVT *Ñe* D140a1–2/P172b7–8, together with effort (*rtsom*, *[*pra*]yatna). The Vaiśeṣikas present effort, merit, deme-

means to achieve this, he advocates the “cultivation of [the thought of] pain” (*duḥkhabhāvanā*).⁵⁷ By bringing to perception (*pratyakṣi*√*kṛ*-) the fact that everything is pain,⁵⁸ this cultivation leads to the knowledge of the defects (*doṣa*) that stain what we wrongly take to belong to the self⁵⁹ insofar as they are the cause of activity (*pravṛttinimitta*)⁶⁰ and therefore lead to pain. This cultivation of pain, in which one realizes that pleasure, like poisoned food, is essentially mixed with pain,⁶¹ is aimed at cutting off (**vyavaccheda*?)⁶² our belief that the elements wrongly attributed to the self are endowed with good qualities⁶³ and thus supposedly induces a state of complete detachment that leads to liberation from *saṃsāra*.

As far as we know, such a cultivation was not prescribed in the Vaiśeṣika that Dharmakīrti may have known, but Naiyāyikas such as Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara do contend that in order to achieve detachment and therefore liberation, one should cultivate (the thought of) pain with respect to rebirth and the means to obtain pleasure. In other words, according to them, one should concentrate on the thought

rit or residual traces as adventitious qualities of the self (see, e.g., PDhS 16,9–10, quoted below, fn. 180, p. 233). On *dharma* and *adharma* as causes of pain and bondage in the Nyāya, see above, fn. 26, p. 194, and below, fn. 73, p. 205. On the role of activity (*pravṛtti*) in bondage according to the Naiyāyikas, see, e.g., NSū 1.1.2, quoted above, fn. 19, p. 192, NBh 219,11–13, quoted above, fn. 71, p. 204, and fn. 225, p. 246, below.

⁵⁷ See in particular PV 2.226–227, 229, 238–239, 245–246, 249, 253–254 and their commentaries. Here the term “thought” between brackets translates the word *sañ-jñā* found in the compound *duḥkhasañjñābhāvana/duḥkhasañjñābhāvanā* used by Pakṣilasvāmin (see, e.g., NBh 247,3–11, quoted below, fn. 78, p. 206, and NBh 247,3, quoted below, fn. 76, p. 206; see also, for *duḥkhasañjñā*, NBh 245,9–14, quoted below, fn. 74, p. 205). Note, however, that Devendrabuddhi uses the expression **duḥ-khākārabhāvanā*, “the cultivation of the aspect of pain” (see PVP D108b2–3/P125b6–8, quoted below, fn. 340, p. 274).

⁵⁸ See PV 2.238.

⁵⁹ See PV 2.236.

⁶⁰ See PVT *Ñe* D102b5–7/P118b6–8, quoted below, fn. 224, p. 246.

⁶¹ See PV 2.231 and PVV 90,20–21 (quoted below, fn. 163, p. 229), PVP D100b6/P116a8 (quoted below, fn. 172, p. 231), PVV 89,22–23 (quoted below, fn. 173, p. 231).

⁶² PVP D106a2–3/P122b6–7 (quoted below, fn. 283, p. 259).

⁶³ See PV 2.245.

that these are intermingled with pain. While explaining why pleasure has been omitted from the list of objects of knowledge enumerated in NSū 1.1.9, Pakṣilasvāmin thus states:

[The mention of] “pain” [without that of pleasure] is not a denial of the awareness of pleasure [i.e., of that] which is experienced as pleasant; rather, what is taught [by this] is the cultivation [consisting of a mental] concentration (*samādhībhāvana*) [on the fact that re-]birth itself, along with the means of obtaining pleasure, is pain, because it is intermingled with pain, since it is [never] free of pain, [and] since it is endowed with various torments. It is [a cultivation consisting of a mental concentration, i.e.,] one cultivates it while being concentrated; [and] by cultivating it one becomes disgusted; [and he] who is disgusted [obtains] detachment; [and he] who is detached [obtains] liberation. Liberation is the annihilation of the series of births and deaths [and] the abandonment of all pain.⁶⁴

The cultivation of the thought of pain must lead to disgust (*nirveda*),⁶⁵ which in turn must lead to a detachment that brings about liberation:

That which is pervaded by this [torment], intermingled with it, which exists without being apart from it, is [called] pain due to [its] association with pain. He who sees that everything is [thus] pervaded with pain, wishing to get rid of pain [and] seeing pain in [re-]birth, is disgusted; being disgusted, he is detached; being detached, he is liberated.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ NBh 15,11–15: *duḥkham iti nedam anukūlavedanīyasya sukhasya pratīteḥ pratyā-khyānam / kiṃ tarhi janmana evedaṃ sasukhasāadhanasya duḥkhānuṣaṅgād duḥkhenāviprayogād vividhabāadhanāyogād duḥkham iti samādhībhāvanam upadiśyate / samāhito bhāvayati / bhāvayan nirvedyate / nirviṇṇasya vairāgyam / viraktasyāpavarga iti / janmamaraṇaprabandhocchedaḥ sarvaduḥkhoprahāṇam apavarga iti /*

⁶⁵ See NBh 15,11–15 (quoted above, fn. 64). On the cultivation of disgusting thoughts described in the commentaries ad NSū 4.2.3, see, e.g., Oberhammer 1984: 38ff., Oberhammer 1987 and Slaje 1995.

⁶⁶ NBh 21,11–13: *tayānuviddham anuṣaktam avinirbhāgena vartamānaṃ duḥkhaḥyogād duḥkham iti / so 'yaṃ sarvaṃ duḥkhenānuviddham iti paśyan duḥkhaṃ jihāsuri janmani duḥkhadarśī nirvidyate / nirviṇṇo virajyate / virakto vimucyate /*

This cultivation is meant to make obvious the various defects that arise from the confusion between the self and what it is not,⁶⁷ but also their causes, i.e., the various elements that are unduly confused with the self. Thus NSū 4.2.1 specifies that “through the right knowledge of the causes of defects, the sense of ego ceases,”⁶⁸ and the NBh explains:

The objects of knowledge [the varieties of which have been enumerated in NSū 1.1.9.] from the body, [sense-organs, objects of perception, cognitions, internal organ, activity, defects, rebirth,] up to pain, are the causes of defects insofar as wrong knowledge bears upon them. Therefore when the right knowledge which bears upon them arises, [it] makes the sense of ego cease, because it is contradictory that these two [i.e., this right knowledge and the sense of ego,] may bear upon the same object.⁶⁹

The knowledge of the defects’ causes allegedly brings about liberation because the various defects are the causes of activity (*pravṛttinimitta*). Commenting on NSū 1.1.18 (according to which “the defects are characterized as prompting to act”),⁷⁰ Pakṣilasvāmin explains that as such they bind individuals to *saṃsāra*:

Because [the defects] have a common substratum with cognitions, they are qualities of the self; because they are the cause of activity and because they have the power of connecting [the present life] with a new birth, they are the causes of *saṃsāra*; because *saṃsāra* is beginningless, they occur in a beginningless series. Wrong knowledge ceases through right knowledge; when

⁶⁷ See NBh 7,12–14 (quoted above, fn. 23, p. 193) and NBh 7,1–2: *etasmān mithyājñānād anukūleṣv artheṣu rāgaḥ pratikūleṣu ca dveṣaḥ / rāgadveṣād hikārāc cāsatyer-śyāsūyāmānalobhādayo doṣā bhavanti* /. “From this wrong knowledge [arise] desire for things that are favourable [to the self’s pleasure] and aversion for those that are adverse [to it]. And because desire and aversion are at the head [of all the other defects, in turn,] defects such as untruthfulness, envy, jealousy, [self-]conceit or cupidity occur.” NSū 4.1.3 distinguishes three sorts of such defects: *tat trairāśyaṃ rāgadveṣamohārthāntarabhāvāt* /. “This [multitude of defects] is [divided] into three groups, because desire, aversion and delusion are distinct things.”

⁶⁸ *doṣanimittānāṃ tattvajñānād ahaṅkāranivṛttiḥ* /.

⁶⁹ NBh 259,6–7: *śarīrādiduḥkhāntaṃ prameyaṃ doṣanimittaṃ tadviśayatvān mithyājñānasya / tad idaṃ tattvajñānaṃ tadviśayam utpannam ahaṅkāraṃ nivartayati / samānaviṣaye tayor virodhāt* /.

⁷⁰ *pravartanālakṣaṇā doṣāḥ* /.

wrong knowledge ceases, the series of desire and aversion is cut off; this is liberation.⁷¹

Upon seeing defects and action as the cause of pain, someone who practices the cultivation of the thought of pain gets rid of pain and thus gets liberated:

On the other hand, he who sees pain, the basis of pain and pleasure [which is always] intermingled with pain [i.e., he who sees] that all of this is pain, thoroughly knows pain; and pain, [when] thoroughly known, is abandoned, because it is no [more] clung upon to, just as poisoned food. In the same way, [he who knows pain] sees defects and action as the cause of pain; and as long as the defects have not been abandoned, the annihilation of the series of pains cannot occur; therefore he abandons the defects. And once defects have been abandoned, activity does not lead to the connection [to a new birth] for [someone] who has abandoned defilements, as has been said [in NSū 4.1.34].⁷²

Cultivating the thought of pain therefore brings about the power to cut off (*vicchid-*) any craving, as Uddyotakara specifies:

[He] who cultivates [the thought that] everything is pain has the thought of non-attachment (*anabhiratī*) with respect to the three worlds. And for [him] who dwells (*upāsīna*) in this [thought], the craving regarding the three worlds is cut off. What [we] call craving is one's longing for rebirth. He who cultivates [the thought] that everything is pain does not have this [craving]; for nobody longs for pain. Since [he] has abandoned [this] craving, he no [longer] clings to these [things] which are instrumental in rebirth. Because [he] does not cling to them, merit and demerit that have not yet arisen no [longer] occur; as for the merit and demerit that have already arisen, they are

⁷¹ NBh 219,11–13: *buddhisamānāśrayatvād ātmaguṇāḥ / pravṛtтиhetutvāt punarbhavapṛatisandhānasāmarthyāc ca saṃsārahetavaḥ / saṃsārasyānāditvād anādinā prabandhena pravartante / mithyājñānanivṛttis tattvajñānāt / mithyājñānanivṛttau rāga dveṣa prabandhavicchedo 'pavarga iti /*.

⁷² NBh 258,15–20: *yaś tu duḥkhaṃ duḥkhāyatanaṃ duḥkhānuṣaktaṃ sukhaṃ ca sarvaṃ idaṃ duḥkhaṃ iti paśyati sa duḥkhaṃ parijānāti / parijñātaṃ ca duḥkhaṃ prahīṇaṃ bhavaty anupādānāt saviśānnavat / evaṃ doṣān karma ca duḥkhaḥ eti paśyati / na cāprahīṇeṣu doṣeṣu duḥkha prabandhacchedena śakyam bhavitum iti sa doṣān prajāhāti / prahīṇeṣu ca doṣeṣu na pravṛtтиḥ pṛatisandhānāya hīnakleśasyety uktam /*.

exhausted through [his] experiences. Because of the annihilation of the seed of *saṃsāra* that is merit and demerit, he is liberated, i.e., he is not born again.⁷³

Here, Uddyotakara seems to have in mind another passage from Pakṣilasvāmin's NBh:

Thus, for [someone] who sees that every locus of the arising [of the body, sense organs and cognitions] is intermingled with various torments, the thought of pain is firmly established with respect to both pleasure and the means of obtaining pleasure[, namely] the body, sense organs and cognitions. And because of this firm establishment of the thought of pain, [this individual] has the thought of non-attachment with respect to all worlds. [And] for [him] who dwells in this thought of non-attachment with respect to all worlds, the craving regarding all worlds is cut off. Because of the abandonment of craving, he is freed from all pain, just as [someone] who understands that milk is poison because of [its] having poison [in it] does not cling to [milk, and] not clinging [to it], does not suffer the pain of death.⁷⁴

The cultivation of the thought of pain is thus presented as the antidote (*pratipakṣa*) to pleasure, which for its part is compared to poisoned food.⁷⁵ Pakṣilasvāmin, while commenting on NSū 4.1.58 (which he

⁷³ NV 59,20–60,5: *sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ bhāvayatas trailokyē 'syānabhiratisañjñā bhavati / tāṃ copāsīnasya trailokyaviṣayā tṛṣṇā vicchidyate / tṛṣṇā nāma punarbhava-prārthanā / sāśya sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ iti bhāvayato na bhavati / na hi kaścid duḥkhaṃ prārthayate / tṛṣṇāprahāṇād yāni punarbhavasādhanaṇi / tāni nopādatte / tadānupādānād anāgatau dharmādharmāu na bhavataḥ / yāv apy utpannau dharmādharmāu tāv apy upabhogāt prakṣayaṃ gacchataḥ / so 'yaṃ dharmādharmalakṣaṇasya saṃsārabhijasyocchedād apavṛjyate na punar jāyate iti /*

⁷⁴ NBh 245,9–14: *evaṃ sarvaṃ utpattisthānaṃ vividhabādhanaṇaṇuṣaktam paśyataḥ sukhe ca sukhasādhaneṣu ca śarīrendriyabuddhiṣu duḥkhasañjñā vyavatiṣṭhate / duḥkhasañjñāvyavasthānāc ca sarvalokeṣv anabhiratisañjñā bhavati / sarvalokeṣv anabhiratisañjñāṃ upāsīnasya sarvalokaviṣayā tṛṣṇā vicchidyate / tṛṣṇāprahāṇāt sarva-duḥkhā vimucyate iti / yathā viṣayogāt payo viṣam iti budhyamāno nopādatte / anupādādāno maraṇaduḥkhaṃ nāpnotīti /*

⁷⁵ For occurrences of the comparison of food poison in Nyāya texts besides NBh 245,9–14 and NBh 247,3–11 (quoted below, fn. 78, p. 206), see NBh 258,15–20 (quoted above, fn. 71, p. 204); see also, e.g., NBh 8,2–3: *tad yathā madhuviṣasampraktam annam anādeyam evaṃ sukhaṃ duḥkhānuṣaktam anādeyam iti /* "Therefore, just as food mixed with honey and poison is to be avoided, in the same way, pleasure, which is intermingled with pain, is to be avoided."

takes to prescribe the cultivation of the thought of pain),⁷⁶ further explains:

And indeed, this [individual] firmly established in the consciousness of pleasure [wrongly] believes pleasure to be the highest human goal[, thinking]: “There is no higher good besides pleasure; when pleasure is obtained, the goal is attained, what was to be done is done.” Because of a wrong conception, he is attached (*saṃrajjate*) to pleasure and the objects that are means of obtaining it. Being attached (*saṃrakta*), he attempts [to obtain] pleasure. [And] for this [individual thus] attempting [to obtain pleasure] arises a pain of various kinds that is the cause of [re-]birth, old age, disease, death, the contact with undesirable [things], the separation from desirable [things], and the non-occurrence of the [things he] longs for; [and] he wrongly believes all this variety of pain to be pleasure. Pain involves (*aṅga*) pleasure: without getting pain, one cannot obtain pleasure. He whose intelligence is troubled by the thought of pleasure, [thinking about pain]: “This is [all] pleasure because it is aimed at [bringing about pleasure],” does not escape *saṃsāra* since he runs [through it like the tiny creatures ceaselessly revolving in the state described in the scriptures as] “Be born! Die!” (*jāyasva mriyasva*).⁷⁷ Therefore [the NSū] teaches the antidote (*pratipakṣa*) to this thought of pleasure, [namely] the cultivation of the thought of pain.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ NSū 4.1.58 states *duḥkhavikalpe sukhābhimānāc ca* /. “And because one wrongly believes the variety of pain to be pleasure.” According to NBh 247,3, the following should be supplied: *duḥkhasañjñābhāvanopadeśaḥ kriyate*, “[we] teach the cultivation of the thought of pain.”

⁷⁷ See ChU 5.10.8: *athaitayoḥ pathor na kataraṇacana tānīmāni kṣudrāṇy asakṛd āvar-tīni bhūtāni bhavanti jāyasva mriyasveti / etat tṛtīyaṃ sthānam* /. “Then there are those proceeding on neither of these two paths – they become the tiny creatures revolving ceaselessly. ‘Be born! Die!’ – that is a third state.” Translation Olivelle 1998:237.

⁷⁸ NBh 247,3–11: *ayaṃ ca khalu sukhasaṃvedane vyavasthitaḥ sukhaṃ paramapurur-ṣārthaṃ manyate / na sukhād anyan niḥśreyasam asti / sukhe prāpte caritārthaḥ kṛtakaraṇīyo bhavatīti / mithyāsaṅkalpāt sukhe tatsādhanēsu ca viṣayeṣu saṃrajj-yate / saṃraktaḥ sukhāya ghaṭate / ghaṭamānasyāsyā janmajarāvyādhiprāyaṇāniṣ-ṭasamprayogeṣṭaviprayogaprārthitānupapattinimittam anekavidhaṃ yāvad duḥ-kham utpadyate / tad duḥkhavikalpaṃ sukham ity abhimanyate / sukhāṅgabhūtaṃ duḥkham / na duḥkham anāsādyā śakyaṃ sukham avāptum / tādarthiyāt sukham evedam iti sukhasañjñāpahataprajñā jāyasva mriyasveti sandhāvātīti saṃsāraṃ*

Uddyotakara too explains:

And he who wrongly believes that the variety of pain accruing to [someone] who makes efforts so as to obtain pleasure is pleasure because it is a cause of pleasure clings to it again [and again]. He does not escape *saṃsāra* [i.e.,] he is born again and again. The antidote to this thought of pleasure is taught [here – namely, the thought that] everything is pain.⁷⁹

Dharmakīrti devotes a great part of the stanzas translated below to criticizing the Naiyāyikas' understanding of *duḥkhabhāvanā* and to distinguishing it from the Buddhist understanding of *duḥkhabhāvanā*. This fact is worth noting, because the reason why Dharmakīrti primarily targets Naiyāyikas in this debate may well be the (at least apparent) proximity of the Nyāya's soteriology with that of Buddhism. For although the Naiyāyikas claim that liberation is a process of discrimination and isolation of the self from what it is not, and although they criticize the Buddhist view that no self is liberated, their soteriological categories resemble very much the Buddhist ones. Similarities are particularly obvious in, e.g., the meditation on the thought of pain, but also in meditations aimed at provoking disgust, the notion of right knowledge as an antidote to bondage, the three types of defects, concepts that are analogous to the Buddhists' *bhava*- and *vibhava-tṛṣṇā*, similarities with certain sequences of *pratītyasamutpāda*, reinterpretation of the Buddhists' four wrong notions, etc.⁸⁰ As already noted by several modern scholars, in all probability these resemblances are due to the fact that the Nyāya's soteriology was influenced by that of Buddhism through the intermediary of the YSū and YBh.⁸¹ These borrowings

nātivartate / tad asyāḥ sukhasañjñāyāḥ pratipakṣo duḥkhasañjñābhāvanam upadiśyate /.

⁷⁹ NV 463,17–464,2: *yaś ca sukhārthaṃ yatamānasya duḥkhavikalpo bhavati taṃ sukhāṅgabhāvāt sukham ity abhimanyamānaḥ punas tad upādatte / punaḥ punar jāyata iti na saṃsāram ativartate / tasyāḥ sukhasañjñāyāḥ pratipakṣa upadeśo 'yaṃ kriyate sarvaṃ duḥkham iti /.*

⁸⁰ See, e.g., Faddegon 1969: 352, Vetter 1990: 127, fn. 1 (which suggests in particular that the Nyāya's method of the cultivation of the thought of pain was borrowed from Buddhism) and Halbfass 1997: 160 and 163, n. 37.

⁸¹ On the influence of the YSū and YBh on the NBh, see, e.g., Oberhammer 1964: 312–315. On the absorption of Buddhist soteriological aspects within the YSū and YBh see, e.g., La Vallée Poussin 1937, Wezler 1987: 375–378 and Bronkhorst 1994. On

might be the reason why Dharmakīrti is so eager to present the Naiyāyikas' soteriological doctrine as a sort of misunderstanding of the Buddhist doctrine of salvation – a misunderstanding that, according to him, stems from the belief in the self's existence to which the Naiyāyikas continue to cling.

3.3. TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY OF PV 2.220–256

3.3.1. *Dharmakīrti's Main Point: Detachment Presupposes Detachment from the Self (PV 2.220–225)*

As seen above, the Naiyāyikas hold that liberation consists in achieving a state of detachment where the self is entirely disconnected from the various means of realizing pleasure (such as our body or sense organs) that we wrongly take to belong to the self, whereas these means of realizing pleasure are only adventitiously associated to the self. Thus according to Manorathanandin, the debate between a proponent of the existence of the self (Ātmavādin) and a proponent of selflessness (Nairātmavādin) starts with this assertion from the Ātmavādin:

Objection: Even if [someone] has an attachment to the self, due to [his] detachment from what [supposedly] belongs to the self [and] is the means to realize pleasure, he is not entangled in *saṃsāra*.⁸²

Dharmakīrti's answer runs as follows:

(2.220) Of necessity, [someone] who is attached to the self is not detached (*virajyate*) from what [supposedly] belongs to the [self and is the means to realize pleasure].⁸³ And there is no cause [that would allow him] to eliminate

the hypothesis that Buddhism influenced the Nyāya soteriology through this absorption, see, e.g., Wezler 1984: 336, Oberhammer 1984: 38ff. and Slaje 1995: 121–122. As for the alternative possibility that the cause of these resemblances may lie in some other common source, see Oberhammer 1977: 210, fn. 287.

⁸² PVV 87,19–20: *yady apy ātmani snehavān tathāpy ātmīye sukhāsādhane vairāgyān na saṃsaratīti cet* /. To be compared with the nearly identical PVP D96a3/P110b8.

⁸³ According to PVP D96a4/P111a1 and PVV 87,21. Note PVT Ñe D139a2–3/P171b4–5: *bdag gi chags pa gañ yin pa de bdag tu chags pa dañ ldan pa dañ 'brel pa tsam gyis byas pa yin gyi rgyu lhag pa la ltos pa ni ma yin no // 'brel pa de yañ dus thams cad du khyad par med pa yin no źes bya bar dgoñs so* /. “Attachment to what [suppo-

[his] attachment to a self [regarded as] free from defects [i.e., free from suffering and absolutely devoid of affliction]^{84, 85}

From the very beginning of the discussion, Dharmakīrti states the gist of his critique of the Nyāya position: no one can achieve detachment from what supposedly belongs to the self without being detached from the self, and the Naiyāyika, by claiming that the self is free of defects (i.e., devoid of any of the aspects that bind us to suffering and *saṃsāra*), makes liberation an unattainable goal. Manorathanandin draws the consequence of this assertion:

Therefore how [could] liberation [be achieved] through a detachment that would regard [merely] what [supposedly] belongs to the self [and not the attachment to the self], since attachment to the self is contradictory to detachment from what [supposedly] belongs to the self?⁸⁶

The Naiyāyika claims that liberation consists in freeing ourselves from our attachment to various factors that we wrongly take to belong to the self; but Dharmakīrti points out that we cannot get rid of what we wrongly consider to belong to the self as long as we do not get rid of our attachment to the self itself.

(2.221a) Objection: [It is not the self but one's] attachment [to the self which] is defective [and should be eliminated].⁸⁷

The Ātmavādin objects that the self is not defective in itself, and that it is only the attachment to it that should be abandoned in order to reach liberation, as Devendrabuddhi explains:

sedly] belongs to the self is due merely to the relation to possessing attachment to the self, but does not depend on any additional cause. Now, this relation never differs. Such is the intention."

⁸⁴ According to PVP D96a6–7/P111a4–5 (*skyes bu de ni sdug bsñal dan bral ba dan gcig tu rnam par 'tshe ba med pa'i bdag 'dod pa yin pa de ltar na bdag la chags pa dan bral ba ñid ma yin no //*. Tib. *rnam par 'tshe ba* may render Skt. *viheṭhā* or *vihiṃsā*).

⁸⁵ PV 2.220: *niyamenātmani sniḥyaṃs tadīye na virajyate / na cāsty ātmani nirdoṣe snehāpagamakāraṇam /*. See Devendrabuddhi's formal application (*prayoga*) in PVP D96a7–b1/P111a5–7.

⁸⁶ PVV 87,22: *tat katham ātmīyavirāgān muktiḥ / ātmasnehasyātmīyavairāgyavirodhitvāt /*.

⁸⁷ PV 2.221a: *snehaḥ sadoṣa iti cet*.

The opponent thinks as follows: The self is free from defects, but [it is] the attachment to this [immaculate self that] is defective. [And] since [it is] defective, the wise ought to eliminate [it], as [one ought to eliminate] a finger bitten by a snake.⁸⁸

Manorathanandin similarly clarifies the Ātmavādin's position in the following way:

Even though the self is free from defects, the attachment to it is defective.⁸⁹

Here is Dharmakīrti's riposte:

(2.221b–222) [Dharmakīrti:] Then [i.e., since attachment is defective and hence ought to be eliminated,]⁹⁰ what [should be done]? [The Ātmavādin:] Get rid of it! [Dharmakīrti: But] it is impossible to get rid of this [attachment] if its object[, the self,]⁹¹ is [regarded as] unblemished (*adūṣita*). [And indeed,] the elimination of desire, aversion, etc.,⁹² which are related to [i.e., arise from one's seeing] good qualities and defects [in a certain object, can only be] due to [the fact that one] no [longer] sees these [good qualities and defects] in the object; but [this elimination can] not [take place according to] the method (*krama*) that [obtains] in the [case of] external [things].⁹³

⁸⁸ PVP D96b2–3/P111a7–8: *bdag ni ñes pa med pa ñid yin la / de la chags pa gañ yin pa de ñid ñes pa dañ ldan pa yin no // ñes pa dañ ldan pa ñid kyi phyir mkhas pa ñid kyis dor bar bya ba yin te / sbrul gyis zin pa'i sor mo bžin no źes de ltar gžan dag sems so //*. On the comparison with a finger bitten by a snake, see below, fn. 123, p. 219.

⁸⁹ PVV 88,1: *yady apy ātmā nirdoṣas tathāpi snehaḥ sadoṣa iti*.

⁹⁰ According to PVP D96b3/P111b1 (*ñes pa dañ bcas pa yin na* and *bdag tu chags pa skyon dañ ldan pa ñid yin pa'i phyir*) and PVV 88,1 (*tataḥ sadoṣatvāt*).

⁹¹ According to PVP D96b4/P111b2 (*bdag*) and PVV 88,4 (*ātmanī*).

⁹² According to PVP D96b7/P111b6, “etc.” includes jealousy (**īrṣyā*). For a definition of *īrṣyā*, see PVṬ Ñe D139a7/P172a3.

⁹³ PV 2.221b–222: *tataḥ kiṃ tasya varjanam / adūṣite 'sya viṣaye na śakyam tasya varjanam // prahāṇir icchādvēṣāder guṇadoṣānubandhināḥ / tayor adṛṣṭer^a viṣaye na tu bāhyeṣu yaḥ kramāḥ //*. [^a PV_{Miy} and PV_{PVV} read *adṛṣṭir*, whereas PV_{Miy(Tib)} reads, together with the PVP (passim), *ma mthoñ bas*.] This might be related to the commentators' explanation of *prahāṇi* as *prahāṇyupāya* (PVP D97a1/P111b7 and PVV 88,10–11). Understanding *prahāṇi* as *prahāṇyupāya* allows one to read *adṛṣṭiḥ* (“[The means for] eliminating [...] is [one's] failing to see [...]”), whereas understanding *prahāṇi* alone fits well the ablative *adṛṣṭeḥ*, indicating the means or cause

According to Dharmakīrti, if, as the Ātmavādin claims, it is only our attachment to the self that is defective while the self remains free of defects, then nothing can remove our attachment to the self. Manorathanandin (anticipating Dharmakīrti's own explanation in PV 2.223) specifies that we could get rid of attachment if attachment were merely due to our seeing positive qualities in the very fact of being attached: upon realizing that attachment is defective, we would cease to be attached. But we are attached to something insofar as we see good qualities in the thing to which we are attached. Therefore if the very object of our attachment, namely the self, is not considered to be defective, it is impossible to cease being attached to it:

Indeed, attachment is not clung to or abandoned due to its own good qualities and defects, but [due to those] of [its] object. Now, [according to you] this object[, the self] is free from defects; therefore how to get rid of [attachment to] it?⁹⁴

Seeing the self as free of defects in fact means attributing to it a positive quality, namely the property of really existing; and it is this attribution that prevents us from getting rid of our attachment to the self. Thus, while commenting on Devendrabuddhi,⁹⁵ Śākyabuddhi specifies that if the self is not regarded as defective, it is impossible to cease being attached to it, "because the attachment to the self only arises from

of this elimination. On the issue of *upāya*, note Śākyabuddhi's (PVT *Ñe* D139b1–2/P172a5–6) interesting explanation: *ma mthoñ ba tsam ni thabs su 'gyur ba ma yin te / med pa ni rgyu ma yin pa'i phyir ro // 'on kyañ yon tan ma mthoñ ba dañ skyon ma mthoñ bas 'dod chags dañ že sdañ mi skye ba de la go rim bžin du yon tan mthoñ ba ma yin pa dañ skyon mthoñ ba ma yin pa ñid ma yin par dgag pas mthoñ ba min pa'i sgras bśad pa yin no //*. "The mere absence of vision cannot be a means, for an absence is not a cause[, and this is the reason why the negation in *adrṣṭi* is not a categorical one (*prasajyapratishedha*)]. Rather, [it is] through the non-vision of good qualities and the non-vision of defects [that] desire and aversion no [longer] arise. Here, the word 'non-vision' expresses, by [way of] an affirmative negation (**paryudāsapratishedha*), the fact that one does not see good qualities and does not see defects, respectively."

⁹⁴ PVV 88,4–6: *na hi snehaḥ svaguṇadoṣābhyām upādīyate tyajyate vā / kiṃ tu viṣaya-sya / viṣayaś ca nirdoṣa iti katham asya varjanam /*.

⁹⁵ See PVP D96b4–5/P111b2–3.

the [false] view of the self as [really] existing.”⁹⁶ As a consequence, we cannot eliminate “desire, aversion, etc.,” or, as the Naiyāyikas put it, “desire, aversion and delusion (*moha*)” – which constitute the defects of the transmigrating individual⁹⁷ – as we could get rid of some unwanted thing that we would regard as external to us.⁹⁸

Indeed, Śrīdhara for instance claims that detachment from the means of realizing pleasure arises in the same way as our avoidance of ordinary unwanted things such as snakes or thorns, i.e., through a conscious effort to get rid of them caused by the realization that they are defective:

[We] see [that people] avoid objects such as snakes, thorns and so on through an effort that is a particular quality of the self [and consists in] an intentional avoidance which presupposes the perception of a particular defect [in them]. From this [we] understand [that] the definitive avoidance of the body and [other means of realizing pleasure] too has as its cause the particular quality of the self that is [an effort consisting in] an intentional avoidance which presupposes the perception of the defects in the [things to be avoided].⁹⁹

However, as Devendrabuddhi emphasizes, one cannot get rid of the attachment to the self as one gets rid of undesirable entities that do not belong to the mental sphere, since attachment of the self cannot be

⁹⁶ PVṬ Ñe D139a5/D171b8: *bdag tu chags pa ni bdag yod pa ñid du lta ba tsam las skyes pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir*.

⁹⁷ See above, fn. 67, p. 203, and 71, p. 204.

⁹⁸ According to Prajñākara Gupta, the phrase “but [this elimination can] not [take place according to] the method (*krāma*) that [obtains] in the [case of] external [things]” is a reply to the following: “Objection: But one [can] abandon something external, even though it is endowed with good qualities.” (PVA 148,19: *athāpi syāt / bāhyam vastu guṇavad api parityajyate* /.) However, as the other commentators emphasize, Dharmakīrti's main point here seems to be rather that we can get rid of an external thing just because we do not want it (*anicchā*), whereas we cannot get rid of our attachment to the self (however hard we may want to abandon this attachment) as long as we do not eliminate its cause, i.e., our belief in the self.

⁹⁹ NK 27,1–3: *dr̥ṣṭo viśayānām ahikaṇṭakādīnām parityāgo viśeṣadoṣadarśanapūrvakābhisandhikṛtanivartakātmaviśeṣaguṇāt prayatnāt / tena śarīrādīnām ātyantikah parityāgo 'pi taddoṣadarśanapūrvakābhisandhikṛtanivartakātmaviśeṣaguṇanimitto vijñāta iti* [...] /.

uprooted as long as one does not eliminate its cause, i.e., the belief in the self's very existence:

When one has caught [something] undesirable like a thorn, one eliminates it [by removing it and putting it] elsewhere, but it is not so with mental qualities (**manoguṇa*) [such as desire and aversion]. Therefore, how [can] attachment to the self (**ātmābhiṣvaṅga?*), which comes from [one's] seeing the self as [really] existing, [be] eliminated as long as it has not been [clearly] established that [its] cause (**nimitta*), the [false] view of self, no [longer] exists?¹⁰⁰

Manorathanandin too explains that while we can abandon some external thing just because we do not want it, we cannot get rid of our attachment to the self as long as the very cause of this attachment, i.e., the wrong notion that the self exists, is complete (*avikala*), i.e., as long as the conditions for the production of its effect remain intact:

However, [it is] not [the case that] the method [employed] with respect to external things, viz. eliminating [them] just because [we] do not want [them] (*anicchā*), can also be employed with respect to internal [factors] such as attachment. [For] it is possible to eliminate [something] external that is [in turn] dependent on [some] external [factor just] because [we] do not want it, but it is not possible to uproot [attachment, etc.,] which are dependent on the [false] view of a self, just because we do not want it, since [attachment] arises because [its] cause, the false view of a self, is complete.¹⁰¹

Dharmakīrti goes on:

(2.223) [And] indeed, attachment is not due to the good qualities [seen in] attachment [itself]; rather, [it is due] to [one's] seeing good qualities in the ob-

¹⁰⁰ PVP D97a2-3/P112a1-2: *tsher ma la sogs pa mñon par mi 'dod pa gañ yin pa de phyuñ nas g'zan du 'dor bar byed pa de ltar yid kyi yon tan rnams ni ma yin no // de bas na bdag yod pa ñid du lta ba'i sgo nas 'oñs pa'i bdag tu mñon par chags pa ni ji srid bdag tu mthoñ ba'i rgyu mtshan med par^a ma grub pa de srid du gañ las spañs pa yin /*. ^a Taking PV 2.223 and PVV 88,15-17 (quoted below, fn. 101) into consideration, one is tempted to read *rgyu ma tshañ (ba) med par* instead of *rgyu mtshan med par*, i.e., "as long as it is not established that its cause, the [false] view of a self, is no [longer] complete."

¹⁰¹ PVV 88,15-17: *na tu bāhyeṣu vastuṣu yaḥ kramo 'nicchāmātrakṛtyāgarūpaḥ sa āntareṣv api snehādiṣu yuktaḥ / bāhyādhīnaṃ bāhyam anicchayā tyaktuṃ śakyam / ātmadarśanādhīnaṃ tu na śakyaparihāram / avikalahetutvenotpatteḥ /*

ject [of attachment. Now] if this cause is complete, what [will] prevent [its] effect [viz. attachment to the self, from arising]?¹⁰²

According to Dharmakīrti, attachment does not grow from our seeing positive qualities in attachment itself, but rather, from our seeing good qualities in the object of our attachment. As Devendrabuddhi points out, this means that we cannot put an end to attachment just because we see the defects of being attached:

If attachment [simply] arose due to seeing good qualities in attachment to the self, then this [attachment] could cease to exist due to seeing defects in it. [But this is not the case.]¹⁰³

Dharmakīrti further argues that attachment to the self cannot be eliminated as long as its cause is complete, and Manorathanandin explains that this cause is “the good quality [that we see] in the object [of our attachment].”¹⁰⁴ Devendrabuddhi specifies that the quality thus attributed to the self is its mere existence:

The cause of [one’s] seeing good qualities in the attachment to the self is simply that one sees the self as [really] existing. [Now,] this [cause] is complete.¹⁰⁵

As long as the cause of our attachment to the self remains intact, this attachment cannot be eliminated. However, the Ātmavādin has stated earlier that the attachment to the self is defective, and Dharmakīrti is now about to ask him a question that Devendrabuddhi introduces in the following way:

¹⁰² PV 2.223: *na hi snehaguṇāt snehaḥ kiṃ tv arthaguṇadarśanāt / kārāṇe ’vikale tasmin kāryaṃ kena nivāryate //*.

¹⁰³ PVP D97a5/P112a4–5: *gal te bdag tu chags pa la yon tan du lta ba las chags pa skye bar ’gyur ba de’i tshes par mthoñ ba las de med par ’gyur na*. The sentence is an introduction to PV 2.223. Manorathanandin (PVV 88,18) simply introduces Dharmakīrti’s verse with *kiṃ ca*. As for Prajñākaragupta (PVA 148,26), he holds PV 2.223 to provide a summary (*saṅgraha*) of what precedes.

¹⁰⁴ PVV 88,22: *kārāṇe ’vikale tasmin viṣayaguṇe*.

¹⁰⁵ PVP D97a6/P112a5–6: *bdag la chags pa’i yon tan mthoñ ba’i rgyu mtshan yañ bdag yod pa mthoñ ba tsam ñid yin no // de ma tshañ ba med pa yin no //*. See Devendrabuddhi’s *prayoga* in PVP D97a7–b2/P112a7–b1.

[You have] said: Attachment is defective, and what is defective ought to be abandoned by the wise, as a finger bitten by a snake. Now, attachment to the self is defective [and] hence ought to be abandoned. With regard to this[, let us ask the following question]:¹⁰⁶

(2.224) Or, what [does] the defectiveness which [you] observe in attachment [consist of, so that attachment to the self would have to be abandoned]¹⁰⁷ [If you answer: The defectiveness of attachment consists in its being] the basis of pain[, we shall reply: But] even so [i.e., even if this attachment is the cause of pain,¹⁰⁸ there will be] no detachment from it, just as [one is not detached] from the self [in spite of its being the cause of pain], because one sees [it] as being one's own.¹⁰⁹

According to the Ātmavādin, attachment to the self must be abandoned because it is the basis, i.e., the cause, of pain. Devendrabuddhi explains that the Ātmavādin thus regards attachment as the basis of pain because due to it one craves for pleasure and thus clings to *saṃsāra*, which in turn is pain:

[He] who craves (**paritṛṣṇāvat*) for pleasure due to attachment to the self will cling to *saṃsāra*, which is pain (**duḥkhabhūta*). Therefore the defect of attachment is nothing but [its being] the cause of pain (**duḥkhaḥetu*), [and] thus it is established as being defective.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ PVP D97b2–3/P112b1–3: *chags pa ni skyon dañ bcas pa yin zin / ñes pa dañ ldan pa gañ yin pa de mkhas pa rnams kyis dor bar bya ba yin te / dper na sbrul gyis zin pa'i sor mo lta bu'o // bdag tu chags pa yañ ñes pa dañ ldan pa yin pa de bas na dor bar bya ba yin no zes bsad pa gañ yin pa de la [...]* /.

¹⁰⁷ According to PVP D97b3/P112b3 (*gañ gis 'di spañs yin*) and PVV 89,1 (*yenāyaṃ varjayitavyaḥ*).

¹⁰⁸ According to PVV 89,5 (*tathāpi duḥkhaḥetutve 'pī*). PVP D97b5–6/P112b6–7: *gal te yañ de sdug bsñal gyi rten ñid yin pa'i phyir ñes pa dañ ldan pa dor bar bya ba yin pa / de ltar yañ [...]* / . “Even if this [attachment, which is] defective due to its being the basis of pain, ought to be abandoned, even so [...].”

¹⁰⁹ PV 2.224: *kā vā sadoṣatā dṛṣṭā snehe duḥkhasamāśrayaḥ / tathāpi na virāgo 'tra svatvadṛṣṭer yathātmani* //.

¹¹⁰ PVP D97b4/P112b4–5: *bdag tu chags pa las bde ba la yoñs su sred pa dañ ldan pa sdug bsñal du gyur pa'i 'khor ba len par 'gyur ro // de bas na chags pa'i ñes pa ni sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ñid yin pa de ltar na skyon dañ ldan par grub pa ñid do* // . See also Devendrabuddhi's *prayoga* in PVP D97b4–5/P112b5–6.

Manorathanandin gives a similar explanation:

To explain: [he] who is attached to the self craves for the means of realizing the [self's] pleasure [and therefore] clings to *saṃsāra*, which is pain.¹¹¹

However, according to Dharmakīrti, even though the Ātmavādin may be right to regard attachment to the self as the cause of pain, he fails to see that this attachment cannot be eliminated as long as it is considered one's own. For regarding something as one's own (whether this thing is seen as a cause of pain or not) is nothing but being attached to it; and the belief that something is our own stems from the belief in the self's existence. Thus Devendrabuddhi explains:

Just as one is not detached from the self even though the self is the cause of pain, because it is the cause of the notion of "one's own," in the same way, one will not be detached from the attachment to the self, if it is grasped as one's own, even if it is the cause of pain.¹¹²

The Ātmavādin, however, refuses to draw from this the conclusion that the cause of pain is in fact the *ātman* itself:

(2.225) Objection: The self is not a cause of pain [when] in isolation (*vinā*) from these [factors that are attachment, cognition and sense organs, but only when associated with them. Answer: But] these [factors] too are such [i.e., they are not causes of pain in isolation but only insofar as they are associated with the self]! [And] thus, both of them [viz., the self and factors such as attachment] are [equally] free from defects [since neither are causes of pain in isolation]; therefore [one can] not [become] detached from either of them.¹¹³

¹¹¹ PVV 89,2: *tathā hy ātmani snihyan tatsukhasādhaneṣu tṛṣṇāvān duḥkhabhūtaṃ saṃsāram upādatte* /.

¹¹² PVP D97b6–7/P112b7–8: *ji ltar bdag la rañ gi blo rgyu yin pa'i phyir / bdag sdug bsñal gyi rgyu yin na yañ 'dod chags dañ bral ba ma yin pa de ltar bdag la chags pa yañ rañ ñid du bzuñ ba na sdug bsñal gyi rten ñid yin na yañ 'dod chags dañ bral bar 'gyur ba ma yin pa [...]* /. Note also PVV 89,5–6: *yathātmani svatvaḍṛṣṭer duḥkha-nidānabhūtāyā hetāv ātmani na virāgaḥ* /. "Just as one is not detached from the self, which is the cause of [one's] seeing [something] as one's own, which [in turn] is the cause of pain." See also Devendrabuddhi's *prayoga* in PVP D97b7–98a1/P113a1–2.

¹¹³ PV 2.225: *na tair vinā duḥkhaḥetur ātmā cet te 'pi tāḍṛśāḥ / nirdoṣaṃ dvayam apy evaṃ vairāgyaṃ na dvayos tataḥ* //.

The Ātmavādin defends his contention that although attachment to the self is defective insofar as it produces suffering and bondage, the self, for its part, is free of such defects. He does so by objecting, in accordance with the Nyāya doctrine, that in fact the self is not the cause of pain in itself, i.e., when isolated from the factors that we wrongly take to be the self.¹¹⁴ It can legitimately be considered a cause of pain only insofar as it is associated with them:

It is because it is endowed with [things] such as attachment, cognitions and sense organs, which [supposedly] belong to it, that the self is a cause of pain, but not in isolation (**kevala?*). Thus only the attachment to the self, etc., are defective, but not the self.¹¹⁵

Dharmakīrti replies that such a reasoning equally applies to the various elements that, according to the Naiyāyika, are adventitiously associated to the self. Thus Devendrabuddhi explains:

Just as the self is not a cause of pain [when] in isolation, but [only] because it is associated with [things] such as the attachment to the self, in the same way, [things] such as the attachment to the self are not [causes of pain] in isolation, but because they are associated with a self.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ On these factors see above, fn. 56, p. 200.

¹¹⁵ PVP D98a2–3/P113a2–3: *bdag gi chags pa'i blo dañ dbaṅ po la sogs pa dañ ldan pa'i phyir bdag sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ñid yin gyi yan gar ba ni ma yin pa de ltar na bdag la chags pa la sogs pa ñid ñes pa dañ ldan pa ñid yin gyi bdag ni ma yin no //*. This interpretation of *bdag gi chags pa'i blo dañ dbaṅ po la sogs pa dañ ldan pa'i phyir* is based on the wording of PVV 89,10: (*na taiḥ*) *snehabuddhīndriyādibhir ātmīyair (vinā duḥkhaḥetur ātmā cet /)*.

¹¹⁶ PVP D98a4–5/P113a6–7: *ji ltar bdag yan gar ba sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ma yin gyi 'on kyañ bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa dañ ldan pa yin pa'i phyir yin pa de ltar na bdag la chags pa la sogs pa yañ yan gar ba ma yin gyi 'on kyañ bdag dañ ldan pa ñid kyi phyir ro //*. Manorathanandin and Prajñākaragupta provide a similar interpretation. Cf. PVV 89,10–11: *te 'pi snehādayas tādrśā ātmānam antareṇa na duḥkhaḥetavaḥ /*. “These [things] too – such as the attachment to the self – are ‘such’ [i.e., they too] are not causes of pain in isolation (*antareṇa*) from the self.” See also PVA 149,3–4: *na cātmasnehādaya ātmānam āśrayam antareṇa duḥkhaḥetavaḥ /*. “And [things] such as attachment to the self are not causes of pain in isolation from the self, which is [their] substratum (*āśraya*).”

The Ātmavādin must therefore acknowledge that neither the self nor what we wrongly consider to belong to the self are defective in themselves:

Just as the isolated self is not defective since it is not a cause of pain, in the same way, [things] such as the attachment to the self are not defective, since they are not causes of pain [in isolation].¹¹⁷

As a consequence, in the Nyāya perspective, it is impossible to reach detachment either from the self or from these various factors, since they are both seen as free of defects. And yet the Naiyāyika himself admits that they are both defective insofar as they are both causes of pain when associated:

Just as one does not become detached from the self, which entails the same defect as [things] such as the attachment to the self and the sense organs, in the same way, one will not become detached from [things] such as the attachment to the self, which share the same defect as the self.¹¹⁸

In other words, liberation is impossible:

And thus, *saṃsāra* and defects are difficult [i.e., impossible] to escape, because [their] cause is complete.¹¹⁹

3.3.2. Cultivating the Thought of Pain (*duḥkhabhāvanā*) Does Not Eliminate the Notion of Belonging to the Self (*ātmīya*) (PV 2.226–228)

The Ātmavādin does not admit his defeat so easily. He puts forward a new argument that involves what Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara

¹¹⁷ PVP D98a5–6/P113a7–b1: *ji ltar bdag yan gar ba sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ma yin pas ñes pa dañ ldan pa ma yin pa de ltar bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa yañ^a sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ma yin pas na bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa yañ ñes pa dañ ldan pa ma yin no //*. ^a Although *yañ* (**apī*) makes sense (but is redundant with the second *yañ*), one wonders whether *yan gar ba* (“isolated/in isolation”), or even *yañ yan gar ba* are not to be preferred.

¹¹⁸ PVP D98a7–b1/P113b1–3: *ji ltar bdag tu chags pa dañ dbaṅ po la sogs pa dañ ñes pa mtshuñs pa can gyi bdag gi chags pa dañ bral ba ma yin pa de ltar bdag dañ mtshuñs pa'i ñes pa bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa'i chags pa dañ bral bar mi 'gyur ro //*.

¹¹⁹ PVV 89,15: *tathā ca saṃsāro doṣāś ca durvārā hetusākalyāt /*.

present as the Nyāya's main instrument of liberation, namely, the cultivation of the thought of pain.

(2.226) Objection: By [subjecting attachment, etc., to] the cultivation of [the thought of] pain, one can [become detached from them in spite of their being one's own], as a limb bitten by a snake [can] be abandoned [although it is one's own, after one has become detached from it because of pain].¹²⁰

According to Devendrabuddhi, the Ātmavādin's reasoning is as follows:

A human being cultivates [the thought of] pain [by seeing pain] in [things] such as the attachment to the self; and by [thus] cultivating [the thought of] pain, he becomes detached from [things] such as the attachment to the self, as someone who cultivates [the thought of] pain abandons a limb bitten by a snake, although [this limb is] grasped as his own.¹²¹

The Naiyāyika opponent considers that it is indeed possible to become detached from the factors wrongly thought to belong to the self by cultivating the thought of pain with respect to them, i.e., by cultivating the idea that they are in fact causes of pain and not means of pleasure: this cultivation can make us abandon them, as Manorathanandin puts it,

just as the limb [that has been] bitten by a snake, although [it is] one's own, is abandoned after one has become detached [from it] due to pain, because [this limb] is no [longer] a basis for enjoyment.¹²²

While comparing this process to that of somebody resorting to the amputation of his own limb bitten by a snake, the Ātmavādin might be implying that the Buddhists, who also make use of this image in their soteriology,¹²³ should acknowledge the possibility of eliminating attachment to the self according to this analogy.

¹²⁰ PV 2.226ab: *duḥkhabhāvanayā syāc ced ahidaṣṭāṅgaḥānivat* /.

¹²¹ PVP D98b3–4/P113b6–7: *skyes bu bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la sdug bsñal du sgom par byed ciñ sdug bsñal bsgom pas kyañ bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la 'dod chags dañ bral bar 'gyur te / dper na sbrul gyis yan lag bzuñ ba bdag gi ñid du ñe bar bzuñ ba de yañ sdug bsñal bsgom pa dañ ldan pas spoñ bar byed pa [...]* /.

¹²² PVV 89,17: *yathātmīyam apy ahidaṣṭam aṅgaṃ duḥkhavaśād virajya tyajyate / an-upabhogāśrayatvāt* /.

¹²³ See, e.g., RĀ 3.64: *sbrul gyis zin la ji lta bur / sor mo bcad la phan bśad pa / de bźin thub pas gźan phan pa / mi bde ba yañ bya bar gsuñs //*. "Just as one says that it is beneficial to cut off a finger when [it has been] bitten by a snake, so the sage

Dharmakīrti's reply runs as follows:

(2.226cd–228) [Answer:] The abandoning [of the sick limb occurs] due to [one's] abandoning the notion of [something] belonging to the self regarding this [limb], but not in the contrary case [i.e., not as long as the notion that this limb belongs to the self remains].¹²⁴ [But] with regard to [things] such as the [body and] sense organs,¹²⁵ which are grasped as the basis of enjoyment [i.e., as the means to realize it],¹²⁶ what could prevent the idea that [they] are one's own? [And] therefore how (*kutaḥ*) [could one ever become] detached from them[, so that one could get rid of them]¹²⁷? It is [indeed] obvious (*pratyakṣa*) to everybody [that] with respect to [things] such as hair that have fallen off [one's] body, a cognition accompanied by contempt (*saghrṇa*) arises, [whereas] with respect to [such things when they have] not [fallen off yet],¹²⁸ it is a cognition] accompanied by love (*sasprḥa*) [that arises].¹²⁹

According to Dharmakīrti, only someone who has already abandoned the notion that a limb is his own – i.e., belongs to the self – accepts the amputation of this limb. In Devendrabuddhi's words:

(**munī*) says that if it helps others, even a [temporary] displeasure (**asukha*) can be brought about."

¹²⁴ Our interpretation of *atra* relies on PVV 89,22: *tatrāhidaṣṭāṅge*. As for *viparyaye*, Manorathanandin (PVV 89,22–23) interprets it as *ātmīyabuddhisattāyām*; see also Devendrabuddhi's commentary quoted below.

¹²⁵ *ādi* is explained *lus kyi dbaṅ po la sogs pa* (**śarīrendriyādi*) in PVP D99a1/P114a5. PVA 149,12 mentions *śarīrādiṣu*. PVT *Ñe* D140b4/P173b6 also points to the body (*loṅs spyod pa'i rten ṅid kyi ni lus bzun ba yin no* //).

¹²⁶ *āśraya* is explained *sgrub par byed pa* (**sādhana*) in PVP D99a1/P114a4–5, and *kāraṇatvena* in PVV 89,23. According to PVT *Ñe* D140b1–5/P173b3–8, *upabhoga* amounts to *sukha*, and *āśraya* to *hetu* (or *kāraṇa*), "because [it is] on their basis [that] the pleasures of the self arise" (PVT *Ñe* D140b4/P173b6: *de'i sgo nas bdag gi bde ba skye ba'i phyir ro* //). As for the sense organs, they are included because they are instrumental in the pleasures of the self (**ātmāsukhasādhana*) insofar as they grasp objects (**viṣayagrahaṇa*).

¹²⁷ According to PVV 89,25 (*yena tyajyate*).

¹²⁸ According to PVV 90,4 (*anyatrācyuteṣu*).

¹²⁹ PV 2.226cd–228: *ātmīyabuddhihānyātra tyāgo na tu viparyaye // upabhogāśrayatvena grhīteṣv indriyādiṣu / svatvadhīḥ kena vāryeta vairāgyaṃ tatra tat kutaḥ // pratyakṣam eva sarvasya keśādiṣu kalevarāt / cyuteṣu saghrṇā buddhir jāyate 'nyatra sasprḥā* //.

As long as one has not abandoned the notion that the limb bitten by a snake is the basis of enjoyment, one does not proceed to eliminate [it. But] when one gets rid of the notion of [something] belonging to the self regarding it, [thinking:] “If it is not in its natural condition, this sick limb is not the basis of enjoyment,” then one can eliminate this limb [...] Therefore as long as the notion of [something] belonging to the self exists, one does not get rid [of anything].¹³⁰

If we consider our body or sense organs as ours, how could we ever become detached from them? Or, as Manorathanandin puts it, “[how could one ever become detached from] them [whereas, insofar as they are] means of realizing enjoyment, [they are] parts of oneself?”¹³¹ Dharmakīrti gives an example favoured by Buddhist authors,¹³² namely that of those elements (such as hairs or nails) that we love as long as we regard them as part of ourselves, and to which we become indifferent or averse when they fall off the body: we keep loving them as long as they are part of our body (which is in turn a means of realizing pleasure) so that we regard them as ours,¹³³ and we only cease being at-

¹³⁰ PVP D98b6–7/P114a2–4: *ji srid du sbrul gyis bzuñ ba'i yan lag la loñs spyod pa'i rten gyi blo ñams pa med pa de srid du dor bar spro ba ma yin no // gañ gi tshe rañ bñin du gnas par ma gyur pa na man chad yan lag 'di loñs spyod pa'i rten ma yin no žes de la bdag gi blo 'dor bar byed pa de'i tshe yan lag de dor bar 'gyur ro // [...] de bas na ji srid du bdag gi blo yod pa de srid du dor ba ma yin no //.*

¹³¹ PVV 89,24–25: *tatropabhogasādhane svīyāvayave.*

¹³² As noted in Vetter 1990: 128, fn. 1, the passage is reminiscent of VisM 195,29–196,1: *tathāhi kesalomanakhadantakheḷasinghāṇika-uccārapassāvādisu eka koṭṭhāsam pi sarīrato bahi patitaṃ sattā hatthena chupitum pi na icchanti aṭṭiyanti harāyanti jigucchanti / yaṃ yaṃ pan'ettha avasesaṃ hoti taṃ taṃ ti evaṃ paṭikūlam pi samānaṃ avijjandhakārapariyonaddhā attasineharāgarattā iṭṭhaṃ kantaṃ niccaṃ sukhaṃ attāti gaṇhanti /.* “And then, when any such bits of it as head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, spittle, snot, excrement or urine have dropped off the body, beings will not touch them; they are ashamed, humiliated and disgusted. But as long as anyone of these things remains in it, though it is just as repulsive, they take it as agreeable, desirable, permanent, pleasant, self, because they are wrapped in the murk of ignorance and dyed with affection and greed for the self.” Translation Ñāṇamoli 2010: 184.

¹³³ See PVP D99a3/P114a7–8: *skra la sogs pa lus las tha dad par ma gyur pa bdag gi ñid du kun nas bzuñ ba yod na chags pa'i blo 'byuñ ba bñin no //.* “As a cognition accompanied by love arises when [things] like [one's] hair, which are not separated [yet] from [one's] body, are grasped as being one's own.”

tached to them inasmuch as our belief that they belong to us disappears.¹³⁴

3.3.3. *The Criticism of the Self's Relations with What One Ought to be Detached From (PV 2.229)*

The commentators explain that the Ātmavādin (who, according to Prajñākaragupta, is relying on the doctrine of the “Vaiśeṣika, etc.”¹³⁵ i.e., here, most probably the Nyāya doctrine of liberation) then objects the following:

Objection: One abandons the very notion of [something] belonging to the self by cultivating [the thought of] pain [with regard to the different factors regarded as belonging to the self].¹³⁶

Dharmakīrti replies:

(2.229) Indeed, the idea of one's own [that applies] to these [factors]¹³⁷ is generated by [their various] relations [to the self],¹³⁸ e.g., [the relation of]

¹³⁴ See PVP D99a2–3/P114a7: *skyon bcas blo ni skye 'gyur ro // rañ gi blo ni ma rtogs te / ña'i loñs spyod kyi rten sgrub par byed pa yin no źes blo dañ bral ba'i phyir ro //*. “[With respect to things such as hair that have fallen off one's body,] a cognition accompanied by contempt (*saghr̥ṇa) arises; [i.e.,] the cognition of one's own (*sva[ṭva]buddhi) is no [longer] perceived, because it is devoid of the cognition (*buddhi) that [these things] are instrumental (*sādhana, *sādhaka) in [being] the basis of the I's enjoyment.” Note, however, that Manorathanandin seems to understand that in both cases the hair, etc., are cognized as belonging to the self. See PVV 90,3–4: *etac ca pratyakṣam eva sarvasya keśādiṣu kalevarāc cyuteṣv ātmīyabuddhiviṣayeṣu saghr̥ṇā buddhir jāyate / janasyānyatrācyuteṣv ātmīyabuddhiviṣayeṣu sa-spr̥hā /*. “And this is obvious for everybody: a cognition accompanied by contempt arises with respect to [things] such as hair that have fallen off the body [and] are the object of the cognition of belonging to the self;^a [and] people have [a cognition] accompanied with love with respect to [such things] that are the object of the cognition of belonging to the self ‘when [they have] not’ [i.e.,] when they have not fallen [yet].” ^a Although PVV_{MS} 17a5 bears the same reading as the edition, we wonder whether the first *ātmīyabuddhiviṣayeṣu* could be a corruption of *anātmīyabuddhiviṣayeṣu* (in which case Manorathanandin's explanation would be similar to Devendrabuddhi's).

¹³⁵ PVA 149,18: *kiṃ ca / vaiśeṣikādīnām /*.

¹³⁶ PVV 90,6: *duḥkhabhāvanayātmīyabuddhir eva hīyata iti cet /*. See also PVP D99b1–2/P114b6–7.

inherence (*samavāya*).¹³⁹ [Now] since this relation [too] is exactly of the same kind [i.e., complete,¹⁴⁰ the idea of the factors being one's own which is born from it¹⁴¹ can]not [be] abandoned even if one sees [defects in them]^{142, 143}

Dharmakīrti is now targetting another aspect of the Nyāya's soteriology. The Naiyāyikas consider that the self entertains various relations (*sambandha*) with the elements to which it is associated in *saṃsāra*, and that these relations must cease in the liberated state. According to Dharmakīrti, they consist of "inherence, etc." (*samavāyādi*), and Prajñākaragupta as well as Manorathanandin seem to explain the "etc." in terms of the sixfold classification of the relation between the sense organ and the sensory object found in Uddyotakara's NV.¹⁴⁴ Thus, among the relations between the sense organ and the object per-

¹³⁷ I.e., "attachment, etc." (*snehādi*) according to PVP D99b2/P114b7, "cognition, etc." (*buddhyādi*) according to PVV 90,8.

¹³⁸ According to PVP D99b2/P114b7–8 (*bdag la 'phrod pa 'du ba'i 'brel pa las yin no //*).

¹³⁹ On the meaning of °ādi here, see the commentaries quoted below and PVP D99b2–3/P114b8: *sogs pa smos pas ni lus loṅs spyod kyi rten ṅid dan dbaṅ po loṅs spyod kyi sgrub par byed pa ṅid 'brel pa las skye ba*. "With the word 'etc.' [Dharmakīrti means that this idea] is generated by relations [such as] the body's being the basis of the [self's] enjoyments (**upabhogāśrayatva*) and the sense organs' being instrumental in [the self's] enjoyments (**upabhogasāadhanatva*)."

¹⁴⁰ According to PVP D99b3/P115a1 (*de bzin yin / sṅa ma bzin du ma tshaṅ ba ṅid med pa yin no //*). At the very end of his commentary on PV 2.229, Manorathanandin (PVV 90,13–14) explains *na hīyate* as follows: *nimittasyāvaikalyāt*, "because [its] cause is complete." Note also Prajñākaragupta's (PVA 149,23) explanation: *ity ātma-sambandho na vyapaiti* /. "Therefore the relation with the self does not disappear."

¹⁴¹ According to PVP D99b3–4/P115a1–2 (*'phrod pa 'du ba la sogs pa'i 'brel pa las skye ba'i bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la raṅ ṅid kyi blo*) and PVV 90,13 (*sā svadhīḥ*).

¹⁴² According to PVP D99b3/P115a1 (*bdag la chags pa la sogs pa'i ṅes pa de ltar mthoṅ yaṅ*), PVV 90,13 (*doṣadṛṣṭāv apī*) and PVA 149,23 (*doṣadarśane 'pī*). While commenting on *sambandhaḥ sa tathaiveti*, Devendrabuddhi (PVP D99b3/P114b8–115a1) and Manorathanandin (PVV 90,13) had explained: *chags pa dan bral bar 'dod pa'i gnas skabs yin na yaṅ* (**vairāgyecchāvasthāyām apī?*), "even when [one] is [in] the condition of aspiring to detachment," and: *duḥkhabhāvanāyām apī*, "even if one cultivates [the thought of] pain."

¹⁴³ PV 2.229: *samavāyādisambandhajanitā tatra hi svadhīḥ / sambandhaḥ sa tathaiveti dṛṣṭāv apī na hīyate //*.

¹⁴⁴ On the issue of this classification's origin, see Preisendanz 1989: 162, fn. 91.

ceived,¹⁴⁵ the NV distinguishes inherence, but also contact (*saṃyoga*), inherence in what is in contact (*saṃyuktasamavāya*) or inherence in what is inherent in what is in contact (*saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*). Similarly, Prajñākaragupta explains:

With pleasure, etc., [the self has] a relation [consisting of] inherence; with the body, [it has a relation consisting of] contact; with visual form, etc., which have their substratum in the body [and are therefore inherent in the body, the self has a relation consisting of] inherence in what is in contact [with it]; with [the properties of] being a visual form, etc., [which are inherent in the visual form, etc., which in turn are inherent in the body in contact with the self, the self has] a [relation consisting of] inherence in what is inherent [in what is in contact with it]; with the auditory sense organ, [it has] a [relation consisting of] contact; with the visual sense organ, etc., [it has a relation consisting of] contact with what has a contact [with it].¹⁴⁶

Whatever the exact meaning of °ādi (“etc.”), Dharmakīrti’s stanza explicitly mentions the relation of inherence, since according to the Naiyāyikas, the elements from which we should detach ourselves inhere as qualities (*guṇa*) in the substratum constituted by the self.¹⁴⁷ As posterior Naiyāyikas such as Jayanta explain, these qualities are adventi-

¹⁴⁵ NV 28,19–29,1: *sannikarṣaḥ punaḥ śoḍhā bhidyate / saṃyogaḥ saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ samavāyaḥ samavetasamavāyo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaś ceti* /. “As for the contact [between the sense organ and the object mentioned in NSū 1.1.4], it is divided into [the] six [following] kinds: contact [*per se*], inherence in what is in contact, inherence in what is inherent in what is in contact, inherence, inherence in what is inherent (*samavetasamavāya*) and the relation between a particularity and what it particularizes (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*).”

¹⁴⁶ PVA 149,21–23: *sukhādinā samavāyasambandhaḥ / śarīreṇa saṃyogaḥ / śarīrāśritai rūpādibhiḥ saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ / rūpatvādibhiḥ samavetasamavāyaḥ / śrotrendriyeṇa saṃyogaḥ / cakṣurādinā saṃyogisaṃyogaḥ* /. Cf. PVV 90,8–10: *tathā cātmanāḥ sukhādinā samavāyaḥ sambandhaḥ / śarīreṇa saṃyogaḥ / śarīrāśritai rūpādibhiḥ saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ / śrotrendriyeṇa saṃyogaś cakṣurādibhiḥ saṃyogisaṃyoga ātmasambandhaḥ* /. “And thus, the self’s relation with pleasure, etc., is inherence. The self’s relation with the body is contact; [its relation] with visual forms, etc., which have their substratum in the body, is inherence in what is in contact [with the self; its relation] with the auditory sense organ is contact; [its relation] with the visual sense organ and so on is contact with what has a contact [with the self].”

¹⁴⁷ On this notion of inherence and Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the self as an inherence cause, see above, Introduction, §0.2.2.

tious (*āgantuka*) and not intrinsic (*sāmsiddhika*) to the substance that is the self,¹⁴⁸ so that their inherence within the self must disappear in the state of liberation, which the Naiyāyikas describe as precisely the absolute separation (*viyoga*) of the self from these various elements.¹⁴⁹ The same idea is found in the Vaiśeṣika: thus Candrānanda, commenting on VSū 1.1.2 (“Merit is that thanks to which prosperity and the *summum bonum* are obtained”),¹⁵⁰ explains that whereas “prosperity is the obtaining of a desired body in the worlds of Brahmā, etc., and the cessation of the non-beneficial, the *summum bonum* is liberation, which consists in the self’s not possessing [its] specific qualities.”¹⁵¹ Dharma-kīrti, however, points out that there is no reason why such a relation should cease: even if we are aware of the defects affecting the elements that inhere in the self, why should this inherence vanish if its causes (i.e., the locus in which the elements inhere and the elements themselves) are still present? But if the Naiyāyika admits that there is no such relation, then he is incapable of explaining how these elements come to be regarded as our own.

3.3.4. The Naiyāyikas’ Liberated State Cannot Be Desired by Those Who Seek Liberation (PV 2.230–235)

According to the commentators, the next objection put forward by the Ātmavādin implicitly targets Sāṅkhya ideas,¹⁵² or at least, someone who does not admit that the self may have a relation such as inherence

¹⁴⁸ See, e.g., NM_M II.437,15–16/NM_V III.6,15: *ātmanaś ca sukhaduḥkhabuddhyādaya āgantukā guṇā na mahattvavat sāmsiddhikāḥ* /. “And pleasure, pain, cognitions and so on are adventitious qualities of the self: [They are] not intrinsic [qualities] such as [the self’s] greatness.”

¹⁴⁹ See, e.g., NV 81,2: *tena śarīrādīnā duḥkhāntenātyantiko viyoga iti* /. “[Final release is the liberation from that, i.e., it is] the absolute separation from that which begins with the body and ends with pain.”

¹⁵⁰ VSū 1.1.2: *yato ’bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah* /.

¹⁵¹ VSV 2,2–3: *abhyudayo brahmādilokeṣv iṣṭaśarīraprāptir anarthopamaś ca / niḥśreyasam adhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ* /.

¹⁵² See PVP D99b5/P115a4 (*grāṇs can*), PVṠ Ñe D141a3/P174a6 (*grāṇs can*), Vibh. 90, fn. 1 (*sāṅkhyam praty āha* /). “Against the Sāṅkhya he says [what follows].”

to anything else,¹⁵³ which is the Sāṅkhya's case.¹⁵⁴ Thus Devendra-buddhi explains that a Sāṅkhya opponent enters the debate at this point and takes advantage of Dharmakīrti's refutation of the Naiyāyika's position so as to put forward his own thesis regarding the self:

The Sāṅkhya [opponent] thinks [as follows]: Since [there can be] no detachment from the idea, born of relations such as [that of] inherence, that attachment to the self, etc., is one's own, one cannot achieve liberation. According to us, however, one remains in *saṃsāra* as long as the cognition that determines primordial nature (**prakṛti*) and the Person (**puruṣa*) as being one [and the same] is present. But when one knows that primordial nature and the Person are distinct, then one is liberated [from *saṃsāra*] because one knows that primordial nature and the Person are different [things] (**prakṛtipuruṣāntarajñāna?*).¹⁵⁵

If the Naiyāyika is right, then as Dharmakīrti has shown, there can be no liberation, because the relation of inherence between the self and the elements thought to belong to it cannot cease, so that one cannot stop regarding attachment to the self, etc., as one's own. The Sāṅkhya proponent, however, offers an alternative that has the advantage of rescuing the self while explaining how we come to see extrinsic elements as belonging to the self, and how the self can be freed from these

¹⁵³ See PVA 149,2–3 (*atha samavāyādisambandhaṃ nāṅgikuryāt / tatrāpi parihāraḥ /*. “But [even] if [the opponent] does not admit relations such as inherence, in this [case] too [his objection] is refuted.”), PVV 90,14 (*atha samavāyādir nāsty eva tadā [...]*. “But if [the opponent considers that] there is simply no [relation such as] inherence, etc., then [...]).

¹⁵⁴ On the opposition between Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika in this regard, see, e.g., Bronkhorst 1986: 57. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas criticize the Sāṅkhyas for disregarding the relation of inherence. For instance, in his commentary ad NSū 1.1.5, Uddyotakara criticizes the Sāṅkhya inference by showing that the seven relations regarded by the Sāṅkhyas as the basis of inference are invalid because none of them expresses *samavāya* (see, e.g., Harzer 2006: 91).

¹⁵⁵ PVP D99b5–7/P115a4–6: *gaṇ yaṇ graṇs can 'phrod pa 'du ba la sogs pa'i 'brel pas bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa raṇ gi blo bskyed pa gaṇ yin pa de ni de la chags pa daṇ bral ba ma yin pas grol bar mi 'gyur gyi / kho bo cag gis ni ji srid du raṇ bžin daṇ skyes bu dag la gcig ñid du ñes pa can gyi blo yod pa de srid du 'khor ba yin žin / gaṇ gi tshe raṇ bžin daṇ skyes bu gžan ñid yin par śes pa de'i tshe raṇ bžin daṇ skyes bu'i khyad par śes pa'i phyir grol ba yin no žes sems na /*. On the compound *prakṛti-* or *pradhāna-puruṣāntarajñāna*, see above, fn. 11, p. 190.

elements: bondage consists in confusing the Person with primordial matter. In other words, the only relation between the self and the elements wrongly ascribed to it in *saṃsāra* is a wrong notion that mixes them, but as soon as this wrong knowledge disappears, i.e., provided that the Person is discriminated from primordial matter, one is liberated.¹⁵⁶

According to the commentators, it is with this Sāṅkhya objection in mind that Dharmakīrti's opponent replies:

(2.230) [Objection:] Even if there were no [relation of] inherence, etc., [nonetheless you must admit a relation since] all these [factors] help produce (*upakāritā*) [the self's enjoyment].¹⁵⁷

According to Devendrabuddhi, the Ātmavādin with whom Dharmakīrti has been debating is trying to avoid the Sāṅkhya's solution to the problem raised by the Buddhist, and his answer runs as follows:

Even so, one should answer [in the following way]: The idea that [factors] such as attachment to the self are one's own is not due to the fact that one does not know that primordial nature and the Person are different [things]; rather, it is due to the fact that [these factors] are means of enjoyment. [And] indeed, [two] distinct things that are external [to each other, i.e., not related through inherence] (**bāhyavastu?*), are not the cause of a single cognition. The notion that these [factors] are one's own could also be due to [their] help in producing [the self's enjoyment. Thus it is said:] "Even if there were no [relation of] inherence, etc." [To wit:] as regards all [these factors], things that are external [to each other] (**bāhyārtha?*), [even though they] lack inherence, "help produce [the self's enjoyment]." [To wit:] they are the causes of the idea of one's own. Thus, the idea of [these things as being] one's own is not due to [one's] determining primordial nature and the Person as being one [and the same], for even if this [determination] is missing, [the idea that these things are one's own] exists on the basis of a relation between what helps produce and what is produced with this help (*upakāryopakārahāva*).¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ See above, §3.1.1.

¹⁵⁷ PV 2.230ab: *samavāyādyabhāve 'pi sarvatrāsty upakāritā /*.

¹⁵⁸ PVP D99b7–100a3/P115a7–b2: *de ltar yañ brjod par bya ste / rañ bžin dan skyes bu'i khyad par šes pa med pa'i phyir bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la rañ gi blo ma yin gyi / 'on kyañ loñs spyod kyiyen lag ñid kyis yin no^a // de ltar na^b phyi rol gyi dños po*

Dharmakīrti's Naiyāyika (and/or Vaiśeṣika) opponent refuses to consider, as the Sāṅkhya does, that we wrongly believe this or that extrinsic element (including the attachment to the self) to be our own because we would confuse the Person with primordial matter. He rejects this hypothesis on the grounds that two distinct entities that are not related through inherence cannot be the cause of a single cognition: how could we ever come to confuse them? According to him, the notion that these various factors are one's own can be explained otherwise: even assuming that these elements do not inhere in the self (an assumption that Dharmakīrti has just forced him to make), these elements help bring about the self's enjoyment insofar as they are means of enjoyment (*upabhogāṅga*); and it is this causality relation between what helps and what is helped that is responsible for our belief that they belong to us.

Devendrabbuddhi thus reformulates the Ātmavādin's reasoning in the following way:

The argument [is as follows]: an *x* that exists even if *y* is absent neither depends on *y* nor is produced by *y*, as the rice sprout which, even if the barley seed is absent, exists if the rice seed is present. Now, even if one does not know that [primordial matter and the Person] are one [and the same thing], the idea [that factors such as attachment, cognition and sense organs are] one's own exists if one knows that these two things that are external [to each other] stand in a relation between what helps produce and what is produced. The logical reason [involved in this argument] is an essential property.¹⁵⁹

tha dad pa dag ni blo gcig gi rgyu ma yin na / de dag la rañ gi blor phan 'dogs par byed pa'i sgo nas 'gyur ba yañ yin no // 'phrod pa 'du sogs med na yañ / 'phrod pa 'du ba ma yin pa'i phyi rol gyi don / thams cad la ni phan 'dogs yod // rañ gi blo'i rgyu yin pa de ltar na rañ bžin dañ skyes bu dag la gcig ñid du ñes par byas pa'i rañ gi blo ni ma yin te / de med na yañ phan gdags par bya ba dañ phan 'dogs par byed pa'i sgo nas yod pa'i phyr ro //.^a Cf. Vibh. 90, fn. 2: *upabhogāṅgatvena (vṛtته)* /.^b *de ltar na* is interpreted here in the sense of *'di ltar*, i.e., **yasmāt*.

¹⁵⁹ PVP D100a3–5/P115b2–4: *sbyor ba ni gañ žig gañ med na yañ yod pa de ni de la ltos pa med ciñ des byas pa ma^a yin te / dper na nas kyi sa bon med du zin kyañ sã lu'i sa bon yod na yod pa'i sã lu'i myu gu lta bu'o // rañ gi blo yañ gcig ñid du šes pa med na yañ phyi rol gyi don dag la phan gdags par bya ba dañ phan 'dogs par byed pa'i dños po'i šes pa yod na yod^b pa yin no žes bya ba ni rañ bžin gyi gtan tshigs so //*.^a *ma em.* : DP om. *ma.* ^b *na yod em.* : DP om. *na yod.*

Having thus explained how the notion that these factors are one's own arises, Dharmakīrti's opponent proceeds to show how this idea can be eliminated:

(2.230cd–231) The idea of [these factors being] one's own may [simply] cease (*na bhavet*) because [they] help produce pain, as [this idea ceases] regarding a finger [bitten by a snake. Objection from Dharmakīrti:]¹⁶⁰ Indeed, this [factor] is not exclusively [a cause of] pain¹⁶¹, insofar as in a certain respect it is also a cause of pleasure.¹⁶² Answer from the Ātmavādin:¹⁶³ But it is] predominantly (*bhūyasā*) [a cause of pain], as poisoned food [which is pleasurable and nonetheless causes pain. And] on account of [one's] attach-

¹⁶⁰ According to PVT *Ñe* D141a7–b1/P174b4–5 (*gcig tu de ni sdug bsñal min źes bya ba la sogs pa ni grub pa'i mtha' smra ba'o //*. “[The sentence] *na hy ekāntena tad duḥkham* [belongs to] the Siddhāntavādin.”). Cf. PVV 90,19, where *na hy ekāntena* [...] is immediately preceded by *iti cet* (“If [the opponent] objects that [...]”) which marks the end of the opponent's objection.

¹⁶¹ According to PVP D100a7/P115b8 (*sdug bsñal gyi rgyu*) and PVV 90,19 (*duḥkham duḥkhaheṭuḥ*).

¹⁶² According to PVP D100a7/P115b7–8 (*rnam grañs kyis bde ba'i rgyu ñid kyañ 'di la yod pa yin no //*) and PVV 90,19–20 (*paryāyeṇa sukhahetutvād api //*).

¹⁶³ According to PVP D100b3–4/P116a4–5, which clearly takes *bhūyasā saviśānnavat* as part of the Ātmavādin's reply: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / gal te yañ gcig tu sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ma yin pa de ltar na yañ phal cher lus dañ dbaṇ po la sogs pa sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ñid yin pa'i phyir / bde ba ñe bar byed pa'i blo dañ chags pa dañ bcas pa'i blo ñid ma yin te / dug bcas zas bźin no //*. “Suppose the following be urged (**syād etat*): Even though they are not exclusively (**ekāntena*) a cause of pain, nevertheless (**tathāpi*), [things] such as the body and sense organs are predominantly (**bhūyasā*) a cause of pain, and this is the reason why [they] are not [the object of] the cognition [of what] helps produce pleasure (**sukhopakārabuddhi?*) nor [the object of] a cognition accompanied by love (**saṣprḥabuddhi?*), as poisoned food (**saviśānnavat*) [which is pleasurable and nonetheless causes pain].” However, note that Manorathanandin seems to understand *bhūyasā saviśānnavat* as the sequel of Dharmakīrti's objection. See PVV 90,20–21: *kintu bhūyasā tad duḥkham saviśānnavat / pariṇatiduḥkhaheṭur api viśānnaṃ āpātasukham ca //*. “Rather, it is [only] predominantly[, but not exclusively,] pain, as poisoned food. And although poisoned food is a cause of pain [in the sense] of a change [for the worse], it involves pleasure at the present moment.” Vetter (1990: 130) seems to favour Manorathanandin's interpretation.

ment to a superior (*viśiṣṭa*) pleasure, one can become detached from [poisoned food insofar as it is] contradictory to this [superior pleasure].¹⁶⁴

The Naiyāyika portrayed by Dharmakīrti contends that the notion that this or that factor belongs to the self can be eliminated for the simple reason that these elements cause pain: upon realizing that they cause pain, we can let go of them, thinking “being the cause of suffering, they ought to be abandoned,”¹⁶⁵ just as we let go of a limb that we no longer regard as ours because it brings nothing but pain. Devendrabuddhi thus explains:

The argument [is as follows]: someone cannot have the idea of one’s own concerning that which causes him an undesirable sensation, as the finger bitten by a snake that is to be eliminated. Now, the complex [formed by things] such as the self, the body and the sense organs is the cause of an undesirable sensation. [The logical reason involved in this argument] is the perception of [something] contradictory to the pervading [property].¹⁶⁶

Dharmakīrti then replies that the notion that these factors are ours cannot disappear as easily as the Ātmavādin contends, for the reason that they are not merely causes of pain. If they were, we would not in fact form any attachment to them and they would not constitute a soteriological obstacle; the difficulty of getting rid of them rather consists in the fact that they are also instrumental in producing pleasure.

As a matter of fact, the Naiyāyika does not deny that the various factors wrongly attributed to the self bring about pleasure.¹⁶⁷ Nonetheless, as he points out in his answer to Dharmakīrti, he considers that *in*

¹⁶⁴ PV 2.230cd–231: *duḥkhopakārān na bhaved aṅgulyām iva cet svadhīḥ // na hy ekāntena tad duḥkhaṃ bhūyasā saviśānnavat / viśiṣṭasukhasaṅgāt syāt tadviruddhe virāgitā //*.

¹⁶⁵ PVP D100a5–6/P115b5–6: *sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ñid du 'gyur ba dor bar bya ba yin no //*.

¹⁶⁶ PVP D100a6–7/P115b6–7: *sbyor ba ni gañ žig gañ gi mi 'dod pa'i tshor ba'i rgyu yin pa de la de ni rañ gi blor mi 'gyur te / dper na sbrul gyis bzuñ ba'i sor mo dor bar bya ba lta bu'o // bdag dañ lus dañ dbañ po la sogs pa'i tshogs kyañ mi 'dod pa'i tshor ba'i rgyu yin no žes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //*.

¹⁶⁷ See, e.g., NBh 15,11–15, quoted above, fn. 64, p. 202, where Pakṣilasvāmin explains that NSū 1.1.9 must not be interpreted as a denial of the experience of pleasure. See also Halbfass 1997: 154–155.

spite of their property of bringing about pleasure, these means of realizing pleasure can be abandoned in view of the greater benefit (i.e., liberation,) that can be expected from this abandonment, just as (according to Pakṣilasvāmin's analogy)¹⁶⁸ we abandon what we know to be poisoned food in spite of its good taste. The various elements that are means of realizing pleasure are bound to produce pain, and the pleasure that they bring about is necessarily intermingled with pain,¹⁶⁹ because of the craving that they induce¹⁷⁰ and because due to this craving, one clings to pain.¹⁷¹ However, the Ātmavādin points out that we are not condemned to being attached to poisoned food: as soon as we discover some other food capable of bringing us some superior pleasure, we renounce eating what we know to be poisoned food, "so that one may renounce poisoned food because there is another possibility,"¹⁷² as Devendrabuddhi explains. Manorathanandin, for his part, formulates the reasoning in the following way:

But food which is poisoned and [yet] mixed with pleasure is regarded with detachment by those who are attached to their own good; in the same way, attachment [to the self], etc., must also be [regarded with detachment by those who are attached to their own good].¹⁷³

According to the Naiyāyika then, detachment from the means of realizing pleasure is possible if we are aware of the possibility of liberation, understood as the cessation of all pain. It is precisely this contention that Dharmakīrti is going to target in the next verses.

(2.232–234) [Answer:] One may [well] renounce a certain state of pleasure (*saukhya*) due to craving for a superior pleasure, but if one does not expect [to reach this superior pleasure], one acts, out of attachment to the self,

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., NBh 258,15–20 (quoted above, fn. 72, p. 204), NBh 245,9–14 (quoted above, fn. 74, p. 205) and fn. 75, p. 205.

¹⁶⁹ See, e.g., NBh 15,11–15 (quoted above, fn. 64, p. 202).

¹⁷⁰ See, e.g., NBh 258,10–15 (quoted above, fn. 22, p. 193), NV 59,20–60,5 (quoted above, fn. 73, p. 205), NBh 245,9–14 (quoted above, fn. 74, p. 205).

¹⁷¹ See, e.g., NBh 247,3–11 (quoted above, fn. 78, p. 206) and NV 463,17–464,2 (quoted above, fn. 79, p. 207).

¹⁷² PVP D100b6/P116a8: *rnam pa gzan srid pa'i phyir ro //*.

¹⁷³ PVV 89,22–23: *nanu saviṣam annaṃ sukhamiśraṃ ca vairāgyaviṣayaḥ svahitakāmānām / evaṃ snehādīr api syād iti [...]* /.

[merely] according to what one obtains: [we] observe that if [a man driven by lust] does not obtain the wanton woman [whom he is longing for, he can turn his] desire (*kāmitā*) towards animals.¹⁷⁴ [And since according to you, when liberated, the self is in a state of isolation that amounts to being nonexistent,] how does someone for whom the self is beloved above all (*vallabha*) accept (*icchati*) the destruction of this [self]? [For] how can love (*preman*)¹⁷⁵ [itself] desire (*icchet*) [something that has] ceased [to be the] substratum of all experiences, transactions (*vyavahāra*) and qualities?¹⁷⁶ [It cannot desire it,] for such is not the nature of love.¹⁷⁷

Dharmakīrti is now criticizing the Nyāya's definition of the liberated state by showing that this state cannot be wanted, and that as such, it prevents the individuals from seeking liberation.

He first points out that we do not abandon a certain pleasure (even a pleasure that, according to the Ātmavādin himself, is intermingled with pain)¹⁷⁸ as long as we cannot expect any pleasure superior to what we are currently experiencing; but the Naiyāyikas' alleged libe-

¹⁷⁴ The reading *nairāśye* is obviously correct, but Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin comment on *nairāśmye*; we therefore leave PVV 91,7–14 (ad PV 2.232) out of consideration. Vibhūticandra (see Vibh. 91, fn. 1) was aware of this variant reading.

¹⁷⁵ According to Śākyabuddhi (PVT *Ñe* D142a4/P175b3), *preman* is to be understood in the sense of the agent, i.e., is the subject of the sentence (*chags pa byed pa po ñid du'o, *prema kartari*). Among the arguments in favour of *preman* as the subject of *icchet*, note PVV 92,2 (*katham prema snehātīśaya icchet*) and PVP D101b1/P117a4–5 = PVT *Ñe* D142a4/P175b3 (*pratika: chags pa yis ni ji ltar 'dod*).

¹⁷⁶ Devendrabuddhi (PVP D101b1/P117a4) explains **guṇa* as **prajñādi*. For an analysis of *anubhavyavahāraguṇa*, see especially PVT *Ñe* D142a4–5/P175b4–5, where Śākyabuddhi explains it as a *dvandva* compound, and then analyzes: *gañ la ñams su myoñ ba dañ tha sñad dañ yon tan gyi rten ñid ldog pa yod pa zes bya bar tshig rnam par sbyar ro // (*yatrānubhavyavahāraguṇāśrayo nivṛtto 'stīti vighrahañ //*.

¹⁷⁷ PV 2.232–234: *kiñcit parityajet saukhyaṃ viśiṣṭasukhatṛṣṇayā / nairāśye tu yathālābham ātmasnehāt pravartate // alābhe mattakāśīnyā dṛṣṭā tiryakṣu kāmitā / yasyātmā vallabhas tasya sa nāśaṃ katham icchati // nivṛttasārvānubhavyavahāraguṇāśrayam / icchet prema katham premnaḥ prakṛtir na hi tādrśī //*.

¹⁷⁸ See PVV 91,3: *kiñcit saukhyaṃ pariṇatiduḥkhabahulam*. “A certain state of pleasure [i.e., a state of pleasure] which is accompanied by pain [in the sense of] a change [for the worse].”

rated state cannot be regarded as such a superior pleasure. As Manora-
thanandin explains:

If one does not obtain a means of realizing a superior pleasure, and if [there
is] a cause of pseudo-pleasure, attachment to the self, which is strong,
prompts to act [so as to obtain it].¹⁷⁹

Dharmakīrti is attacking here one of the most peculiar features of the Nyāya doctrine of liberation: because in the liberated state, the self supposedly ceases to be the substratum of the impermanent qualities that are instrumental in experiencing pain as well as pleasure, the (or at least some) Naiyāyikas contend that the liberated self is perfectly insentient and deny that it may experience any kind of pleasure. The same idea is found in the Vaiśeṣika, since there too, liberation is conceived of as the separation of the self from such qualities as knowledge and pleasure.¹⁸⁰ As is well known, this doctrinal element was rejected by Bhāsarvajña, a much later Naiyāyika;¹⁸¹ but it was criticized early on by some proponents of the thesis that liberation consists in a permanent state of bliss,¹⁸² and Pakṣilasvāmin already mentions their objec-

¹⁷⁹ PVV 91,15–16: *balavān ātmasneho viśiṣṭasukhasāadhanasyālābhe sukhābhāsahetau ca pravartayati* /. Should one interpret *sukhābhāsahetau ca* as a locative indicating the object, i.e.: “the attachment to the self, which is strong, prompts to act even with regard to a pseudo-pleasure”?

¹⁸⁰ See, e.g., VSV 2,2–3 quoted above (fn. 151, p. 225). The specific qualities of the self involve those mentioned in VSū 3.2.4 (i.e., “pleasure and pain; desire and aversion; and effort”: see above, fn. 82, p. 20), as specified by Praśastapāda in PDhS 16,9–10: *ātmaliṅgādhikāre buddhyādayaḥ prayatnāntāḥ siddhāḥ* /. “The [qualities] beginning with ‘cognition’ and ending with ‘effort’ have been established [to belong to the self] in the section [of the VS] devoted to the marks of the self.” (On the qualities of the self, note also PDhS 16,7–9: *tasya guṇā buddhisukhaduḥkhecchā dveṣaprayatna-dharmādharmasaṃskārasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ*. “The qualities of the [self] are: cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, residual traces, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.”) Note, however, that according to Vibhūticandra, Dharmakīrti’s target here is rather the Sāṅkhya (see Vibh. 91, fn. 3, where *sāṅkhyasya* explains *yasya* in PV 2.233c).

¹⁸¹ See, e.g., Narayanan 1983, Chakrabarti 1983: 171 and 173–175, Oberhammer 1984: 285ff., Halbfass 1997: 156, Ratié 2011a: 86–91.

¹⁸² See, e.g., NBh 23,4–5: *nityaṃ sukham ātmano mahattvavat / tat tu mokṣe ’bhivyajyate / tenābhivyaktenātyantaṃ vimuktaḥ sukhī bhavatīti kecin manyante / teṣāṃ pramāṇābhāvād anupapattiḥ* /. “Some consider that, just as [its] greatness, the

tion that “activity is aimed at obtaining [something] desirable (*iṣṭa*),”¹⁸³ so that in order to be sought, liberation must be a desirable (and therefore pleasurable) state:

Here is [our opponent’s] inference: “The teaching of liberation is aimed at obtaining [something] desirable, and [so is] the activity of [those] who seek liberation; neither can be aimed at nothing.”¹⁸⁴

Uddyotakara, for his part, mentions the objection in the following way:

[Objection:] In this [world], the ordinary people [whom we can observe], when engaging in activity, do so in order to obtain [something] desirable; now, those who are in the process of liberating themselves (*mokṣamāṇa*) engage in activity; [therefore] they too must have an activity aimed at obtaining [something] desirable, [and] this very activity [can] have a goal [only] if [there is] a permanent pleasure, [and] not otherwise.¹⁸⁵

It is again to be found in some later works such as Jayanta’s NM:

With respect to [liberation as we define it, some] proponents of Vedānta object [the following]. Such a liberation[, which consists in the mere separation from pain,] cannot be the goal of the efforts of [practically] rational people; for who indeed would make effort so as to obtain a self in which no awareness of pleasure whatsoever is attained, [as this self is] similar to a piece of stone?¹⁸⁶

pleasure of the self is permanent, but [only] becomes manifest in liberation, [and that] thanks to this manifested [pleasure], one is entirely released [i.e.,] experiences pleasure (*sukhin*). [But] because they have no means of valid cognition [to justify it,] it cannot be [so].” On this controversy over the blissful state of the liberated condition in the Nyāya, see, e.g., Chakrabarti 1983.

¹⁸³ NBh 23,18: *iṣṭādhigamārthā pravṛttir iti*.

¹⁸⁴ NBh 23,18–19: *idam anumānam / iṣṭādhigamārtho mokṣopadeśaḥ pravṛttiś ca mukṣūṇām / nobhayam anarthakam iti /*.

¹⁸⁵ NV 82,13–15: *ihāyaṃ lokaḥ pravartamāna iṣṭādhigamārthaṃ pravartate / pravartante ca mokṣamāṇāḥ / teṣāṃ apīṣṭādhigamārthayā pravṛtṭyā bhavitavyam / seyaṃ pravṛttir nityasukhe ’rthavatī nānyatheti /*.

¹⁸⁶ NM_M II.431,17–432,1/NM_V III.2,11–13: *tatra vedāntavādina^a āhuḥ – nāyam īdṛśo mokṣaḥ prekṣāvatāṃ prayatnabhūmir bhavitum arhati / ko hi nāma śilāśakalakalpam apagatasakalasukhasamvedanasampadam^b ātmānam upapādayitum yateta /*. ^a *tatra vedāntavādina* NM_V: *atra tāvad vedāntina* NM_M. ^b *°sāmpadam* NM_V: *°saṃsparśam* NM_M.

Jayanta's opponent further explains:

But if the self were insentient in this [liberated] state [and thus] in no way different from a stone, then liberation would be done with! Only *saṃsāra*, in which at least pleasure is enjoyed, would be a state worth [experiencing], however occasional (*antarāntarāpi*), stained with pain [and] meagre [this *saṃsāric* pleasure may be. For] let [us] ponder over this: what is preferable – the experience of a little pleasure, or the annihilation of all pleasures?¹⁸⁷

The objection seems to have been some kind of *topos*¹⁸⁸ and its actual authorship is unclear. Jayanta attributes it to Vedāntins, but was it really formulated in the first place (i.e., at least from the NBh onwards) by “early Vedāntins,” as some modern scholars assume,¹⁸⁹ or by other early Naiyāyikas whose doctrines have not come down to us?¹⁹⁰ In any case, Dharmakīrti apparently exploits this very objection when he argues that there can be no expectation (*nairāśya*) of the Naiyāyika's liberated state since it is devoid of pleasure, so that if one loves the self, one cannot desire this state: if liberation is a mere lack of pleasure, there is no reason why we should abandon the pleasures of *saṃsāra*, however infected they may be by pain. It is worth noting too that a Vedāntin such as Maṇḍanamiśra formulates against the Naiyāyikas and/or Vaiśeṣikas an objection very close to Dharmakīrti's here:

And a liberation defined as the cessation of the specific qualities [of the self, namely] consciousness and so on, is not different from the view of annihilation; for even if [something] exists, [its] entirely lacking perception is not

¹⁸⁷ NM_M II.4.32,4–7 / NM_V III.2,15–18: *yadi tu jaḍaḥ pāṣāṇanirviśeṣa eva tasyām avasthāyām ātmā bhavet tat kṛtam apavargeṇa / saṃsāra eva varam avasthānam^a yatra tāvad antarāntarāpi duḥkhakaluṣitam api svalpam api sukham upabhujyate / cintyatām tāvad idaṃ kim alpasukhānubhavo bhadraḥ uta sarvasukhoccheda eva / .^a avasthānam NM_V: astu NM_M.*

¹⁸⁸ On the comparison of the Nyāya's liberated state with a stone (and on the statement that being a jackal in the Vṛndā forest would be preferable to liberation according to the Vaiśeṣika/Nyāya), see Halbfass 1997: 156 and 161–162, n. 26; see also Frauwallner 1956: 105, n. 142 and Mesquita 1995: 253.

¹⁸⁹ See, e.g., Jha 1984: I.285ff., Chakrabarti 1983, Halbfass 1997: 155, or Framarin 2008. On the paucity of our knowledge regarding pre-Śāṅkarian Vedānta, and for bibliographical references on the subject, see, e.g., Qvarnström 1989: 15–18.

¹⁹⁰ See, e.g., Potter 1977b: 688, n. 21; see also Shamasastri 1937: 355–356.

different from nonexistence. And who would long for the nonexistence of a self beloved above all? Therefore liberation would not be a human goal.¹⁹¹

One can wonder whether here Maṇḍanamiśra has borrowed the criticism from Dharmakīrti, or if they have both drawn it from a common source. At any rate, Dharmakīrti's ironical analogy in PV 2.233ab (a man who wants a woman but cannot hope to get one contents himself with an animal) is explicitly quoted by another Brahmanical author, namely, the Naiyāyika Udayana. Quite amusingly, the latter exploits it *against* the proponents of the thesis that liberation consists in bliss, as an illustration of the fact that as soon as desire arises, it can focus on any object (so that someone who desires a liberation imagined as an eternal bliss is bound to end up desiring worldly objects as well):

And this [process supposedly leading to the removal of ignorance] can never reach its end since, the intention [to act] being dependent on the traces [left by former] pleasure, once this [intention to act] arises, one can act even with regard to sensuous objects [even though one is] desirous of superior pleasures, according to the illustration [given by Dharmakīrti]: “[We] observe that if [a man driven by lust] does not obtain the wanton woman [whom he is longing for, he can turn his] desire towards animals.”¹⁹²

Interestingly enough, Pakṣilasvāmin already addresses the objection according to which a liberated state devoid of pleasure cannot be desired. His main line of argument consists in pointing out that we do not merely act so as to get something that we desire, but also so as to avoid what we do not desire. According to him, the objection does not hold “because [activity can also] be aimed at avoiding [something that is] not desirable”;¹⁹³ one can endeavour to obtain liberation with the sole

¹⁹¹ BSi 16,14–16: *vijñānādiviśeṣaguṇanivṛttilakṣaṇā ca muktir ucchedapakṣān na bhi-dyate / na hi sato 'py ātyantiko darśanābhāvo 'bhāvād viśiṣyate / kaś ca sarvataḥ preyasa ātmano 'bhāvam abhikāṅkṣed ity apuruṣārtho mokṣaḥ syāt /*.

¹⁹² ĀTV 922,3–8: *durantaṃ ca tat / tadabhisandheḥ sukhasaṃskārasahakāritayā tad-udbhava viśiṣṭasukhābhilāṣiṇo vaiṣayike 'pi pravṛttisambhavāt / alābhe mattakāśin-yā dṛṣṭā tiryakṣu kāmītey udāharaṇād iti /*. Chakrabarti (1983: 177) considers that the “rather obnoxious illustration” belongs to Udayana himself; Dravid (1995: 434) presents the quotation as a general “saying.”

¹⁹³ NBh 23,18: *aniṣṭoparamārthatvāt*.

aim of getting rid of pain, and in order to get rid of pain, it is necessary to renounce whatever is the object of our desires:

And this [inference put forward by our opponent] does not hold, since the teaching of liberation is aimed at avoiding what is not desirable, and [so is] the activity of [those] who seek liberation. Even [that which is] desirable turns out not [to be] desirable because it is intermingled with [what is not] desirable, since no desirable [thing] can exist without being pervaded with [something] undesirable. And [someone] making efforts so as to get rid of what is not desirable also abandons what is desirable, because it is impossible to get rid [of one of them while] separating [it from the other].¹⁹⁴

Pakṣilasvāmin emphasizes that this position is in keeping with scripture (even though they may state that liberation involves a permanent pleasure) provided that one understands the term “pleasure” as merely denoting an absence of pain (and the Ātmavādin portrayed by Dharmakīrti may well have this reasoning in mind when mentioning a “superior pleasure” in PV 2.231):

And even though there may be [some] scripture [teaching that the liberated state is pleasant, this does] not [entail any] contradiction since the mention of pleasure [in this scripture simply] means the absolute absence of the pain [which characterizes] *saṃsāra*. [In other words:] even though there may be a certain scripture [teaching] that for [someone who is] liberated there is an absolute pleasure, this is possible in the following way: the word “pleasure” is used [here] in the sense of an absolute absence of the pain [which characterizes] *saṃsāra*. For [we] observe that in the world, [people] frequently use the word “pleasure” in the sense of an absence of pain.¹⁹⁵

Uddyotakara similarly explains:

¹⁹⁴ NBh 23,19–22: *etac cāyuktam / anīṣṭoparamārtho mokṣopadeśaḥ pravṛttiś ca mukṣūṇām iti / neṣṭam anīṣṭenānanuviddham sambhavatīty anīṣṭānubandhād iṣṭam apy anīṣṭam sampadyate / anīṣṭahānāya ca ghaṭamāna iṣṭam api jahāti vivekahāna-syāśakyatvād iti /*.

¹⁹⁵ NBh 24,7–10: *ātyantike ca saṃsāraduḥkhābhāve sukhavacanād āgame 'pi saty avirodhaḥ / yady api kaścid āgamaḥ syān muktasyātyantikam sukham iti sa sukhaśabda ātyantike saṃsāraduḥkhābhāve prayukta ity evam upapadyate / dṛṣṭo hi duḥkhābhāve sukhaśabdaprayogo bahulaḥ loka iti /*.

[This objection does] not [hold], because [we] observe [that there are] two [kinds of] activities: two [kinds of] activities are found in the world, [namely those] that are aimed at obtaining [what is] desirable and [those] that are aimed at getting rid of [what is] not desirable. Among them, it is uncertain whether the state of renunciation (*pārvīrāṇya*) is aimed at obtaining [what is] desirable or at getting rid of [what is] not desirable. If [you reply that we know this] from scripture [i.e., that we] know from scripture that a liberated self possesses a permanent pleasure, since [we] learn [from the scripture] that the liberated self experiences pleasure, [we answer that] scripture too must be examined in the following way: does it say that [the liberated self] possesses (*yoga*) a permanent pleasure, or rather that it is completely separated (*viyoga*) from pain? And [we] observe in the world that the word “pleasure” is frequently used in the sense of a [mere] absence of pain as well. And thus, when [they] cease to have (*viyoga*) fever, etc., even ordinary people are found to say: “[Now] we have come to experience pleasure (*sukhin*).”¹⁹⁶

Pakṣilasvāmin further argues that if someone who aspires to be liberated wanted bliss, he would never obtain liberation, since he would remain attached to pleasure (and therefore to the bondage of *saṃsāra* as well):

[Besides,] one does not obtain liberation if one does not get rid of the desire of a permanent pleasure, because it is acknowledged that desire is bondage. If that is the case, he who strives for liberation incited by desire for a permanent pleasure, [thinking:] “A permanent pleasure is manifested in liberation,” cannot obtain liberation; [i.e.,] he is not capable of obtaining [it]. For desire is acknowledged to be bondage; and it is not sound [to say] that although there is [such a] bondage, somebody [can] be liberated. [On the other hand, someone] who has abandoned the desire of a permanent pleasure encounters no obstacle [to the obtainment of liberation. I.e.,] on the other hand, he [who really seeks liberation] abandons the desire of a permanent pleasure; since

¹⁹⁶ NV 82,15–21: *na / pravṛttidvaitadarśanāt / dve pravṛttī loke dṛṣṭe / iṣṭādhigamārthāniṣṭahānārthā^a ca / tatredaṃ pārvīrāṇyaṃ kim iṣṭādhigamārtham āho 'niṣṭahānārtham iti sandihyate / āgamād iti cet / āgamād etad gamyate muktasyātmāno nityaṃ sukham iti / muktaḥ sukhī bhavātīti śrūyate / āgamo 'py evaṃ vicāraṇīyaḥ / kim ayaṃ nityena sukheṇa yogam āhota duḥkhenātyantikaṃ viyogam āheti / dṛṣṭas ca duḥkḥābhāve 'pi sukhaśabdaprayogo bahudhā loka iti / evaṃ ca jvarādiviyoge laukikā apy ācakṣāṇakā bhavanti sukhinaḥ saṃvṛttāḥ sma iti / .^a iṣṭādhigamārthāniṣṭahānārthā conj. : iṣṭādhigamārthāniṣṭādhigamārthā Ed.*

this [desire] is abandoned, this [person] has no desire of a permanent pleasure that would be an obstacle [to liberation]. If that is so, [there is no desire of a permanent pleasure,] whether [someone] liberated possesses a permanent pleasure or not, in either case, his obtaining liberation is not doubtful.¹⁹⁷

It is striking that Dharmakīrti does not mention any of these Naiyāyika replies to the objection according to which the liberated state as they describe it cannot be desired nor, as a consequence, aimed at. Instead of attacking these responses, he points out in PV 2.234 that in the Nyāya system, because the liberated state is devoid of pleasure, it amounts to naught, since it is no longer what the Naiyāyikas themselves consider it to be, i.e., “the substratum of all experiences, transactions and qualities.” As Śākyabuddhi explains:

But if, in the state of liberation (**nirvāṇāvasthā*), [the self] is devoid of the nature [consisting in being the] substratum of the experience of all pleasures and pains, then it has no possibility of pleasure; how[then,] could [we] accept that one [may] long for it?¹⁹⁸

Dharmakīrti’s commentators point out that by presenting liberation in such a way, the Ātmavādins implicitly admit the self’s impermanence, since according to their own definition of the self, the liberated state as they describe it is indistinguishable from the self’s perishing. Devendrabuddhi thus introduces the passage in the following way:

¹⁹⁷ NBh 24,11–18: *nītyasukharāgasyāprahāṇe mokṣādhigamābhāvo rāgasya bandhanasamājñānāt / yady evaṃ mokṣe nīyaṃ sukham abhivyajyata iti nītyasukharāgeṇa mokṣāya ghaṭamāno na mokṣam adhigacchen nādhigantum arhatīti / bandhanasamājñāto hi rāgaḥ / na ca bandhane saty api kaścin mukta ity upapadyata iti / prahīṇanītyasukharāgasyāpratikūlatvam / athāsya nītyasukharāgaḥ prahīyate / tasmin prahīṇe nāsya nītyasukharāgaḥ pratikūlo bhavati / yady evaṃ muktasya nīyaṃ sukhaṃ bhavaty athāpi na bhavati nāsyobhayoḥ pakṣayor mokṣādhigamo vikalpyata iti /*

¹⁹⁸ PVT Ñe D142a1–2/175a8–b1: *ci ste mya ñan las ’das pa’i gnas skabs na bde ba dan sdug bsñal thams cad ñams su myoñ ba’i rten gyi ño bo dan bral ba ñid yin pa de bas na de la bde ba’i srid pa yod pa ma yin na / de ji ltar don gñer bar byed ces ’dod pa [...]* /.

Don't you [Ātmavādins] admit that [liberation is] the isolation (**kaivalya*) from any substratum of experience, etc.? [But] since this isolation is not different from nonexistence, [you] will indirectly admit that this self perishes.¹⁹⁹

While commenting on Devendrabuddhi's introduction to the same passage, Śākyabuddhi explains:

For if it loses its [very] nature of self, [namely its nature of being] the substratum of qualities of the self such as pleasure and pain, then it will be without a nature [of its own], because [you Ātmavādins] do not accept [this] nature [as that of the self in the liberated state] and because no new nature is [ever] produced [in this state, for] if a new nature were produced, the self would turn out to be impermanent. Such is [Devendrabuddhi's] intention.²⁰⁰

Devendrabuddhi, for his part, adds:

If the [opponent] admits that the substratum of experiences, transactions and qualities [has] ceased, then he should admit that it is no [longer] a self. Thus, there is not the least difference between [something that is] without a nature of its own (**niḥsvabhāva?*)[, like a hare's horn]²⁰¹ and [something that has] ceased [to be the] substratum of experiences, transactions and qualities.²⁰²

He concludes:

¹⁹⁹ PVP D101a7/P117a2–3: *loñs spyod la sogs pa'i rten thams cad ma tshañ ba ñid du 'dod pa 'am / med par khyad par med pa ñid kyi phyir / don gyis bdag de 'jig pa ñid yin par 'dod par 'gyur ro //*. According to LC 1771^b, Tib. *ma tshañ ba* may render Skt. *kaivalya*.

²⁰⁰ PVṬ Ñe D142a2–3/P175b1–3 (commenting on *med par khyad par med pa'i phyir* in Devendrabuddhi's introduction): *'di ltar gal te bde ba dañ sdug bsñal la sogs pa bdag gi yon tan gyi rten bdag gi rañ gi ño bo de las ñams pa de bas na ño bo med pa ñid du 'gyur te / rañ gi ño bo khas mi len pa'i phyir dañ ño bo g'zan skye ba med pa'i phyir ro // ño bo g'zan skye na ni bdag ñid mi rtag pa ñid du 'gyur ro zes bya bar dgoñs so //*.

²⁰¹ According to PVṬ Ñe D142a5–6/P175b6 (*rañ b'zin med pa las te ri boñ gi rā la sogs pa las zes bya ba'i don to //*).

²⁰² PVP D101b4–5/P117b1–3: *gal te 'di ñid ñams su myoñ ba dañ tha sñad dañ yon tan gyi rten ldog pa can du 'dod pa de'i tshe des ni de'i bdag med pa ñid yin par 'dod par 'gyur ro // de ltar na rañ b'zin med pa las ñams su myoñ ba dañ tha sñad dañ yon tan thams cad kyi rten ldog pa can yin par khyad par cuñ zad kyañ yod pa ma yin no //*.

Therefore whoever does not accept that the self is nonexistent ought not to admit that all the [self]'s experiences, etc., [have] ceased [in the liberated state].²⁰³

Manorathanandin gives a similar explanation:

Moreover, [you] accept [that] the self is in [a state of perfect] isolation because [things] like cognitions, the sense organs and the body being causes of pain, one becomes detached from them [and consequently] abandons them. Therefore [you] ought to accept that [it] perishes, since in the state of liberation, this self is entirely severed from experiences, etc., [and] since there is no difference [between thus lacking the nature of a self] and perishing.²⁰⁴

Dharmakīrti comes back to this idea in PV 2.255, at the very end of his long criticism of Ātmavāda as the main obstacle to liberation. For now however, the argument does not seem to be put forward as a general remark regarding the internal contradiction of Ātmavāda (seen as a doctrine that asserts the existence of the self and yet advocates reaching a state where the self is as good as annihilated). Here, it rather seems to serve the specific purpose of showing that the Naiyāyikas fail to answer their opponents' objection: it is useless to assert as they do that one does not act merely so as to obtain pleasure but also so as to avoid pain, because someone who seeks liberation while being attached to the self cannot *want* such a state, i.e., cannot really seek such a liberation, as the nature of attachment is precisely not to be able to want the disappearance of what we are attached to. As Devendra-buddhi puts it:

²⁰³ PVP D101b7/P117b4–5: *de bas na gaṇ ṅig bdag gaṇ yin pa med par mi 'dod pa des ni de'i ṅams su myoṅ ba la sogs pa thams cad kyaṅ ldog pa can yin par 'dod par mi bya'o //*.

²⁰⁴ PVV 91,17–19: *kiṃ ca / yadi buddhīndriyaśarīrādīnāṃ duḥkhaḥetutvāt teṣu vairāgyāt tattyāgāt kaivalyam ātmana iṣṭam / muktidaśāyāṃ tadātmabhogādisakalaparicchēdabhāvān^a nāśāviśeṣān nāśa eveṣṭaḥ syāt /*. ^a °paricchēdabhāvān em.: °paricchēdābhāvān Ed.

[It is not the nature of love to] long for [something] desirable whose nature turns out to be as good as nonexistent, since it is devoid of any substratum of experience, etc.²⁰⁵

However hard the Naiyāyikas may try to justify the absence of pleasure in their liberated state, they themselves cannot make an effort to obtain liberation, because they cannot want it. Dharmakīrti concludes:

(2.235) [Therefore]²⁰⁶ in all cases, believing in the self greatly²⁰⁷ (*alam*) strengthens [one's] attachment to the self; [and] this [attachment to the self]²⁰⁸ which is the] seed of the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self, remains intact (*tadavastha*) [as long as one believes in the self].²⁰⁹

The belief in the self, far from being helpful to someone who seeks liberation, makes attachment to the self virtually unshakable. This attachment to the self is in turn the cause of what the Ātmavādin claims to eradicate, namely attachment to what is thought to belong to the self, and it is bound to go on producing its effect as long as the very belief in the self is not eliminated.

3.3.5. The Criticism of the Naiyāyikas' Understanding of *duḥkhabhāvanā* as a Means of Liberation (PV 2.236–246)

Dharmakīrti now turns back to the Nyāya's main instrument of liberation, i.e., the cultivation of the thought of pain. According to Manoranandin, the following verses answer this objection from the Ātmavādin:

²⁰⁵ PVP D101b3/P117a7: *loñs spyod la sogs pa'i rten thams cad dan bral ba ñid kyis med par mtshuñs par 'gro ba'i bdag ñid can gyi 'dod pa don du gñer bar byed /*.

²⁰⁶ According to PVV 92,5 (*tasmāt*) and PVP D102a1–2/P117b7 (*gañ gi phyir de lta yin pa de'i phyir*).

²⁰⁷ Skt. *alam* is rendered by Tib. *śin tu* (PVP D102a2/P117b7) and explained *atyartham* in PVV 92,7.

²⁰⁸ Devendrabuddhi explains *tat* as **ātmāsneha* in PVP D102a2/P117b8.

²⁰⁹ PV 2.235: *sarvathātmagrahaḥ sneham ātmani draḍhayaty alam / ātmīyasnehabījaṃ tat tadavasthaṃ vyavasthitam //*.

Suppose the following be urged: Detachment arises due to seeing defects in what [supposedly] belongs to the self. [Against this, Dharmakīrti] says [...].²¹⁰

The Ātmavādin considers that detachment can be achieved by making us aware of the defects in what we wrongly take to belong to the self, and according to him, this perception of the defects can be brought about by the cultivation of the thought of pain. Dharmakīrti is about to show at length that this cultivation is useless.

(2.236) Even if [one makes] an effort [in order to become detached from pain,²¹¹ attachment to the self] which exists (*vṛttimat*) provided that [it can] rest on [one's seeing even] the slightest (*leśa*) positive quality [in the self],²¹² opposes detachment from [the things] that [supposedly] belong to the self and conceals their defects.²¹³

According to the Ātmavādin, the cultivation of the thought of pain makes obvious the defects of the means of realizing pleasure that we wrongly take to belong to the self. In other words, it shows how they actually bring about pain. According to the Nairātmyavādin, however, this cultivation cannot achieve its goal, because our attachment to these factors rests on attachment to the self, which in turn rests on our belief that the self exists; and as Devendrabuddhi remarks,

if one does not eliminate attachment to the self, one cannot eliminate attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self.²¹⁴

²¹⁰ PVV 92,12: *syād etat / ātmīye doṣadarśanād vairāgyam utpadyata ity āha [...]* /.

²¹¹ According to PVP D102a3–4/P118a1–2 (*gal te yañ sdug bsñal la chags pa dañ bral ba'i phyir / 'bad rtsol rtsom pa yod pa de lta na yañ /*). Note also PVV 92,15: *doṣadarśanād yatne 'pi sati*. “Even if there is an effort due to [one's] seeing defects [in what supposedly belongs to the self].”

²¹² According to PVP D102a4/P118a2 (*bdag gi yon tan gyi cha mthoñ ba'i sgo nas*). Note however PVV 92,16: *ātmīyeṣu guṇaleśasya sukhasādhanaṭvāsya samāśrayaṇāt*. “Provided that [it can] rest on [one's seeing even] the slightest good quality in the [things supposedly] belonging to the self[, namely their] being means of realizing pleasure.”

²¹³ PV 2.236: *yatne 'py ātmīyavairāgyaṃ guṇaleśasamāśrayāt / vṛttimān pratibadhnāti taddoṣān saṃvṛṇoti ca //*.

²¹⁴ PVP D102a5/P118a4: *bdag tu chags pa dor ba med na / bdag gi chags pa dor bar bya bar nus pa ma yin no //*.

This attachment to the self, which rests on our seeing even the slightest positive quality (i.e., mere existence)²¹⁵ in the self, prevents us from seeing the factors' defectiveness (i.e., the fact that they cause pain)²¹⁶ and hence from becoming detached from them. Manorathanandin draws the consequence of this:

Therefore how can [someone] who is attached to the self be detached from what [supposedly] belongs to the self? For attachment to the self is the root[-cause] of all defects.²¹⁷

To this the Ātmavādin replies that by becoming detached from the self we can become detached from what we wrongly consider to belong to the self, though the self is not *per se* responsible for our attachment:

(2.237) Objection: [But one] becomes detached from the self as well. [Answer:] Now[, even if we admit that one can become detached from a self regarded as free from defects], just as he who becomes detached [from the self thus considered] does not abandon the self [for all that, in the same way, he will not abandon what supposedly belongs to the self just because he has become detached from it].²¹⁸ As a consequence, cultivating [the thought of] pain is useless.²¹⁹

As Devendrabuddhi explains,²²⁰ the Ātmavādin's answer is unacceptable because PV 2.220cd has already shown that there is no way to become detached from a self seen as perfectly free of defects. Manorathanandin too reminds his readers of this impossibility:

²¹⁵ See, e.g., PVP D97a6/P112a5–6, quoted above, fn. 105, p. 214.

²¹⁶ See PVV 92,17: *taddoṣāṃś ca duḥkhasāadhanādīn*. "And [it conceals] their defects, i.e., [their being] means of realizing pain, etc."

²¹⁷ PVV 92,17–18: *tat kuta ātmasnehavata ātmīye vairāgyayogaḥ / ātmasnehasya sarvadoṣamūlatvāt* /.

²¹⁸ According to PVP D102b2/P118b1 (*skyes bu bdag la chags pa dañ bral du zin kyañ bdag spoñ ba ma yin no // de bžin bdag gi yañ chags pa dañ bral na yañ de dor bar 'gyur ba ma yin pa de ltar na*). The wording is closely similar to PVV 92,24–25 (*na hy ātmani virakto 'pi taṃ tyajati / tathātmīye 'pi viraktas taṃ na tyakṣyatīti* [...]).

²¹⁹ PV 2.237: *ātmany api virāgaś cen nedānīṃ yo virajyate / tyajaty asau yathātmānaṃ vyarthāto duḥkhabhāvanā* //.

²²⁰ See PVP D102b1/P118a8: *de ñid 'dir ñes med gañ la chags pa dañ bral ba'i rgyu ni yod pa ma yin no źes bya bar bśad zin to* //.

And there is no cause [that could] remove the attachment to a self free of defects.²²¹

Nonetheless, here Dharmakīrti provisionally admits that we can become detached from the self;²²² nevertheless, even then we would not really abandon it, since we would still believe in its existence; and for the same reason, we would not really abandon what we wrongly take to belong to it. Devendrabuddhi summarizes the argument in the following way:

Thus, one gives oneself up to the cultivation [of the thought] of pain in order to achieve detachment, which is the cause (**nimitta*) of [one's] getting rid of pain; [but] if (**yadā*), although one obtains detachment through this [cultivation of the thought of pain], one does not get rid of the self, then, similarly, he who cultivates [the thought of] pain will not get rid of what [supposedly] belongs to the self.²²³

An Ātmavādin relying on the doctrine defended by Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara might object that even though the self is not eliminated when we become detached from it, pain at least is eliminated; and pain is precisely what someone seeking liberation tries to avoid. Devendrabuddhi explains why such a reasoning does not hold:

Suppose the following be urged: Although one becomes detached [from the self], one eliminates pain [alone], which can be eliminated, whereas the self cannot be eliminated. [To this one should answer: But] then, if one does not get rid of the self, which is the cause of activity (**pravṛttinimitta*) [leading to] pain, this [pain] does not cease either, [and] thus one does not eliminate what [supposedly] belongs to the self. Or, if [you] accept that one eliminates the na-

²²¹ PVV 92,20–21: *na cātmani nirdoṣe snehāpagamakāraṇam asti /*.

²²² See PVP D102b1/P118a8–b1 (*gṛān yañ bdag la chags pa dañ bral ba yañ bla ste / de ltar na yañ [...]* /). See also PVV 92,21 (*bhavatu tāvat tathāpi*).

²²³ PVP D102b3–4/P118b2–4: *de ltar na sdug bsñal bsgom pa sdug bsñal dor ba'i rgyu mtshan 'dod chags dañ bral ba kun nas byed pa'i phyir tshol bar byed do // gañ gi tshe des kyañ 'dod chags dañ bral ba thob pa yod na yañ bdag dor ba ñid ma yin pa de'i tshe / de dañ 'dra bar sdug bsñal bsgoms pas bdag gi yañ dor bar mi 'gyur ro //*.

ture which is the cause of activity [leading to] pain, [then] it will follow that, since [it] is of a perishable nature, the self is not a self.²²⁴

According to the Naiyāyikas, activity (*pravṛtti*) leads to pain, and the defects (*doṣa*) are the causes of activity.²²⁵ However, Dharmakīrti has already shown that it is the belief in the self's existence that constitutes the real defect, i.e., the real cause of bondage. As a consequence, the self must be the real cause of activity that leads to pain, so that pain itself cannot cease as long as we do not cease believing in the self's existence. If the Naiyāyika really seeks to eliminate the cause of activity, he should rather endeavour to eliminate the self itself, i.e., he should accept the doctrine of *nairātmya*.

Dharmakīrti is now about to adduce a third reason why the cultivation of the thought of pain as advocated by the Naiyāyikas is useless. Devendrabuddhi introduces the verse in the following way:

Moreover[, let us consider the following objection:] He who cultivates [the thought of] pain can become detached from what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [for] he can make pain [directly] perceptible (**pratyakṣi-√kr-*) through cultivation, because all undertakings of [salvific] means such as cultivation are aimed at having [something directly] perceptible, because a specific result other than this one is not established. [Now,] in order to show that, since [pain] is not different when [the cultivation of the thought of pain and the subsequent perceptualization] exist, there is no detachment [from what (supposedly) belongs to the self] even by means of the perception produced

²²⁴ PVP D102b5–7/P118b6–8: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / 'dod chags dañ bral ba yod du zin kyañ dor bar nus pa can gyi sdug bsñal dor ba yin gyi / bdag dor bar nus pa can ni ma yin no že na / de'i tshe sdug bsñal 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan bdag dañ ma bral na de yañ ldog pa med pa ñid yin pa de ltar na bdag gi yañ dor ba ñid ma yin pa 'am / sdug bsñal la 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan gyi rañ bžin spoñ bar khas len na 'jig pa'i rañ bžin can yin pas na bdag bdag med pa ñid thal bar 'gyur ro //*.

²²⁵ See, e.g., NSū 1.1.18, quoted above, fn. 70, p. 203, and NBh 219,11–13, quoted above, fn. 71, p. 204. According to the Naiyāyikas, activity leads to pain because it produces merit and demerit (*dharmādharmā*) which in turn lead to the experience of pleasure and pain. See, e.g., NSū 1.1.2, quoted above, fn. 19, p. 192, NBh 258,10–15, quoted above, fn. 22, p. 193, and NBh 7,12–14, quoted above, fn. 23, p. 193.

by the cultivation [of the thought of pain, Dharmakīrti] states [the following stanza].²²⁶

(2.238) Even by cultivating [pain], it is nothing but pain that the [*yogin*]²²⁷ may make [directly] manifest [to himself. But] this [pain, which is taught in your treatises as a means towards liberation and which, according to them, must be cultivated,]²²⁸ is already perceptible prior [to the cultivation process. Thus] even so,²²⁹ [he who makes pain directly perceptible to himself through cultivation]²³⁰ does not become detached [from what supposedly belongs to the self].²³¹

The Naiyāyikas' cultivation of the thought of pain is supposed to bring about the immediate awareness of pain, but this attempt is perfectly redundant insofar as we experience pain as the most evident of facts. As Manorathanandin explains, pain is already perceptible prior to the cultivation process, "when one experiences the blow of a sword for instance" (*śāstraprahārādyanubhavadakāla*).²³² Now, there is no point in revealing what is already obvious, and this cultivation has no effect whatsoever on the pain that we are already experiencing, so that it

²²⁶ PVP D102b7–103a2/P118b8–119a3: *g'zan yañ sdug bsñal bsgoms pas bdag gi la 'dod chags dañ bral bar 'gyur zñ / 'dis kyañ bsgom pas sdug bsñal mñon sum du byed par 'gyur te / bsgom pa la sogs pa thabs rtsom pa thams cad kyi 'bras bu ni mñon sum du gnas pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir ro // de las lhag pa'i 'bras bu'i khyad par grub pa med pa ñid kyi phyir ro // de'i yod na yañ khyad par med pa'i phyir / 'dod chags dañ bral ba mi 'byuñ ba ni bsgom pas byas pa'i mñon sum las kyañ yod^a pa yin no zes bstan pa'i phyir / sdug bsñal bsgoms pas kyañ de dag ces bya ba la sogs pa smos te /*
^a yod em. : med DP.

²²⁷ According to PVP D103a2/P119a3 (**yogin*) and PVV 93,1 (*bhāvaka*).

²²⁸ According to PVP D103a3/P119a4–5 (*luñ las bstan pa'i sdug bsñal gañ yin pa de gañ bsgom pas bsgom par bya ba gañ yin pa de*) and PVV 93,4 (*tac ca [...] pratyakṣam eva duḥkhaṃ snehādī*).

²²⁹ PVV 93,5: *tathāpi pratyakṣīkṛtāmasnehādiḥkhatve 'pi*. "“Even so” [i.e.,] even if [cultivating the thought of pain] makes [directly] perceptible the fact that attachment to the self and so on are pain.”

²³⁰ According to PVP D103a3–4/P119a5–6 (*bsgom pas kyañ sdug bsñal mñon sum du byas pa can*).

²³¹ PV 2.238: *duḥkhabhāvanayāpy eṣa duḥkham eva vibhāvayet / pratyakṣaṃ pūrvam api tat tathāpi na virāgavān /*

²³² PVV 93,4.

cannot bring about any detachment. Devendrabuddhi thus reformulates Dharmakīrti's reasoning in the following way:

And [here,] the argument [is as follows]: he who is attached to the self (**ātmasnehavat?*), even though he perceives pain in a direct manner, does not become detached through it [from what supposedly belongs to the self], like the human being in the condition of an ordinary person (**prthagjana*). Now, the human being who wishes to perceive pain in a direct manner is attached to the self even after [he has made it perceptible by means of cultivation. The logical reason involved in this argument] is the perception of [what is] contradictory to the cause (**kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi*).²³³

While commenting on this stanza, Devendrabuddhi emphasizes the difference in this respect between the Naiyāyikas' cultivation of the thought of pain and the Buddhist cultivation of selflessness:

The treatise that teaches [that] the mere cultivation of [the thought of] pain [is enough] in order to [achieve] liberation does not teach anything [that would be] unperceived [otherwise]. For the manifestation [of pain] thanks to the cultivation [of the thought] of pain is not known to be a cause of detachment. Thus, the treatise is useless even though it teaches this [cultivation of the thought of pain as a salvific means. On the contrary,] our [treatises] are correct because [according to them], one becomes detached through selflessness, which [remains] first unperceived [and] then [only] is made [directly] perceptible through cultivation.²³⁴

The Naiyāyikas' doctrine is useless because it teaches nothing that would be unknown prior to its understanding, whereas the Buddhist path leads to the direct realization of the thus far unperceived selfless-

²³³ PVP D103a6-7/P119a8-b2: *sbyor ba yañ gañ bdag la chags pa dañ ldan pa de ni sdug bśñal mñon sum du mthoñ du zin kyañ de las 'dod chags dañ bral bar ñe bar 'gro ba ma yin te / dper na so so'i skye bo'i gnas skabs can gyi skyes bu de ñid lta bu'o // sdug bśñal mñon sum du mthoñ bar 'dod pa'i skyes bu de yañ phyis kyañ bdag tu chags pa dañ ldan pa yin no źes bya ba ni rgyu 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //*.

²³⁴ PVP D103a4-6/P119a6-8: *grol ba'i phyir sdug bśñal bsgom pa tsam ston pa'i bstan bcos kyis ma mthoñ ba cuñ zad kyañ bstan pa med de / 'di ltar sdug bśñal bsgom pas rnam par bsgoms pa 'dod chags dañ bral ba'i phyir rgyur rtogs^a pa ma yin pa de ltar na de ston par byed pa yin du zin kyañ bstan bcos kyi 'bras bu med pa ñid yin no // kho bo cag gi ni sñar bdag med pa ñid ma mthoñ ba phyis bsgom pas mñon sum du byas pas 'dod chags dañ bral ba'i phyir rigs pa yin no //*. ^a *rtogs conj.* : DP rtag.

ness. Thus according to our authors, ordinary persons (*prthagjana*) are *per definitionem* under the sway of ignorance (*avidyā*), of which we already know that it consists in the twofold false view of the self or personalistic belief (*ātmadr̥ṣṭi*, *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*).²³⁵ However, through listening to the Buddhist teachings (the so-called *śrutamayī prajñā*) and reflecting upon them by means of the *pramāṇas* (the so-called *cintāmayī prajñā*), they gain an initial insight into selflessness and enter the path properly speaking, i.e., cultivation (the so-called *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*), which entails two main segments: first, the path of vision (*darśana-mārga*), in which they secure a first intuitive insight into the nobles' truths, i.e., the fundamental structure of reality, and get rid of the speculative (*vi-* or *pari-kalpita*) form of the personalistic belief; and second, the path of (mental) cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), in which they gradually uproot all the remaining defilements. Finally, upon the transformation of the basis-of-existence (*āśrayaparivṛtti*) – which coincides with the attainment of liberation – the innate (*sahaja*) form of the personalistic belief is eradicated.

The Ātmavādin could nonetheless argue that the cultivation of the thought of pain does reveal something thus far unperceived, namely the defects inherent in what we wrongly think to belong to the self. Thus according to Devendrabuddhi, the following stanzas answer this objection from the Ātmavādin:

[Objection: But we] observe that someone becomes detached due to seeing a defect in something.²³⁶

Dharmakīrti shows, however, that as long as we believe in the self's existence, making these defects obvious is of no avail:

(2.239–241) Even if [someone's] mind momentarily (*tatkṣaṇam*)²³⁷ swerves by [observing] a [certain] defect in one [thing usually recognized as a means

²³⁵ See above, Introduction, §0.1.1.

²³⁶ PVP D103a7/P119b2–3: *gal te la lar ñes pa mthoñ ba las skyes bu 'dod chags dan bral ba mthoñ ño //*.

²³⁷ I.e., according to PVP D103b2/P119b5 (*ji srid ñes pa mthoñ ba'i bar la*), "as long as he observes [this] defect."

of realizing the self's pleasure],²³⁸ yet it does not become [entirely]²³⁹ detached from this [thing], as a lover [who has become detached from a certain woman because he sees a defect in her does not become detached] from another woman.²⁴⁰ For when one distinguishes between what is to be avoided (*tyājya*) [e.g., the unattractive woman from whom one is detached] and what is to be sought (*upādeya*) [e.g., the attractive woman to whom one is attached],²⁴¹ the attachment that has arisen regarding the [attractive] one²⁴² is the seed [i.e., the cause,]²⁴³ of the rise, in turn, of all [other] attachments[, including the attachment to what one was previously detached from]. An immaculate attachment to an immaculate [self], and the [diverse immaculate] means[, such as the sense organs, which are means of providing enjoyment for this self],²⁴⁴ and the world consists of just this.²⁴⁵ Now[, under

²³⁸ According to PVP D103b1/P119b4 (*bdag gi bde ba sgrub par byed pa ñid du khas blañ pa'i yul 'ga' žig la*). Note, however, PVV 93,7: *ekatrāparādhakārīṇi*, "in one offending [thing]." In fact the two commentaries are not contradictory, as the Naiyāyikas advocate a variety of cultivation of the thought of pain that focuses on the disgusting or offending aspects of things usually regarded as instrumental in pleasure: see above, fn. 65, p. 202.

²³⁹ According to PVV 93,11 (*viraktaḥ sarvathā*).

²⁴⁰ According to PVP D103b3–4/P119b7–8 (*dper na 'dod pa dan ldan pa 'ga' žig bud med gžan la skyon cuñ zad mthoñ bas chags pa dan bral ba / gžan la chags pa dan ma bral ba ñid yin pa lta bu'o // yul gžan la 'byuñ ba can gyi 'dod chags kyi lhag ma ni bud med de la yañ 'dod chags skye ba'i rgyur 'gyur ro //*).

²⁴¹ According to PVP D103b5–6/P120a2–3 (*skyes bu 'ga' žig dor bar bya ba yin / dper na mñon par 'dod par bya ba ma yin pa'i bud med lta bu'o // 'ga' žig blañ bar bya ba yin te / dper na mñon par 'dod pa'i bud med lta bu'o // de ltar na blañ bar bya ba dan dor bar bya ba sna tshogs pa ñid yod na'o //*).

²⁴² Devendrabuddhi clearly takes *eka* to refer to the thing recognized as desirable (PVP D103b6–7/P120a3–4: *blañ bar bya bar 'dod pa'i don gyi rjes su 'brañ ba can no //*). Manorathanandin takes it to refer to either the *tyājya* or the *upādeya* (PVV 93,15: *ekasmin bhāvinī dveṣaṇīyāyānūrāgaviṣayatayā vā //*).

²⁴³ That is, **nimitta* according to PVP D103b7/P120a4 (*'dod chags kyi yul gyi rjes su 'byuñ ba can gyi chags pa de ni / sa bon yin te rgyu mtshan yin no //*) and *kāraṇa* according to PVV 93,18 (*sā saktir bījaṃ kāraṇam*).

²⁴⁴ According to PVP D104a6/P120b4–5 (*bdag skyon med pa'i loñs spyod sgrub par byed pa dbaṅ po la sogs pa de dag kyañ skyon med yin no //*).

²⁴⁵ I.e., according to PVP D104a7/P120b5–6, of the self (**ātman*), of the attachment to it (**tatsneha*) and of things such as the sense organs and the body (**indriyaśarīrā-dī*). Note PVV 94,1: *tribhir jagataḥ saṅgrahāt /*. "Because the world exhausts itself (*saṅgraha*) in [these] three [things]."

such circumstances,] from what [can] the [person longing for liberation]²⁴⁶ become detached?²⁴⁷

There is no point in making obvious the defects inherent in the means of realizing the self's pleasure, since the awareness of these defects is incapable of putting an end to our attachment to what we consider ours: if we happen to realize that something considered ours is defective, for all that we do not become detached from it, just as a lover who has seen a defect in the woman he loves and gets detached from her does not thereby acquire detachment with respect to all women. Devendrabuddhi explains:

The remaining [part] of the desire that was born regarding one object [i.e., the woman whom one used to love,] can become the cause of the rise of desire even towards the woman [from whom one had become detached in the meantime]. Thus [it is the seed of the rise,] in turn, [of all other attachments. To wit:] even if the vision of good qualities is a cooperating [factor in the rise of desire, the fact that one sees defects certainly does not guarantee that desire does not rise anew, so that] at a certain time, one can feel desire even for that very woman from whom one used to be detached (**vairāgyaviṣaya?*). Thus, one is [certainly] not entirely detached [from this object].²⁴⁸

According to PV 2.240, the very distinction between what is to be avoided and what is to be sought involves attachment, since attachment to what is to be sought in turn gives rise to all other attachments, including those that regard objects from which we used to be detached. Devendrabuddhi explains:

²⁴⁶ According to PVV 94,1 (*sa muktukāmaḥ*).

²⁴⁷ PV 2.239–241: *yady apy ekaṭra doṣeṇa tatkṣaṇaṃ calitā matiḥ / virakto naiva tatrāpi kāmīva vanitāntare // tyājiyopādeyabhede hi saktir yaivaikabhāvinī / sā bījaṃ sarvasaktīnāṃ paryāyeṇa samudbhava // nirdoṣaviṣayaḥ sneho nirdoṣaḥ sādhanāni ca /^a etāvad eva ca jagat kvedānīm sa virajyate //. ^a Note PV_{Miy(Tib)}: *skyon med yul can chags pa dañ // sgrub byed kyañ ni skyon med yin /*, suggesting a distributive meaning for *nirdoṣaḥ*.*

²⁴⁸ PVP D103b4–5/P119b8–120a2: *yul gžan la 'byuñ ba can gyi 'dod chags kyi lhag ma ni^a bud med de la yañ^b 'dod chags skye ba'i rgyur 'gyur ro // de ltar na rnam grañs kyis yon tan mthoñ ba lhan cig byed pa yod na yañ dus gcig gi tshe sñar 'dod chags dañ bral ba'i yul du gyur pa'i bud med de ñid la yañ 'dod chags dañ ldan par 'gyur ba de ltar na / śin tu 'dod chags dañ bral ba ñid ma yin no //. ^a See PVT Ñe D143a1–2/P176b4–5. ^b See PVT Ñe D143a2/P176b5.*

Someone may [well] be detached, at a [certain point in] time, from a certain [thing supposedly] belonging to the self; nonetheless, since [this person] has not abandoned attachment to a self,²⁴⁹ he can in turn, due to this very seed [of another attachment], feel again an attachment for [something supposedly] belonging to the self, as [one falls in love] with another woman. Therefore, this [person] is not entirely detached from a certain [thing].²⁵⁰

The commentator then emphasizes the contrast with the Buddhist path in this respect:

And this defect does not pertain to the [Buddhists'] perception of selflessness (**nairātmyadarśana*) [as a means toward salvation], because the perception of selflessness makes one detached from all [this, viz. both] the self and what [supposedly] belongs to the self indifferently. Moreover, [for the Ātmavādin] there [can] be no detachment from attachment to the self, etc., because, given that the self is immaculate, [things] like desire for this [self] are no less immaculate [than the self].²⁵¹

Dharmakīrti concludes in PV 2.241 that if, as the Ātmavādin contends, the root of attachment and suffering is nothing but the self's adventitious association with elements wrongly regarded as belonging to it, then nothing is defective in any way: neither the self (since it is free of defects when isolated from the means of experience), nor attachment to it (since the object of this attachment is immaculate), nor even the means of pleasure wrongly ascribed to it. For as Manorathanandin explains, even the means of realizing pleasure, which the Naiyāyika

²⁴⁹ Note that Tib. *bdag tu chags pa*, although it most often renders *ātmasneha*, is occasionally found to render *ātmīyasneha*: the passage could also mean "because he has not abandoned the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self."

²⁵⁰ PVP D103b7–104a2/P120a4–6: 'di dus gcig gi tshe bdag gi 'ga' 'zig la gañ 'dod chags dañ bral bar 'gyur ba de ltar na yañ / bdag tu chags pa ma spañs pa ñid kyi phyir / sa bon de ñid kyi bdag gi la yañ rnam grañs 'ga' 'zig gis chags par 'gyur te / bud med gžan la bžin no // de bas na de la la la śin tu 'dod chags dañ bral ba ma yin no //.

²⁵¹ PVP D104a4–5/P120b2–4: bdag med par mthoñ ba la yañ skyon 'di yod pa ma yin te / bdag med pa ñid mthoñ ba las bdag dañ bdag gi thams cad la khyad par med par 'dod chags dañ bral ba ñid kyi phyir ro // gžan yañ bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la 'dod chags dañ bral ba ñid ma yin no // de ltar na bdag skyon med pa yin pa'i phyir / de la 'dod chags la sogs pa yañ skyon yod pa ma yin te /.

tries so hard to see as defective, are in fact immaculate insofar as they are not associated with the self:²⁵²

The means of enjoyment as well [i.e.,] the sense organs, the body, etc., [and the sense organs' objects, i.e.,] sounds, tastes, visual objects, etc., are immaculate; because [according to the Ātmavādins,] all these [things] which are the self, etc., considered individually, are not causes of pain.²⁵³

Devendrabuddhi makes clear that as a consequence, in the Ātmavādin's perspective there is nothing to be detached from:

And since this [all] is immaculate, detachment cannot be cultivated. And since there is nothing else to be abandoned, from what can this person become detached so that (s)he might be liberated from the bondage of *saṃsāra*?²⁵⁴

(2.242) Objection: [Although attachment to the self for instance has an immaculate object, i.e., the self,] it²⁵⁵ is [not only endowed with good qualities but it is] also defective²⁵⁶ [inasmuch as it is the basis of pain. Answer:] The [defectiveness which you define as being the basis of pain]²⁵⁷ is the same for the self.²⁵⁸ [Thus as long as] the [person who strives for liberation²⁵⁹ has] not

²⁵² Dharmakīrti has already shown this in PV 2.225.

²⁵³ PVV 93,21–22: *upabhogasādhanāni cendriyaśarīrādīni śabdarasarūpādīni nirdoṣāni / ātmādinām sarveṣāṃ pratyekaṃ duḥkhaḥetutvābhāvāt /*.

²⁵⁴ PVP D104a7–b1/P120b6–7: 'di la skyon med pa ñid kyi phyir 'dod chags dañ bral ba ñid bsgom par bya ba ma yin no // dor bar bya ba gzan yañ yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir skyes bu de dag gañ la chags bral 'gyur gañ gis 'khor ba'i 'chiñ ba las grol bar 'gyur^a / .^a P om. gañ gis 'khor ba'i 'chiñ ba las grol bar 'gyur /.

²⁵⁵ PVV 94,3 seems to include *tasya* in the objection and interprets it as *snehendriyādeḥ*. Devendrabuddhi (PVP D104b4–5/P121a4) seems to exclude *tasya* from the objection (as does the *pratīka*: *gal te skyon bcas yin na yañ*) and to treat it as **mumukṣoḥ puruṣasya*. However, Devendrabuddhi's (PVP D104b2–3/P121a1–2) explanation of the objection clearly refers to *ātmasneha* as the subject: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / gal te yañ bdag skyon med pa'i yul can bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa yin pa de ltar na yañ sdug bsñal gyi rten ñid yin pa'i phyir 'di skyon dañ ldan pa yin no //*. "Suppose the following be urged: Even if [things] such as the attachment to the self have the immaculate self as their object, they have defects because they are the basis of pain."

²⁵⁶ According to PVV 94,3 (*na kevalaṃ guṇavattā sadoṣatāpi*).

²⁵⁷ According to PVP D104b5/P121a4 (*sdug bsñal gyi rten gyi mtshan ñid de /*).

²⁵⁸ Note Manorathanandin's (PVV 94,5) introduction to PV 2.242cd: *evaṃ tarhy ātma-doṣam eva vairāgyabhāvanayā jahyād iti cet /*. "Objection: [If it is] so, then through

[become] detached from the [self],²⁶⁰ which entails the [very same] defect [as] the [above-mentioned factors, i.e., the defect of being the cause of pain],²⁶¹ from what does he now become detached?²⁶²

The Ātmavādin defends his position by arguing that his thought has been distorted by the opponent: he does hold that attachment to the self has an immaculate object, but this does not make attachment to the self free of defects. On the contrary, this attachment is wrong and must be eliminated, since the Ātmavādin has already made clear that it is the basis of pain.

Dharmakīrti answers that the same can be said of the self, which, according to the Ātmavādin himself, must also be regarded as a basis of pain, at least inasmuch as it is associated with the means of experience. Thus, if we do not get detached from the self although we see it as a cause of pain, we cannot get detached from anything else that we might wrongly consider to belong to the self, as Devendrabuddhi makes clear:

Just as one is not detached from the self although it is the cause of pain, similarly, one will not be [detached] either from what [supposedly] belongs to the self.²⁶³

Manorathanandin further explains:

the cultivation of detachment, one may abandon the self's defect only [and not the self itself]."

²⁵⁹ According to PVV 94,7 (*sa mumukṣuḥ*); see also PVP D104b6/P121a6, quoted above, fn. 255, p. 253.

²⁶⁰ According to PVP D104b5/P121a5 and PVV 94,7 (*tatrātmāni*).

²⁶¹ According to PVT Ñe D143a2–3/P176b5–6 (*gañ la bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa 'byuñ ba'i nañ tshul can de'i skyon yod pa zes bya ba ni bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la 'byuñ ba'i nañ tshul can gyi skyon gañ yin pa'i skyon de ñid ni sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ñid yin no //*). Whereas Manorathanandin provides no explanation of *taddoṣe*, Devendrabuddhi (PVP D104b5–6/P121a5) clearly interprets it as a *bahuvrīhi* compound (*gañ la bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa 'byuñ ba'i nañ tshul can de'i skyon yod pa zes bya bar tshig rnam par sbyar ro //*).

²⁶² PV 2.242: *sadoṣatāpi cet tasya tatrātmāny api sāmā / tatrāviraktas taddoṣe kve-dānīm sa virajyate //*.

²⁶³ PVP D104b6/P121a6–7: *ji ltar sdug bsñal gyi rgyu ñid yod na yañ / bdag la 'dod chags dañ bral ba ldan pa ma yin pa de ltar bdag gi la yañ mi 'gyur ba [...]* /.

Just as one is not detached from the self, although it is defective, because one sees the self [as existing], similarly, due to attachment, one will not become detached from [something else] although it too has the defect of the [self], because one sees [it] as belonging to the self.²⁶⁴

Devendrabuddhi thus reformulates Dharmakīrti's reasoning in the following way:

And [here,] the argument [is as follows]: an x that does not occur even though a y is present does not have this y for its cause, as a sprout of rice does not exist even though a seed of barley exists. Now, detachment from the self does not occur even though [its] being the cause of pain exists. [The logical reason involved in this argument] is the perception of [something] contradictory to the pervader (**vyāpakavinuddhopalabdhi*).²⁶⁵

Dharmakīrti goes on:

(2.243ac) [Moreover, if] attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self were] born of the vision of good qualities,²⁶⁶ the vision of defects could [certainly] annul [it]. But this [attachment²⁶⁷ indeed] bears on the sense organs, etc., however it is not of such a kind (*evam*) [i.e., it is not born of the vision of good qualities in the sense organs]^{268, 269}

Dharmakīrti is now attacking the Ātmavādin's contention that attachment to the things that we wrongly believe to belong to the self has as its sole cause the fact that we see good qualities in them. If it were the

²⁶⁴ PVV 94,7–9: *yathā sadoṣe 'py ātmany ātma darśanād aviraktas tathā taddoṣe 'pi snehād ātmīyatvadarśanān na virajyete* /.

²⁶⁵ PVP D104b7–105a1/P121a7–8: *sbyor ba 'aṅ gaṅ žig gaṅ yod na yaṅ mi 'gyur ba de ni de'i rgyu mtshan can ma yin te / dper na nas kyi sa bon yod na yaṅ sā lu'i myu gu med pa lta bu'o // bdag la 'dod chags daṅ bral ba yaṅ sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ṅid yod na yaṅ mi 'gyur ro zes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o* /.

²⁶⁶ According to PVP D105a1/P121a8–b1 (*gṛān yaṅ gal te bdag gi la chags pa 'di yon tan mthoṅ ba las 'gyur ba / de'i tshe* [...]) /.

²⁶⁷ According to PVP D105a2/P121b2 (*chags pa de*) and PVV 94,15 (where *sa ca snehajendriyādāv* is likely to be emended into: *sa ca sneha indriyādāv*).

²⁶⁸ According to PVP D105a2/P121b2 (*yon tan mthoṅ ba las 'byuṅ ba ma yin*) and PVV 94,15 (*guṇadarśanān na dṛṣṭaḥ*).

²⁶⁹ PV 2.243ac: *guṇadarśanasambhūtaṃ snehaṃ bādheta doṣadrk / sa cendriyādāu na tv evam* [...]

case, this attachment could certainly be annulled through realizing that these factors are in fact defective, and the Naiyāyika's cultivation of the thought of pain would be an effective means of liberation, "for the vision of defects [would be] contradictory to the cause of the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self."²⁷⁰ But we are not attached to such things as our sense organs because we would see positive qualities in them:

[Although it relates to the sense organs, this attachment] is not born of the vision of good qualities; rather, the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self arises due to [its] being the basis of [the self's] enjoyment, etc. Now, how could the vision of pain, which does not annul the cause of the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self [i.e.,] the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, remove the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self?²⁷¹

Dharmakīrti then adduces several reasons to show that the Naiyāyika's cultivation of pain is useless:

(2.243d–244) [It is not born of the vision of good qualities in the sense organs, and therefore cannot be eliminated through the cultivation of the thought of pain,] because even children for instance have [attachment to their sense organs, etc.]; because [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self]²⁷² occurs even with regard to what [is one's own but] has defects[, like one's own impaired sense organs];²⁷³ because [attachment to what suppo-

²⁷⁰ PVP D105a1/P121b1: *skyon du lta ba bdag gi chags pa'i rgyu dan 'gal ba'i phyir /*.

²⁷¹ PVP D105a2–3/P121b2–3: *yon tan mthoñ ba las 'byuñ ba ma^a yin gyi / 'on kyañ loñs spyod kyi rten ñid yin pa la sogs pa'i sgo nas bdag gi blo bskyed pa yin na de ji ltar bdag gi chags pa'i rgyu bdag gi blo la sdug bsñal mthoñ ba gnod par byed pa ma yin no // bdag gi chags pa la gnod par 'gyur /*. [^a *ma* conj. : DP om. *ma*.] The Sanskrit original of the last (and, as far as its Tibetan translation is concerned, problematic) segment of Devendrabuddhi's explanation is provided by Vibh. 94, fn. 3: *ātmīya-buddher abādhakaṃ duḥkhadarśanaṃ katham ātmīyasneham apanudet /*.

²⁷² According to PVP D105a7/P122a1 (*rjes su chags pa*) and PVV 94,19 (*snehasya*). Cf. below, ad PV 2.244b, PVP D105b1/P122a3 (*bdag gi chags pa*) and Vibh. 94, fn. 6 (*snehañ*).

²⁷³ According to PVP D105a6–7/P121b8–122a1 (*mig la sogs pa bdag gi la yañ bdag gi ñid du bzuñ ba la*) and PVV 94,18 (*svakīye cakṣurādau guṇavikale*). As examples of the defects involved, see PVP D105a7/P122a1 (*rab rib dan loñ ba dan 'za ba dan*

sedly belongs to the self] does not occur with regard to what [belongs] to someone else even if [it is] endowed with good qualities[, like another person's beautiful eyes];²⁷⁴ or [again,] because [even] when it is one's own, one abandons [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self] with regard to what is dead for instance[, like one's fallen hair, nails or amputated limbs]^{275,276}

First, even children, who do not discriminate yet between defects and good qualities, are attached to their sense organs, which shows that our attachment to our sense organs does not arise from our finding positive qualities in them:

Even children and cattle, etc., who do not conceptualize the good qualities and defects (**a[pari]kalpitaguṇadoṣa?*) of [things] like the eyes that are [supposedly] related to the self, are attached to the eyes, etc. One ought to understand that, since this [attachment] exists even when there is no seeing of good qualities, it is not produced by the [latter].²⁷⁷

gzugs ñan pa la sogs pa, i.e., **timira*, **kāṇa[tva]*, *ža ba* [?], **vairūpya*) and PVV 94,18 (*kāṇatva*).

²⁷⁴ According to PVP D105b1/P122a2–3 (*skyes bu gžan ñid du mñon par 'dod pa'i mig la sogs pa yon tan dañ ldan pa gañ yin pa de la*) and PVV 94,19 (*anyatra parakiye netrādaḥ doṣarahite guṇavaty api*).

²⁷⁵ According to PVP D105b2/P122a4 (*gañ gi tshe bdag gi yañ 'das śiñ žig par gyur pa la'o* //). Examples and explanations of *ādi* are found in PVP D105b2–3/P122a4–5 (*sogs pa smos pas ni rañ gi lus las bog pa la sogs pa'i yan lag dañ ñiñ lag de dañ 'dra ba khyad par med pa yon tan ldan par mtshuñs pa dag la*) and PVV 94,23 (*atītādaḥ keśanakhādaḥ / ādīśabdāl lūnāṅgulyādaḥ* [...] /).

²⁷⁶ PV 2.243d–244: *bālāder api sambhavāt^a // doṣavaty api sadbhāvād abhāvād guṇavaty api / anyatrātmīyatāyām vā vyatītādaḥ vihānitah* //. ^a PV_{Vetter} and PV_{Miy(Tib)} read *darśanāt* instead of *sambhavāt*, but all commentators comment on *sambhavāt*: PVP D105a5/P121b6–7 (*yod pa'i phyir ro*), PVA 155,19 (*bhāvāt*), PVV 94,16 (*sambhavāt*).

²⁷⁷ PVP D105a5–6/P121b7–8: *byis pa dañ phyugs la sogs pa bdag dañ 'brel pa'i mig la sogs pa la yon tan dañ skyon du brtag pa dañ bral ba la yañ mig la sogs pa de la chags par 'gyur ba ñid yin no* // *yon tan mthoñ ba de med par yañ 'di yod pa'i phyir des byas pa ma yin no žes bya bar rtogs par 'gyur ro* //. Cf. PVA 155,18–19: *bālapaśv-ādīnām cāparikalpitaguṇadoṣāñām bhāvāt* /. “Because children, cattle, etc., have [an attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self] although they do not conceptualize good qualities and defects.” See also PVV 94,15–16: *bālāder api guṇaparīkṣām anupagamyā^a cakṣurādāv ātmīyatvamātreṇa snehasya sambhavāt* /. [^a *guṇa-*

Manorathanandin further explains that the real cause of the child's attachment to his organs is his mere apprehension of these organs as *his*:

The presence and absence of attachment are not [respectively] due to the vision of good qualities and defects [in the object of attachment]; rather, [they are respectively] due to the vision [of this object] as belonging to the self (*ātmīyatvadarśana*) [and] to the lack of [such a] vision, because [attachment and its absence respectively] conform to the presence and absence of this [vision].²⁷⁸

Second, we are attached to our sense organs even though we realize that they are impaired, which shows that the awareness of our organs' defects does not prevent us from being attached to them:

Therefore the [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self] occurs even from [one's] seeing defects.²⁷⁹

In contrast, we are not attached to the others' sense organs, even though we may notice their virtues, and we cease to be attached to what we no longer consider ours (such as fallen hair), "because one abandons attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self when one gets rid of the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self."²⁸⁰ As a consequence, "attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self] is not produced by the vision of good qualities,"²⁸¹ but stems from our very belief that it does belong to the self:

Therefore, since [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self] does not occur even when one sees good qualities and occurs when there is a notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [this attachment,] which arises from

parīkṣām anupagāmya conj. : guṇaparīkṣā 'bhyu(pagā)mya Ed.] "Because children for instance can have an attachment to the eyes, etc., whereas they have not [yet] undertaken an examination of [their] good qualities [i.e.] due to the mere fact that [they regard the eyes, etc.] as belonging to the self."

²⁷⁸ PVV 94,16–17: *guṇadoṣadarśanān na snehabhāvābhāvau / kiṃ tv ātmīyatvadarśanādarśanāt tadanvayavyatirekā nuvidhānād iti /*.

²⁷⁹ PVP D105a7/P122a1–2: *de bas na yon tan dañ skyon mthoñ ba las kyañ 'di 'gyur ba yin no //*.

²⁸⁰ PVP D105b3/P122a5: *bdag gi blo dor bayod na bdag gi chags pa dañ bral ba'i phyir /*.

²⁸¹ PVP D105b3/P122a5: *chags pa yon tan mthoñ bas byas pa mayin no //*.

the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, does not have the vision of good qualities for its cause (**nimitta*).²⁸²

Dharmakīrti has shown that our attachment to the elements that we take to belong to the self does not arise from our seeing positive qualities in them, but from the mere fact that we take them to be ours. The Ātmavādin might attempt to escape the objection by showing that nonetheless, our very notion that the means of enjoyment belong to us arises from our seeing positive qualities in them. In this way, he could show that Dharmakīrti's argument does not affect his position: the cultivation of the thought of pain can lead us to detachment by making us cease to see the means of enjoyment as endowed with positive qualities, and therefore by making us cease to see them as ours. According to Devendrabuddhi, PV 2.245 answers such an objection from the Ātmavādin:

Suppose the following be urged: [Well,] the vision of good qualities is not the cause of attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self. Rather, [its cause] is the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self. But this [very] notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self arises from the vision of good qualities. Therefore, one becomes detached from what [supposedly] belongs to the self by breaking, by means of the cultivation [of the thought] of pain, the vision of good qualities which is the cause of the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self.²⁸³

Dharmakīrti's answer runs as follow:

(2.245–246) And for this very reason, nor is the observation of good qualities the cause of the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self. Therefore [i.e., since this notion does not have the vision of good qualities for its

²⁸² PVP D105b3–4/P122a5–6: *de bas na yon tan mthoñ ba la yañ med pa'i phyir dan bdag gi śes pa yod na yod pa'i phyir bdag gi blo las byuñ ba ni yon tan mthoñ ba'i rgyu mtshan can ma yin pa [...]* /.

²⁸³ PVP D106a2–3/P122b6–7: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi bdag gir chags pa'i yon tan mthoñ ba ni rgyu ma yin no // 'o na ci yin ze na / bdag gi blo ñid yin no // bdag gi blo de yañ yon tan mthoñ ba las 'gyur ro //^a des na sdug bsñal bsgom pas bdag gi'i blo'i rgyur gyur pa yon tan mthoñ ba'i rgyun bcad pa las bdag gi chags pa dan bral ba yin pa [...]* / .^a To be compared with Vibh. 95, fn. 3: *syād etat / ātmīyasnehasyātmīya-buddhir eva hetuḥ / sā tu guṇadarśanāt [...]* /.

cause,]²⁸⁴ it²⁸⁵ is not abandoned either due to the vision of non-qualities [i.e., defects].²⁸⁶ Furthermore, [we] indeed observe that due to attachment,²⁸⁷ one superimposes unreal good qualities onto that [which is taken to be one's own,²⁸⁸ so that attachment prevents the vision of defects]. Therefore how [can] a [soteriological] injunction [prescribing the cultivation of the thought of pain]²⁸⁹ annul this [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self]²⁹⁰ if, as is the case, it] does not annul its cause [i.e., the vision of the self]^{291?292}

Dharmakīrti has just shown that our attachment to the elements thought to belong to the self does not stem from our observing positive qualities in them. He now specifies that he has refuted by the same token the contention that our very notion that they belong to the self may arise from our observing such good qualities in them. Rather, as Manorathanandin specifies, the cause of this notion can be nothing but the vision of the self:

And the cause of the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self is not observing good qualities, but rather, the very vision of the self.²⁹³

As a consequence, the cultivation of the thought of pain as the Naiyāyikas define it cannot have the power to eliminate our attachment by

²⁸⁴ According to PVP D106a5/P123a1 (*yon tan mthoñ ba'i rgyu can ma yin pa de'i phyir*) and PVV 95,1 (*tasmād guṇadarśana hetukatvābhāvāt*).

²⁸⁵ I.e., according to PVP D106a5/P123a2 and PVV 95,1, the notion of what supposedly belongs to the self (*bdag gi blo = ātmīyabuddhi*).

²⁸⁶ According to PVV 95,1–2 (*aguṇasya doṣasya darśanāt*).

²⁸⁷ PVP D106a7/P123a5 explains: *bdag tu chags las* (**ātmāsneha*). Should *bdag tu chags* rather be reconstructed as **ātmīyasneha*?

²⁸⁸ Devendrabuddhi (PVP D106a7/P123a5) seems to explain *tatra* as **ātmīyasnehe*, while Manorathanandin (PVV 95,7) explains it as *ātmīye*, preferable in our opinion.

²⁸⁹ According to PVP D106b1/P123a6 (*grol ba'i phyir brjod pa'i cho ga*) and PVV 95,8–9 (*vidhir dīkṣā duḥkhabhāvanādirūpaḥ*).

²⁹⁰ According to PVP D106b1–2/P123a7 (*bdag gi'i chags pa de la*) and PVV 95,9 (*taṃ snehādīm*).

²⁹¹ According to PVV 95,8 (*tasya snehādeḥ kāraṇasyātmadarśanasya*).

²⁹² PV 2.245–246: *tata eva ca nātmīyabuddher api guṇekṣaṇam / kāraṇam hīyate sāpi tasmān nāguṇadarśanāt // api cāsadguṇāropaḥ snehāt tatra hi dṛśyate / tasmāt tat-kāraṇābādhi vidhis taṃ bādhate katham //*.

²⁹³ PVV 94,25: *ātmīyabuddher api na guṇekṣaṇam kāraṇam kintv ātmadarśanam eva*.

making obvious the defects of what we are attached to. As Manorathanandin points out, the reason for this is that perceiving these defects is not contradictory to the cause of attachment:

For a [particular] property suppresses something [when it is] contradictory to [its] cause, as fire [eliminates] a specific horripilation [caused by cold. And] indeed, the vision of a self is the cause of attachment, of the vision of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, etc. Now, the vision of defects is not contradictory to this [vision of a self].²⁹⁴

According to Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti further points out that attempting to make obvious these defects is all the more useless since we naturally tend to superimpose good qualities onto what we take to be ours; “and due to [this] superimposition of unreal qualities, one never finds oneself in the position of seeing the defects.”²⁹⁵ Devendrabuddhi thus introduces this verse by explaining:

Moreover, the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [and] hence also attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self, exists as long as one has not got rid of attachment to the self. Now, this [attachment] prevents the vision of defects [...]. Thus how [can there be] a vision of defects [under such circumstances], so that attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self might be eliminated through it [i.e., through the vision of defects]?²⁹⁶

Dharmakīrti concludes that the Naiyāyikas’ cultivation of the thought of pain is pointless, since it is incapable of achieving the goal that the Naiyāyikas ascribe to it, i.e., eliminating our attachment to what we

²⁹⁴ PVV 95,4–5: *kāraṇaviruddho hi dharmo^a nivartakaḥ kasyacid yathāgnī romāñcavṛṣeṣasya / ātmadarśanaṃ hi snehātmīyadrśādeḥ kāraṇam / na ca tadvirodhinī doṣadrk* /. [^a dharmo PVV_{MS} 18a3 : dharmī Ed.] What Manorathanandin has in mind here is the perception of something contradictory to the cause, *kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi*, the example of which is the elimination of a specific horripilation by fire, which contradicts its cause, i.e., cold: see NB_M 2.40/NB_S 2.41 and NB_T_M 137,3–138,2/NB_T_S 35,9–20.

²⁹⁵ PVP D106a7–b1/P123a5: *yon tan med par sgro 'dogs pa las kyañ skyon mthoñ ba'i skabs śin tu med pa ñid yin no //*.

²⁹⁶ PVP D106a6–7/P123a3–5: *gžan yañ ji srid du bdag tu chags pa dan ma bral ba de srid du bdag gi blo yod pa / de bas na de srid du bdag gi'i chags pa yañ yod pa yin no // de yañ skyon mthoñ ba [...] la gags byed pa yin pa de ltar na gañ las skyon mthoñ ba yin žiñ / gañ gis de las bdag gi chags pa zad par 'gyur /*.

take to belong to the self. He then states the reason for this: such a cultivation has no power to eliminate the cause of this attachment, namely, our belief in the existence of the self, so that, as Manorathanandin explains, it cannot destroy our attachment to the means of enjoyment, “because the negation (*niṣedha*) of the effect cannot be achieved without the suppression (*nivṛtti*) of [its] cause.”²⁹⁷

*3.3.6. Dharmakīrti’s Refutation of the Sāṅkhya Position (PV
2.247–248)*

According to the commentators, the next couple of verses are directed against the Sāṅkhya soteriology. Devendrabuddhi thus considers that these stanzas are a reply to an Ātmavādin who defends the Sāṅkhya thesis that attachment is due to the confusion between the Person and primordial matter,²⁹⁸ and whose objection runs as follows:

As for us, we do not claim that attachment is due to the vision of good qualities, but rather, that attachment is [due to] a cognition which [erroneously] unifies primordial nature and the Person. Therefore, since one eliminates the idea of one’s own by knowing that primordial nature and the Person are distinct [things], one becomes detached [from what supposedly belongs to the self].²⁹⁹

Manorathanandin gives a similar explanation:

As for the representatives of the Sāṅkhya, they think [as follows]: As long as one regards the Person and primordial matter, which are [respectively] conscious and unconscious, as being one, (s)he is possessed of attachment and is not freed; [whereas] when (s)he perceives [their] difference, there is no [more] attachment, and (s)he is released.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ PVV 95,9: *kāraṇānivṛtṭyā kāryaṇiṣedhasya kartum aśakyatvāt /*.

²⁹⁸ See above, §3.1.1.

²⁹⁹ PVP D106b2–3/P123a7–8: *kho bo yon tan du mthoñ ba las chags par mi smra’o // ’o na ci yin že na / rañ bžin dañ skyes bu dag la blo gcig tu byed pa ni chags pa yin no // des na rañ bžin dañ skyes bu gžan du śes pas rañ ñid kyi blo ’dor ba’i phyir ’dod chags dañ bral ba yin no že na /*.

³⁰⁰ PVV 95,11–12: *sāṅkhyās tu manyante / cetanācetanayoḥ puruṣapradhānayoḥ yāvad aikyaṃ manyate puruṣaḥ / tāvat sa snehavān amuktaś^a ca / bhedaḥ pratītau na sneho vimuktaś^b ceti /*. ^a *amuktaś* conj. : *ayuktaś* Ed. ^b *vimuktaś* conj. : *vīyuktaś* Ed.

According to the Sāṅkhya, we are attached to things such as our sense organs because although these are in fact nothing but evolutes of the primordial, unconscious and active matter, we wrongly identify them with the self, i.e., the Person understood as a pure, passive consciousness. Devendrabuddhi notices that the Sāṅkhya position has already been set aside earlier and refers back to PV 2.230ab.³⁰¹ There, according to Devendrabuddhi's interpretation of the verse,³⁰² the Naiyāyika opponent was criticizing the Sāṅkhya thesis that we regard what does not essentially belong to the self as ours because of some confusion between the Person and primordial matter. Devendrabuddhi then adds:

[But] let [us] admit that [attachment] is produced by [such] a unitary cognition. Even so, it is incorrect that the cognition of the self is one with [that of] the sense organs, etc.³⁰³

In other words, Dharmakīrti is now going to refute in his own name the Sāṅkhya position; but whereas, according to Devendrabuddhi, the Naiyāyika was attacking the Sāṅkhya thesis in PV 2.230 on the grounds that "[two] distinct external things are not the cause of a single cognition,"³⁰⁴ here Dharmakīrti is ready to concede that attachment might be the result of a unitary cognition confusing two distinct entities. However, he is about to show that attachment to things that we consider to belong to us does not arise from the confusion between the Person and primordial matter:

(2.247–248) [Even] an [ordinary, non-liberated] person (*ayaṃ janaḥ*) knows that the self is distinct from [things] such as the sense organs. [And this (s)he knows] because [(s)he] longs for ever better [sense organs, but not for an ever better self, and] because [(s)he] knows [that things like hair and limbs are subject to] destruction and arising [while the self is lasting]. As a consequence, attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self] is not due either to [one's] seeing [primordial matter and the Person] as being one[, because

³⁰¹ See PVP D106b3–4/P123a8–b2: 'dir phyi rol gyi don dag la gcig tu ŷen pa med na yañ phan 'dogs par byed pa tsam gyis rañ ñid kyī blos chags pa yin no ŷes bśad zin to //.

³⁰² See above, fn. 158, p. 227.

³⁰³ PVP D106b3–4/P123a8–b2: blo gcig gis byas pa yin pa yañ bla ste / de ltar na yañ dbaṅ po la sogs pa la bdag ñid kyī blo gcig pa ñid 'thad pa ma yin no //.

³⁰⁴ See above, fn. 158, p. 227.

such an attachment exists even when this view does not.³⁰⁵ Thus this is the real cause of the attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self:] it is by nature that, being attached to the self, one is attached to (*anu√rañj-*) the internal factors of perception.³⁰⁶

Dharmakīrti's reply to the Sāṅkhya opponent consists in showing that attachment to what we consider to belong to the self cannot be the result of a confusion between the self and matter (or more precisely, between the Person and the subtle body, which includes the sense organs),³⁰⁷ because any ordinary person (i.e., anyone who is not yet liberated) is already aware of the difference between his or her sense organs and the self understood as a permanent entity. This knowledge is obvious from the fact that we do long for better sense organs but not for a better self. Thus Manorathanandin explains in the following way why it is obvious that ordinary persons know this difference:

Because [this person] longs for [things] such as eyes and a body which are, [as Dharmakīrti says, *parāpara*, that is,] ever different (*aparāpara*) from [those] having defects such as blindness [i.e.,] ever better [than those]; but [(s)he] does not desire another self. Therefore, even if (s)he is not liberated, this person knows [that] the self is distinct [from the sense organs, etc.].³⁰⁸

As for Devendrabuddhi's lengthier commentary, it explains that when wishing that we had better organs, we are actually longing for organs other than those that we currently possess, whereas we never long for another self. Even if we happen to long for a better self, we are not thereby aspiring to a self that would be other than the actual self, precisely because we consider the self a permanent entity:

Because [this person] longs for sense organs, etc., that are better than the eyes, etc., obtained earlier [and] devoid of good qualities, thinking: "I wish my

³⁰⁵ According to PVP D107a4/P124a4 (*de med na yañ yod pa'i phyir ro /*).

³⁰⁶ PV 2.247–248: *parāparaprārthanāto vināśotpattibuddhitāḥ / indriyādeḥ pṛthagbhūtam ātmānaṃ vetty ayam janaḥ // tasmān naikatvadṛṣṭyāpi snehaḥ sniḥyan sa ātmani / upalambhāntaraṅgeṣu prakṛtyaivānuraḥyate //*.

³⁰⁷ See above, §3.1.1.

³⁰⁸ PVV 95,14–16: *kāṇatvādidōṣayuktāparāparasya viśiṣṭaviśiṣṭasya cakṣuḥsarīrādika-sya prārthanātaḥ / ātmanaś cānyasyānabhilāṣataḥ / tasmāt pṛthagbhūtātmānam ayam amukto 'pi jano veti /*.

eyes, etc., were other, better than these [ones],” but not: “I wish my self were other [than this one].” And even when [this person] has such a longing, “I wish my self were so [and so],” (s)he longs for a [better] condition of a lasting self, not for another self. Therefore, [this person] has the cognition that the sense organs, etc., are different from the self.³⁰⁹

Besides, ordinary persons distinguish the sense organs from the self insofar as they are aware of the sense organs’ impermanence, whereas they consider the self a lasting entity:

And this [person], by seeing that the self is lasting, has the cognition that [things] such as hair, nails, limbs and the eye, etc., arise and cease to exist; therefore (s)he does not believe that [they] are one [and the same].³¹⁰

As a consequence, attachment to what we think to belong to the self cannot originate from the confusion between primordial matter and the Person: although we do consider that the sense organs belong to the self, we do not identify the sense organs with the self, and yet, despite our distinguishing between the sense organs and the self, we are attached to our sense organs. What, then, is the cause of this attachment? According to Dharmakīrti, when one is attached to the self, one is *ipso facto* or by nature³¹¹ attached to the internal factors of perception, i.e., “to the sense organs and so on [regarded as] belonging to the self, which are the means of realizing [the self’s] enjoyment.”³¹² Devendra-buddhi explains:

³⁰⁹ PVP D106b4–6/P123b3–5: *gañ gi phyir sñar thob pa’i mig la sogs pa yon tan med pa las mchog ste [...] dbaṅ po la sogs pa [...] don du gñer ba’i phyir ro // ‘di las bdag gi mig la sogs pa gžan khyad par du gyur cig sñam pa yin gyi ṇa’i bdag gžan du gyur cig ces ni ma yin no // gañ gi tshe yaṅ ṇa’i bdag ‘di lta bar gyur cig ces don du gñer bar ‘gyur ba de yaṅ bdag gnas pa’i gnas skabs don du gñer ba yin gyi / bdag gžan du don du gñer ba ni ma yin no // de’i phyir mig la sogs pa bdag las tha dad pa’i blo daṅ ldan pa yin no //*.

³¹⁰ PVP D107a1–2/P123b8–124a1: *‘di kyaṅ bdag gnas pa ṇid du mthoṅ bas skra daṅ sen mo daṅ yan lag daṅ mig la sogs pa skye ba daṅ ‘jig pa’i blo daṅ ldan pa ṇid kyi phyir gcig tu žen pa can ma yin no //*.

³¹¹ I.e., by *prakṛti*. Here Dharmakīrti might be playing with the meaning of the word, which of course also denotes the Sāṅkhya’s primordial nature.

³¹² PVP D107a6/P124a6 (which explains *upalambhāntaraṅgeṣu*): *dbaṅ po la sogs pa loṅs spyod sgrub par byed pa bdag gi la’o (*upabhogasādhaneṣv indriyādiṣv ātmīyeṣu)*. Cf. PVV 95,24.

As a consequence, attachment to the self indeed has the property of arising merely from the vision of the self as [really] existing. This [attachment to the self] is [in turn] the cause of [one's] attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [and] prevents detachment from what [supposedly] belongs to the self. Thus, the cultivation of [the thought of] pain is [simply] useless.³¹³

The mere belief in the self's existence generates attachment to the self, and mere attachment to the self generates in turn attachment to what we think to belong to the self. As a consequence, the Naiyāyika's cultivation of the thought of pain is useless, because it is aimed at destroying attachment to what we regard as belonging to the self while leaving intact its root cause, namely, our belief in the self's existence.

*3.3.7. The Naiyāyikas' Cultivation of the Thought of Pain as a
Misunderstanding of the Buddhist Path (PV 2.249–254)*

From PV 2.249 onwards, Dharmakīrti endeavours to show in what way the Buddhist view of detachment differs from the Naiyāyikas' and how the cultivation of the thought of pain should be understood in the Buddhist perspective. As already noted above (§3.1.2), Dharmakīrti seems to engage at length in this discussion with a Naiyāyika for the reason that the latter's soteriology comprises many features (among which, most importantly, the cultivation of the thought of pain) very similar to those of Buddhism (and perhaps indirectly borrowed from the latter). As a result, Dharmakīrti seems eager to show the superiority of the Buddhist path while presenting the Naiyāyikas' "crypto-Buddhist" soteriological notions as a basic misunderstanding of the Buddhist, selfless soteriology.

According to Devendrabuddhi, the next stanza is a reply to the following objection:

But do [we] not observe that one becomes detached [from what supposedly belongs to the self] upon seeing the present pain of living beings? Therefore

³¹³ PVP D107a6–7/P124a7–8: *des na bdag tu chags pa bdag yod pa ñid du mthoñ ba tsam las 'byuñ ba'i ñaṅ tshul can med pa can ma yin te / de ni bdag gi la chags pa'i rgyu yin no // de bdag gi la 'dod chags dañ bral ba'i gags byed pa yin pa de ltar na sdug bñal sgom pa 'bras bu med pa yin no //*.

how [can you say that they do] not become detached [from it] by means of the cultivation [of the thought] of pain?³¹⁴

Dharmakīrti answers in the following way:

(2.249–250) As for the disgust (*nirveda*) for [one's] present pain, [it is] not detachment: such [a thing] is aversion (*dveṣa*). [And] even then [i.e., in this condition where disgust prevails],³¹⁵ there is attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self],³¹⁶ because one seeks another[, more satisfactory] condition. Because aversion originates from pain (*duḥkha*), it lasts just as long [as there is pain].³¹⁷ But] once this [pain] has ceased [due to the presence of something contradictory to its cause],³¹⁸ a person³¹⁹ recovers its original nature [of loving what supposedly belongs to the self]^{320, 321}

The Nyāya's cultivation of the thought of pain is aimed at bringing about disgust: according to Pakṣilasvāmin, "by cultivating it, one becomes disgusted; [and he] who is disgusted [obtains] detachment; [and he] who is detached [obtains] liberation."³²² Dharmakīrti, however,

³¹⁴ PVP D107a7–b1/P124a8–b1: *srog chags rnams kyi da ltar gnas pa'i sdug bsñal mthoñ nas 'dod chags dañ bral bar 'gyur ba mthoñ ba ñid ma yin nam / de ji ltar na sdug bsñal bsgom pas 'dod chags dañ bral ba ma yin ze na /*.

³¹⁵ According to PVP D107b3/P124b5 (*gnas skabs gañ la yañ skyes bu 'di la lar yid 'byuñ ba de tshe yañ*) and PVV 96,3 (*tadāpi nirvedāvasthāyām*).

³¹⁶ According to PVP D107b3/P124b5 (*bdag gi la yañ chags pa*).

³¹⁷ According to PVP D107b5/P124b8 (*ji srid du 'di sdug bsñal 'jug pa de srid du 'di'i yid byuñ ba 'jug par 'gyur ro //*) and PVV 96,6–7 (*sa nirvedākhyo dveṣo yāvad duḥkham anuvartate tāvanmātram tāvatkālaparimāṇam samsthitir asyeti /*).

³¹⁸ According to PVP D107b5–6/P124b8–125a1 (*gañ gi tshe yañ de 'jug pa'i rgyu dañ 'gal ba'i rkyen ñe bas sdug bsñal ldog par 'gyur ba de'i tshe sdug bsñal de log na*) and PVV 96,10 (*tasmin duḥkhe kāraṇanirodhān nivṛtte*).

³¹⁹ According to PVP D107b6/P125a1 (*skyes bu de*) and PVV 96,11 (*sattvadarśī*). Note, however, that the stanza could also be read as meaning that after taking the form of aversion, *attachment* recovers its original nature when pain ceases.

³²⁰ According to PVP D107b7/P125a1 (*bdag gi'i chags pa las byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi rañ bñin*) and PVV 96,10–11 (*svām eva prakṛtiṃ viśayeṣv avirāgalakṣaṇām*).

³²¹ PV 2.249–250: *pratyutpannāt tu yo duḥkhān nirvedo dveṣa īdṛśaḥ / na vairāgyaṃ tadāpy asti sneho 'vasthāntaraiṣaṇāt // dveṣasya duḥkhaṇitvāt sa tāvanmātra-samsthitih / tasmin nivṛtte prakṛtiṃ svām eva bhajate punaḥ //*.

³²² See NBh 15,11–15, quoted above, fn. 64, p. 202. On *nirveda* in the Nyāya, see also above, fn. 65, p. 202.

considers that this disgust is in fact no detachment at all, but a kind of aversion. Now, the Naiyāyikas themselves acknowledge that aversion is still a form of attachment, or its negative side: according to Pakṣila-svāmin, liberation consists in the cessation of the series of desire and aversion.³²³ Dharmakīrti explains that it is the case because someone full of aversion for his or her present condition does not cease to aspire to another, more pleasurable condition. Devendrabuddhi comments:

[Even in the condition where disgust prevails,] because one seeks a pleasurable condition other than the present painful condition, attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self] is not abandoned.³²⁴

Manorathanandin similarly explains:

[Even in the condition where disgust prevails, there is attachment,] because one seeks another condition [i.e.,] a [condition] different from the condition that arouses disgust because of pain. For when there is no attachment, the rejection of one [thing] does not lead to the desire of another.³²⁵

In fact, this accusation had already been put forward against the Nyāya by the time the NV was composed, and Uddyotakara denies that the Nyāya's prescribed abandonment of pain may amount to mere aversion:

[Objection: But] even if [someone seeking liberation] acts out of aversion, [thinking] "I must abandon pain," even so, [this person] cannot be released, because aversion is acknowledged to be bondage; for [you yourself acknowledge that] bondage [consists of] both desire and aversion. [Reply:] No, because it is not an obstacle; [i.e.,] abandoning pain is not an obstacle [to liberation]. On the contrary, the [person who endeavours to achieve liberation] is not averse to pain; and since (s)he acts without being averse [to anything],

³²³ See NBh 219,11–13, quoted above, fn. 71, p. 204, and NBh 7,12–14, quoted above, fn. 67, p. 203.

³²⁴ PVP D107b4/P124b6: *da ltar gyi sdug bsñal gyi gnas skabs ma gtogs pa'i bde ba'i gnas skabs gžan tshol ba'i phyir chags pa ma spañs pa yin no //*.

³²⁵ PVV 96,4–5: *avasthāntarasya duḥkhaheṭor nirvedakāriṇyām avasthāyām vilakṣaṇa-syaiṣaṇāt / na hi sneham antareṇaikatyāgād aparavāñchā /*.

(s)he reaches an abandonment of pain that is not an obstacle [to liberation].³²⁶

According to Dharmakīrti, however, this denial is meaningless, since the Naiyāyikas' rejection of pain cannot be anything but aversion, i.e., a hatred that still stems from attachment, as long as the root cause of attachment, namely the belief in the self, has not been eradicated. As a result, his pseudo-detachment is bound to cease as soon as the cause of pain disappears and to recover its original nature of love for what he still believes to belong to the self.

By way of contrast, Dharmakīrti now explains what authentic detachment is, i.e., what detachment is in the Buddhist perspective:

(2.251) On the other hand, what [we Buddhists] call "detachment"³²⁷ [is nothing but the] equanimity (*audāsīnya*)³²⁸ towards everything [which characterizes the *arhats* – who are] like the sandalwood [in the presence of] the axe³²⁹ – [and which is] due to the abandonment of repulsion (*tyāga*) and clinging (*upādāna*).³³⁰

What the Buddhists call detachment is indifference or equanimity (*audāsīnya*) "towards everything" [i.e.] towards all objects, which, due to the absence of the [false] view of a [substantial] living being, are no longer determined as being harmful or beneficial [to the self].³³¹ This

³²⁶ NV 83,1–4: *yady api dveṣāt pravartate duḥkhaṃ hāsyāmīti tathāpi na mucyeta / dveṣasya bandhanasamājjñānād iti / rāga dveṣau hi bandhanam iti / na / apratikūlatvāt / apratikūlaṃ duḥkhaḥānaṃ bhavati / na punar ayaṃ duḥkhaṃ dveṣti / adviṣaṃś cāyaṃ pravartamāno 'pratikūlaṃ duḥkhaḥānaṃ adhigacchatīti /*

³²⁷ PVV 96,18: *vairāgyaṃ nāma āgamaprasiddhaṃ kathyate /* "What is called 'detachment,' i.e., known through scripture [as 'detachment']."

³²⁸ PVV 96,17–18: *audāsīnyam anumayapratigharahitatvam*. "Equanimity [i.e.] being devoid of inclination and hostility."

³²⁹ See below, fn. 332, p. 270.

³³⁰ PV 2.251: *audāsīnyaṃ tu sarvatra tyāgopādānahānitaḥ / vāsīcandanakalpānāṃ vairāgyaṃ nāma kathyate //*

³³¹ PVV 96,15–16: *sattvadṛṣṭyabhāvāt sarvatra viṣaye pratikūlatvānukūlatvābhyām anadhyavasīte*. See also PVP D107b7–108a1/P125a3–4: *bdag gi dños po źes bya ba ñe bar len pa'i phuñ po'i tshogs srid^a pa la ñe bar mkho ba rnams la btañ sñoms su gnas pa la'o //*. [^a PVT Ñe D144b1/P178b1 reads *sred*.] "['Equanimity,' i.e.,] a state of indifference (**upekṣāvasthā?*) towards [all things] that are conducive (**upayogin?*)

equanimity arises from the abandonment of the attitude consisting in clinging, but also of the repulsion that drives us away from things without constituting a genuine detachment. And whatever may be the exact meaning of the sandalwood and axe simile illustrating the nature of this equanimity,³³² Dharmakīrti is here pointing out that detachment

to the [re-]birth of the group of the *upādānaskandhas* [commonly referred to as] 'body(/embodiment)' (**ātmabhāva*)."

³³² As pointed out by Vetter (1990: 146, fn. 1), Norman (1960: 270–271) has studied the original meaning (common to early Jaina and Buddhist sources) of the compound *vāsīcandanakalpa*: "like the sandalwood tree [in the presence of] the axe" (but note Bloomfield's [1920: 342] rendering: "he for whom the [cooling] sandal is not different from a [painful] sword"). Norman comes to his conclusion on the basis of Böhrtling's *Sprüche* no. 401, 2313 and 7099: *apamānito 'pi kulajo na vadati puruṣaḥ svabhāvadākṣiṇyāt / na hi malayacandanataruḥ paraśuprahataḥ sravet pūyam //; chinno 'pi candanatur na jahāti gandhaṃ vṛddho 'pi vāraṇapatir na jahāti līlām / yantrārpito 'pi madhurātām na jahāti hikṣuḥ kṣiṇo 'pi na tyajati śīlaguṇān kulīnaḥ //; sujano na yāti vairaṃ parahitabuddhir vināśakāle 'pi / chede 'pi candanataruḥ surabhayati mukhaṃ kuṭhārasya //*. In Norman's (partial) translation (1960: 270): "Even when disgraced, a noble man does not speak [...]; when struck by the axe the sandalwood tree would not put forth evil-smelling sap." "Even when cut down the sandalwood tree does not give up its smell; [...] even when destroyed a noble man does not abandon his morality and virtue." "Even at the time of destruction a noble man whose mind is devoted to the good of others does not become hostile; even when being cut down a sandalwood tree perfumes the blade of the axe." Note, however, that Devendrabuddhi's, (Śākyabuddhi's and) Manorathanandin's explanations of the compound suggest that these had forgotten the original meaning of the simile. See PVP D108a2–5/P125a5–b1: *de la skyes bu gcig sems dañ ba can gyis lag pa gcig śin tu tsan dan gyis byugs la gžan rnam par sdañ bas lag pa cig śos śin tu bcad pa de la skyes bu de dag de (P : D de ji) ltar 'jug pa dag gi nañ nas gcig yid byuñ ba 'am / cig śos la mñon par chags pa med pa de bžin du tsan dan dañ ste'u la yin te / 'on kyañ gñi ga la rjes su chags pa dañ / khoñ khro ba med pa'i mtshan ñid can gyi btañ sñom su gnas par 'gyur ba de ltar na / groñ bar 'dod pa'i bdag ñid can / tsan dan dañ ste'u dag la mtshuñs par 'jug par 'gyur ro // don de ñid bstan pa'i phyir tsan dan dañ ni ste'u bžin žes smos pa yin no //*. "In that respect, one person has placidly (**prasannacitta*?) smeared (**vi√lip*?) one hand entirely with sandal while another [person] has cut off one hand with contempt (**vidveṣa*?); from among the two actions of that kind [proper to] these two persons, one is without [any] agitation (**udvega*) and the other without [any] attachment (**abhiśvaṅga*?), [and] so it is with regard to the axe and the sandal. However, [it is] with regard to both [of them that] one should dwell in equanimity, which consists (**lakṣaṇa*) in the absence of [both] inclination (**anunaya*?) and hostility (**pratigha*?). Thus, he whose nature is to desire liberation ought to act similarly with regard to [both] the sandal and the axe. In order to indicate this meaning, [Dharmakīrti] says: *vāsīcan-*

is a state of real indifference rather than a mere aversion, and that the Ātmavādins are incapable of making us reach such a state.

However, Dharmakīrti himself has stated in PV 2.222ac that desire, aversion, etc., can be eliminated only provided that the good qualities and defects of objects are no longer seen. Now, as Devendrabuddhi makes clear, this seems to be contradictory to Dharmakīrti's rejection of the cultivation of the thought of pain (since the latter is supposed to prevent us from seeing good qualities in objects) and the Ātmavādin could exploit this apparent contradiction:

Objection: If one does not eliminate attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self, etc., by means of the cultivation of [the thought of] pain, how [is it, then, that] you have said above[, in PV 2.222ac]: “[And indeed,] the elimination of desire, aversion, etc., which are related to [i.e., arise from one's seeing] good qualities and defects [in a certain object, can only be due to the fact that one] no [longer] sees these [good qualities and defects] in the object”? Do you claim that the cultivation of [the thought of] pain is the means to get rid of desire, etc., or do you claim that the cultivation of [the thought of] pain [can]not destroy it? [There is obviously] a contradiction here.³³³

Besides, as Manorathanandin points out, Dharmakīrti's position could seem contradictory to his own scriptures, since the Buddha himself is said to have taught the cultivation of the thought of pain:

Objection: If [one does] not [achieve] liberation by eliminating attachment, etc., by means of the cultivation of [the thought of] pain, how [is it,] then,

danakalpa.” The translation of this passage is tentative. Devendrabuddhi's explanation is reminiscent of *Yājñavalkyaśmṛti* II.3.53: *yaḥ kaṇṭakair vitudati candanair yaś ca limpati / akruddho 'parituṣṭaś ca samastasya ca tasya ca //*. “If someone pricks him with thorns, or anoints him with sandal, he is neither angry nor satisfied with all and with that man.” Translation Bronkhorst 1986: 46. See also PVT *Ñe* D144b1–3/P178b2–4. PVP 96,16–17 explains *vāsīcandanakalpānām as sāḥṣātkṛtanairātmya-tattvānām*.

³³³ PVP D108a5–7/P125b1–4: *gal te sdug bsñal bsgom pas bdag gi'i chags pa la sogs pa spoñ ba ma yin na / ji ltar na rañ ñid kyis sñar yon tan skyon dan rjes 'brel ba'i / 'dod sdañ la sogs spañs pa ni // de dag yul la mthoñ med pa // žes bśad pa yin na / ci bdag ñid kyis sdug bsñal bsgom pa 'dod pa la sogs pa spoñ ba'i thabs su brjod nas / yañ na sdug bsñal bsgom pa 'di ži bar byed pa ma yin no žes brjod pa 'dir 'gal lo že na /*.

[that] the Blessed One has preached the cultivation of [the thought of] pain?³³⁴

Dharmakīrti anticipates these objections by explaining that admittedly, the Buddhist scriptures teach some sort of cultivation of the thought of pain, but not in the sense understood by the Naiyāyikas:

(2.252) [It is not with reference to the painfulness consisting of physical and mental pain that] the cultivation of [the thought of] pain is taught [in our scriptures; rather, the cultivation of the thought of pain is taught there] with respect to (*matvā*) the [kind of] painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*). And according to us [Buddhists],³³⁵ this [kind of painfulness] consists in [these factors'] arising from [causes and] conditions. This is [not directly the salvific means properly speaking, but] the basis [i.e., the cause,]³³⁶ of the perception of selflessness[, the latter being the direct means to achieve liberation].³³⁷

The Buddhist position involves no contradiction, because the cultivation of the thought of pain is not advocated by the Buddhists with reference to the “painfulness [consisting of] pain” (*duḥkha-duḥkhatā*) but only to the “painfulness [consisting of] conditioning factors” (*saṃskāraduḥkhatā*).³³⁸

³³⁴ PVV 96,20–21: *nanu yadi duḥkhabhāvanayā snehādihānyā na muktis tat katham bhagavatoktā duḥkhabhāvaneti /*.

³³⁵ According to PVV 97,1 (*no 'smākaṃ saugatānām*).

³³⁶ According to PVP D108b4/P126a1–2 (*bdag med pa ñid mthon ba skye ba'i thabs yin te /*) and PVV 97,2 (*āśrayaḥ kāraṇam*).

³³⁷ PV 2.252: *saṃskāraduḥkhatāṃ matvā kathitā duḥkhabhāvanā / sā ca naḥ pratyayotpattiḥ sā nairātmya dṛgāśrayaḥ /*.

³³⁸ Note PVV 96,23–24: *na hi duḥkha-duḥkhatāṃ abhisandhāya tadbhāvanoktā kiṃ tarhi saṃskāraduḥkhatāṃ /*. “For it is not with respect to the painfulness [consisting of] pain that this cultivation [of the thought of pain] has been taught; rather, [it is with respect to] the painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors.” On the three painfulnesses (*duḥkhatātraya*) in Buddhism, see Schmithausen 1977. From relatively later parts of the *sūtras* onward, Buddhism distinguishes three forms of painfulness: painfulness of pain, painfulness (lying) in transformation(/decay), and painfulness of the conditioning factors (where items 1 and 3 are genitive-*tatpuruṣas* and item 2, a locative-*tatpuruṣa*; see Schmithausen 1977: 921). These three forms were originally related to the three varieties of (affective) sensation (*veda-nā*). The pleasant (*sukha*) sensation is painful inasmuch as it changes for the worse;

Devendrabuddhi first explains that according to the Ātmavādins, we are attached to things because we see positive qualities in them, and by this vision of good qualities, the Naiyāyikas mean that we regard these things as means of pleasure for the self. In contrast, for the Buddhists, the vision of positive qualities is much more complex and involves a number of convictions, such as the belief in permanence, pleasurable-ness, but also selfhood or the property of belonging to a self – and as a result, its antidote involves the realization of selflessness:

[Answer:] This is not the case, for [we] do not admit that the vision of good qualities [as you present it, i.e.,] being a means for the pleasure of the self, is [really] the vision of good qualities, so that one could admit that attachment vanishes through the vision of defects. Rather, the qualities consist of [being] permanent, [being] pleasurable, [being] a self and [being] what [supposedly] belongs to the self, and seeing them separately or altogether is the vision of good qualities [that we have in mind]. One gets rid of it by means of its antidote [i.e.,] the perception of impermanence, etc. [And] since this is the intention, there is no contradiction.³³⁹

Devendrabuddhi then explains Dharmakīrti's distinction between painfulness consisting of psychological and/or physical pain and painfulness consisting of the conditioning factors:

The cultivation of the aspects of pain, etc., that is taught in [our authoritative] treatise(s) does not consist in [that kind of] pain characterized as the painful-

the unpleasant (*duḥkha*) sensation is painful simply inasmuch as it amounts to psychological and/or physical pain; the neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant (*aduḥkhā-sukha*, viz. neutral) sensation is painful inasmuch as it is conditioned. The doctrine of the three painfulnesses was later reinterpreted so as to match Buddhism's claim to the universality of suffering. Moreover, new interpretations were put forward in order to provide the three compounds with a symmetrical analysis as *karmadhārayas*: *duḥkham eva duḥkhatā*, *saṃskārā eva duḥkhatā*, and *vipariṇāma eva duḥkhatā*.

³³⁹ PVP D108a7–b2/P125b4–6: *de ni ma yin te / 'di ltar yon tan mthoñ ba bdag ñid kyi bde ba sgrub par byed pa ñid ni / 'dir yon tan mthoñ bar 'dod pa ma yin na / gañ gis na de skyon du mthoñ ba las chags pa zad par 'dod par 'gyur / 'o na ci yin že na / rtag pa dañ / bde ba dañ / bdag dañ / bdag gi ñid la sogs pa ni yon tan yin žiñ de mthoñ ba yañ lhan cig gam / so sor yon tan du mthoñ ba / de'i gñen po mi rtag pa ñid la sogs par mthoñ bas spoñ ba yin no žes dgoñs pa'i phyir 'gal ba yod pa ma yin no //*. On the aspects (*ākāra*) "(im)permanent," "(un)pleasurable," "self(less)" and "belonging to a self(/empty)," see Introduction, §0.1.3.

ness [consisting of] pain, [which is] due to the associated [mental factors] or to [that which is] related to them [i.e., to the objects that one experiences as painful]; rather, [it is] while having in mind another [kind of] pain [that] it has been taught [by the Blessed One. Objection: Now,] what does [this] cultivation of [the aspect of] pain consist of? [Answer:] Having cognized painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors, having acknowledged painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors, [the Blessed One has] taught the cultivation of painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors.³⁴⁰

In the Buddhist perspective, the cultivation of the thought of pain has as its sole object the fact that conditioning factors are causally produced in dependence on other conditioning factors, or, as Devendrabuddhi puts it, the fact that “the [successive] moments of an entity are dependent on causes (**hetupāraṇtrya*).”³⁴¹ This thought is the basis of the awareness that everything is empty of self:

By ascertaining through reason(ing) that the entities which perish instantaneously [are] impermanent, one can progress to [the determination that] what is impermanent is dependent on causes, perishes at every moment [and is] not an agent. Therefore, if one cultivates [the fact] that “this is not the self” or “this is not what belongs to the self,” one will know [i.e., perceive in a direct manner,] that [everything] is empty of a person.³⁴²

³⁴⁰ PVP D108b2–3/P125b6–8: *bstan bcos las sdug bsñal la sogs pa'i rnam pa bsgom pa bśad pa gañ yin pa de yañ de dañ mtshuñs par ldan pa 'am / de dañ 'brel ba las^a de sdug bsñal gyi sdug bsñal ñid kyi mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsñal ma yin gyi 'on kyañ sdug bsñal gžan la dgoñs nas bstan pa yin no // 'o na sdug bsñal bsgom pa gañ yin že na / 'du byed sdug bsñal ñid mkhyen nas / 'du byed kyi sdug bsñal ñid du bžed nas / 'du byed kyi sdug bsñal bsgom pa gsuñs pa yin /*.^a Note PVT Ñe D144b4/P178b6: *de dañ mtshuñs par ldan pa ni sems dañ sems las byuñ ba'i tshogs so // de dañ 'brel pa las ni sdug bsñal gyi ñams su myoñ ba'i 'gyur ba'i yul lo //*.

³⁴¹ PVP D108b4/P126a1: *dños po skad cig ma rnam ni rgyu'i gžan dbañ ñid yin no //*. *hetupāraṇtrya* also occurs at PVV 97,1.

³⁴² PVP D108b4–5/P126a2–3: *skad cig mar zad pa can gyi dños po mi rtag pa rigs pas ñes par byas pas mi rtag pa gañ yin pa de ni rgyu'i gžan dbañ skad cig ma re rer 'jig pa can byed pa med par 'jug par 'gyur ro // de bas na 'di ni bdag gam bdag gi ma yin no žes bsgoms pa na / gañ zag stoñ pa ñid du rtogs pa 'gyur ro^a //*.^a Note PVT Ñe D144b4–5/P178b6–7: *rtogs par 'gyur ro žes bya ba mñon sum du byed pa'o //*.

Although cultivation of the thought of pain thus considered is not a means of liberation *per se*,³⁴³ it is the cause of the perception of selflessness. The latter, at which all cultivations (including that of the thought of pain) are aimed, is the real means of liberation, as Manorathanandin emphasizes while introducing the following verse:

To explain: entities, which are the effects of causes, perish at [every] moment [and] occur in series, are neither of the nature of a self nor controlled by a self. Therefore the cultivation of the painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors is conducive to the perception of selflessness; and this is the [real] cause of liberation. This is what [Dharmakīrti] says [in PV 2.253].³⁴⁴

(2.253) As for liberation, [one achieves it] by perceiving emptiness [i.e., the fact that everything is empty of a self.³⁴⁵ All] the remaining [forms of] cultivation [viz. those of impermanence, pain, etc.,]³⁴⁶ are [only] aimed at this [perception that everything is empty of self³⁴⁷. And] this is the reason why [the Blessed One] has said that pain[fulness] is [established] through impermanence, [and] selflessness through pain[fulness].³⁴⁸

Devendrabuddhi explains the beginning of the stanza in the following way:

“By perceiving emptiness” [i.e.,] by no [longer] perceiving [anything in the form] “I” and “mine,” [one has] no [longer] attachment or disgust towards anything [and] thus one is liberated from the bondage of *saṃsāra*. As a consequence, liberation is [achieved] by perceiving selflessness [i.e.,] by seeing emptiness, whereas all the remaining [forms of] cultivation, such as [that] of

³⁴³ PVP D108b4/P126a1: *de ni bsgom pa na yañ dños su grol ba'i phyir ma yin no //*. “[But] even if one cultivates it, it is not in order to really [achieve] liberation.”

³⁴⁴ PVV 97,3–4: *tathā hi hetuphalabhūtāḥ kṣaṇakṣayaṇo bhāvāḥ prabandhapravṛttayo^a nātmarūpā nāpy ātmādhiṣṭhitā iti saṃskāraduḥkhatābhāvanā nairātmyadarśanānukūla saiva ca muktihetur ity āha [...] / .^a prabandhapravṛttayo* PVV_{MS} 18b1 : *pravṛttayo* Ed.

³⁴⁵ According to PVV 97,6 (*śūnyatāyā nirātmatāyā dṛṣṭeḥ*).

³⁴⁶ According to PVV 97,6 (*śeṣasyānityaduḥkhāder bhāvanāḥ*).

³⁴⁷ According to PVV 97,6–7 (*tadarthā nirātmatādarśanārthāḥ*).

³⁴⁸ PV 2.253: *muktis tu śūnyatādṛṣṭes tadarthāḥ śeṣabhāvanāḥ / anityāt prāha tenaiva duḥkhaṃ duḥkhān nirātmatām //*.

impermanence, aim at this [perception of emptiness, i.e.] result in the perception of emptiness.³⁴⁹

And again:

Cultivations [such as those] of impermanence and pain are means to perceive emptiness but are not really the cause of liberation. For this very reason, the Blessed One says that pain is due to impermanence, and selflessness to pain.³⁵⁰

Dharmakīrti himself specifies in the stanza that this is the reason why the Buddha has said that painfulness is established through impermanence and selflessness is established through painfulness. In this respect all the commentators quote the following *sūtra* text from the *Madhyamāgama*:

Corporeity, O monks, [is it] permanent or impermanent? – Impermanent, O Venerable. [And] that which is impermanent, [is it] painful or pleasurable? – Painful, O Venerable. That which is impermanent, painful and subject to change, is it suitable to regard it [in the following way,] “This is mine,” “I am this,” “This is my self”? – No, O Venerable.³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ PVP D108b5–7/P126a3–5: *ston pa ñid mthon ba las [...] ña dan ña'i zes bya bar mthon ba med pas 'ga' žig la yañ rjes su chags pa 'am / 'ga' žig las skyo^a ba med pa de ltar na / 'khor ba'i 'chiñ ba las grol bar 'gyur ro // de bas na bdag med pa ñid mthon ba de ni / ston pa ñid lta bas grol bar 'gyur gyi / mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa bsgom pa lhag ma gañ yin pa de dag thams cad de don yin / ston pa ñid mthon ba'i 'bras bu can yin no // .^a skyo em. : skye DP.*

³⁵⁰ PVP D108b7–109a1/P126a5–6: *mi rtag pa dan sdug bsñal bsgom pa dag ni ston pa ñid mthon ba'i thabs yin gyi / dños su grol ba'i rgyu ma yin pa'i gtan tshigs de phyir / bcom ldan 'das ñid kyis mi rtag pa'i rgyu las sdug bsñal dan sdug bsñal gyi rgyu las bdag med gsuñs [...] / .*

³⁵¹ See PVP D109a1–3/P126a7–b1: *dge sloñ dag 'di lta ste / gzugs rtag pa 'am mi rtag pa yin / btsun pa mi rtag pa lags so // mi rtag pa gañ yin pa de bde ba yin nam sdug bsñal yin / btsun pa sdug bsñal lags so // mi rtag pa dan sdug bsñal dan / rnam par 'gyur ba'i chos can gañ yin pa de la 'di ni ña'o // 'di ni ña'i'o // 'di ni bdag go zes bya ba de ltar blta bar rigs pa ma yin no // btsun pa de ni ma lags so zes bya ba lta bu'o // .* PVV 97,11–14: *rūpaṃ bhikṣavo nityaṃ anityaṃ vā / anityaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ tad duḥkhaṃ sukhaṃ vā / duḥkhaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ duḥkhaṃ vipariṇāmadharmakaṃ kalpyan nu tad evaṃ draṣṭum^a etan mamaṣo 'ham asmy eṣa me ātmeti / no hīdaṃ bhadanta / .* [^a draṣṭum PVV_{MS} 18b2 : draṣṭur Ed.] PVA 157,17–19: *rūpaṃ bhikṣavo nityaṃ anityaṃ vā / anityaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ tad duḥ-*

Devendrabuddhi explains in what sense the knowledge of impermanence and painfulness (understood as painfulness consisting of the conditioning factors, i.e., as the mere fact that conditioning factors are produced in dependence on other conditioning factors) can be considered a means of liberation:

Thus painfulness is established on account of impermanence, [and] impermanence and painfulness are [in turn] the means towards selflessness[, and] this is the reason why they are said to be the means towards liberation. Therefore, knowing impermanence and painfulness is not directly the cause of liberation; rather, [it is] the cause of the vision of emptiness, which is the basis of liberation.³⁵²

In contrast, Dharmakīrti now depicts the result of the cultivation of pain as understood by the Ātmavādin:

(2.254) And failing to be(come) detached [from what supposedly belongs to the self, one] is subject to craving [and] relies on all [sorts of] undertakings [aimed at securing pleasure and avoiding pain].³⁵³ Thus] failing to be liberated

khaṃ sukhaṃ vā / duḥkhaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ tad duḥkhaṃ vipariṇāmadharmakāṃ kalpyan nu^a tad evaṃ draṣṭum etan mamaiṣo 'ham asmy eṣa mamātmēti / no hīdaṃ bhadanta / [^a nu conj. : tu Ed.] The text translated above runs as follows: *rūpaṃ bhikṣavo nityaṃ anityaṃ vā / anityaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ tad duḥkhaṃ sukhaṃ vā / duḥkhaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ duḥkhaṃ vipariṇāmadharmakāṃ kalpyan nu tad evaṃ draṣṭum etan mamaiṣo 'ham asmy eṣa me ātmēti / no hīdaṃ bhadanta /*. The parallel Pali text (MN III.19 [no. 109: *Mahāpuṇṇamasutta*]) runs as follows: (*taṃ kim maññātha bhikkhave /*) *rūpaṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vā ti / aniccaṃ bhante / yaṃ paṇāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā ti / dukkhaṃ bhante / yaṃ paṇāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ / etaṃ mama eso 'ham asmi eso me attā ti / no h' etaṃ bhante /*. The reference to the Pali canon is indicated at Vibh. 97, fn. 2 (most certainly to be interpreted as a footnote by Sāṅkrtyāyana himself). On *etaṃ mama eso 'ham asmi eso me attā ti*, see Collins 1982: 96 and 98.

³⁵² PVP D109a3–4/P126b1–3: *de ltar na mi rtag pa ñid kyi phyir sdug bsñal ñid du rab tu bsgrubs pa bdag med pa ñid kyi mi rtag pa ñid dañ / sdug bsñal ba ñid thabs su gyur pa'i phyir grol ba'i thabs su gsuñs pa yin no // des na mi rtag pa dañ sdug bsñal ba ñid śes pa dños su grol ba'i rgyu ma yin gyi 'on kyañ grol ba'i rten du gyur pa stoñ pa ñid du lta ba'i rgyur gyur pa ñid yin no //*. See also PVP 97,14–15.

³⁵³ According to PVP D109a7/P126b6–7 (*bde ba dañ sdug bsñal thob pa dañ yoñs su spañs pa'i phyir 'jug pa la brten pa'o //*).

from defilements and actions, such [a person]³⁵⁴ is said to be³⁵⁵ entangled in *saṃsāra*.³⁵⁶

According to Manorathanandin, the subject of this sentence is “he who sees the self.”³⁵⁷ However, according to Devendrabuddhi, it is rather “he who possesses the cultivation of [the thought of] pain”;³⁵⁸ and here, Devendrabuddhi certainly has in mind the Nyāya’s way of understanding this cultivation. In other words, someone who, following the Nyāya’s method, merely cultivates the thought of pain instead of cultivating the thought of the conditioning factors’ painfulness as defined by Dharmakīrti, can only fail to become detached from what (s)he regards as belonging to the self, because (s)he remains inexorably attached to the self. (S)he is thus bound to go on craving, and for this reason “[s]he relies on the causes that bring about actions [and are] characterized as rejecting and clinging.”³⁵⁹ Because (s)he thus rejects and clings, (s)he cannot free him- or herself “from defilements and actions,” which, according to Manorathanandin, “have the [false] view of a self and activity for their [respective] causes.”³⁶⁰ According to Devendrabuddhi,

³⁵⁴ I.e., according to Devendrabuddhi, “the person who wishes to be(come) detached without having eliminated the [false] view of self” (PVP D109b1–2/P126b8: *skyes bu ’dod chags dañ bral bar ’dod pa bdag tu lta ba ma spañs pa can no //*).

³⁵⁵ On the meaning of *nāma* here see PVV 97,23: *saṃsārī nāma prasiddhaḥ*. “[Such a person is] well known under the name of *saṃsārin*.”

³⁵⁶ PV 2.254: *avirakṭaś ca tṛṣṇāvān sarvārambhasamāśritaḥ / so ’mukṭaḥ kleśakarmabhyām saṃsārī nāma tādrśaḥ //*.

³⁵⁷ PVV 97,17: *ātmadarśī saḥ*.

³⁵⁸ PVP D109a6–7/P126b5–6: *gañ gi phyir de ltar sdug bsñal bsgoms pas ’dod chags dañ bral ba ma yin pa de’i phyir / sdug bsñal bsgoms pa dañ ldan pa bdag dañ bdag gi ’dod chags dañ bral ba ma yin no //*. “[And] since, in this way, one does not be(come) detached through the cultivation of [the thought of] pain, he who possesses the cultivation of [the thought of] pain does not become detached from the self and what [supposedly] belongs to the self.”

³⁵⁹ PVV 97,19–20: *hānyupādānalakṣaṇān karmaṇasavahetūn samāśritaḥ /*.

³⁶⁰ PVV 97,23: *kleśakarmabhyām ātmadarśanapravṛttikāraṇakābhyām*.

he causes desirable and undesirable actions and defilements such as attachment to thrive; thus failing to be liberated from defilements and actions, these cause [him] to take a new existence.³⁶¹

Attachment as well as actions requiring a karmic retribution lead him to rebirth, so that he remains trapped in the cycle of rebirths.

*3.3.8. The Inconsistency of the Nyāya's Soteriology with Its
Ātmavāda and the Soteriological Necessity of Selflessness
(PV 2.255–256)*

Before concluding that the way to liberation consists in cultivating the thought of selflessness rather than that of pain, Dharmakīrti once again attacks the Naiyāyikas' depiction of the liberated state. So far he has shown that contrary to what the Ātmavādin claims, it is impossible to get rid of our attachment to what we regard as belonging to the self without getting rid of the very belief in the self. According to his commentators, however, here he provisionally accepts his opponent's view that one can abandon what is wrongly believed to belong to the self without getting rid of the belief in the self, and he does so in order to show the absurd consequence to which such a position leads anyway. Devendrabuddhi thus introduces the next verse in the following way:

Therefore so far [it has been shown] in this way [that] if one grasps a self, there is no elimination of what [supposedly] belongs to [this] self, so that one [could] accept [that] liberation [occurs]. Alternatively, let us admit that one eliminates [what supposedly belongs to the self]. Accepting [this provisionally], one ought to say [what follows].³⁶²

³⁶¹ PVP D109a7–b1/P126b7–8: *las 'dod pa dañ mi 'dod pa dañ mñon par chags pa la sogs pa'i ñon moñs pa gso bar byed pa de ltar na / de ñon moñs las las grol ba ma yin / de dag gis kyañ yañ srid pa len par byed pa [...]* /.

³⁶² PVP D109b5/P127a6: *de de ltar na re zig bdag tu 'dzin pa yod na bdag gi dor ba med pa gañ gis na grol bar 'dod / dor ba yañ bla ste / khas blañs nas brjod par bya'o //*. Cf. PVV 97,24–25: *tad evam ātmani satī nātmīyatyāgaḥ / tathā'muktir ity uktam / bhavatu vātmīyatyāgas tathāpi [...]* /." Thus in this way, it has been said that if there is a self, [there can be] no elimination of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [and] thus no liberation. Alternatively, let us admit that there [can be] an elimination of what [supposedly] belongs to the self [even if there is a self. But] even so [...]." Note Prajñākaragupta's somewhat different introduction in PVA 157,26–27:

(2.255–256) He³⁶³ who would reject (*necchet*) only what [supposedly] belongs to the self [while claiming not to reject the self would] possess neither an experiencer[, since there would be nothing left to be experienced,] nor, then, a self; for the characteristic of the [self] is [precisely] to act and to experience [the results of action]. Therefore, O [you] who desire liberation, uproot the [false] view of a [substantial] living being, [a false view] whose seed, [a previous] similar [false view, occurs in] a beginningless series^{364, 365}

According to Dharmakīrti, even if the Naiyāyika managed to get rid of the factors that he regards as leading to craving, he would be left with no experiencer, since there would be nothing left to be experienced in his liberated state, “for being an experiencer requires [something] to

athāpi syāt / ātmīyam eva paramārthatō nāsti / tena kutaḥ snehasambhavaḥ / sneho hi nāma viṣaye bhavati / na nirviṣayaḥ / tad apy asat /. “Suppose the following be urged: That which [supposedly] belongs to the self does not really exist. Therefore, how can there be an attachment [to it]? [And] indeed, what we call ‘attachment’ bears on an object [and is] not objectless. [Answer:] This too is false[, because] [...]”

³⁶³ PVV 97,25 explains *asya* as *ātmīyasya*. With *asya* thus interpreted, PV 2.255ab could be rendered as follows: “[For him] who would reject only what [supposedly] belongs to the self, there is neither an experiencer of that [which supposedly belongs to the self] [...]” Devendrabuddhi’s (PVP D109b6–7/P127a7) explanation remains unclear (*de gaṇ gi tshe des dor ba de’i dus na bdag gi yin no źes bya ba de’i tshe rgol ba po / ‘di’i za ba po ste /*), but he is likely to interpret *asya* as the correlative of *yaḥ*, i.e., **asya vādinah* (note that Manorathanandin added *tanmate*, i.e., “in the doctrine of him [who] [...]”, in order to supply a correlative of *yaḥ*).

³⁶⁴ Or more literally, “whose seed [...] has a beginningless series.” For an analysis of the compound, see PVP D110a6–7/P128a1–2: *gaṇ la thog ma med pa’i rgyun yod pa de ni thog ma med pa’i rgyun can no // ‘jig tshogs su lta ba gaṇ la rigs mtshuṅs pa sa bon yod pa de ni rigs mtshuṅs pa’i sa bon can te /*. “That which has a beginningless series is *anādisantāna*. The personalistic [false] view which has a homogenous seed is *tulyajātīyabījaka*.” The compound belongs to the *bahuvrīhigarbhahuvrīhi* class. Note also PVV 98,13–14: *anādisantānas tulyajātīyaḥ pūrvapūrvasattvadarśanasvabhāvo ‘vidyārūpo bījaṃ kāraṇaṃ yasyās tām*, “that whose seed [i.e.,] cause is [something] homogenous – the series of which is beginningless – whose nature is each preceding perception of a [substantial] living being [and] consists of nescience.” Following Manorathanandin, the translation would be: “whose seed is the homogenous [false view of a (substantial) living being,] the series of which (= *tulyajātīya*) is beginningless.”

³⁶⁵ PV 2.255–256: *ātmīyam eva yo necched bhoktāpy asya na vidyate / ātmāpi na tadā tasya kriyābhogau hi lakṣaṇam // tasmād anādisantānatulyajātīyabījakām / utkhātamūlām kuruta sattvadrṣṭiṃ mumukṣavaḥ //*.

be experienced,” as Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin put it.³⁶⁶ Devendrabuddhi further clarifies Dharmakīrti’s reasoning by reformulating it into the following inference:

That for which there is nothing to experience (**bhogya*, **bhoktavya*) cannot be an experiencer (**bhoktr*), as the son of a barren woman (**vandyāputra*). Now, the self that longs for liberation has nothing to experience. [The logical reason involved in this argument] is the non-perception of the pervader.³⁶⁷

However, a self that would be no experiencer at all would no longer be a self, “for if there is no experiencer, it follows that there is no self either.”³⁶⁸ The reason for this is that the Naiyāyikas themselves define the self as the agent (*kartr*) of all actions and as the experiencer (*bhoktr*) of all pleasant and unpleasant experiences that result from actions. As a matter of fact, they even rely on this definition of the self so as to prove its existence: according to them, the self must be inferred because a permanent agent and experiencer must be postulated so as to account for both action and its karmic retribution in the form of pleasure and pain.³⁶⁹ If, however, the liberated self is free of action, pleasure and pain, it is no longer a self, as it loses *ipso facto* the very characteristic that makes it a self. The argument is reminiscent of the following passage in Aśvaghoṣa’s BC, which is likely to target the view of the liberated self propounded by the Vaiśeṣikas³⁷⁰ and/or Naiyāyikas:

And a knowing subject (*kṣetrājñā*) free of a body must be either knowing or without knowledge. If he is knowing, there is [something] to be known for him, [and] since there is [something] to be known, he is not released. But if he is proven to be without knowledge [in the liberated state], what is the point

³⁶⁶ PVP D109b7/P127a8: *za ba po ñid ni loṅs spyod par bya ba la brten pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir ro //*. The Sanskrit of the PVP passage is found at PVV 97,26: *bhogyāpekṣatvād bhoktrtvasya /*.

³⁶⁷ PVP D109b7/P127a8: *gañ la loṅs spyod par bya ba yod pa ma yin pa de ni za ba por yañ 'gyur ba ma yin te / dper na mo gśam gyi bu lta bu'o // bdag grol bar 'dod pa'i yañ bdag gi'i loṅs spyod par bya ba yod pa ma yin no źes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa yin no //*.

³⁶⁸ PVV 98,6: *bhoktrabhāve ātmāpi nāstīti prasaṅgāt /*.

³⁶⁹ See above, Introduction, §0.2.2, and Chapter 2, §2.2.

³⁷⁰ See Bronkhorst 2005: 593.

of the self that you postulate? For [the property of] not knowing is well known without [having recourse to] a self, as [for instance] in the case of a log or a wall.³⁷¹

Devendrabuddhi, for his part, explains that being neither an agent nor an experiencer is contradictory to the very definition of the self propounded by the Ātmavādin:

If it neither performs actions nor experiences the results of the actions performed [in the past], it is not a self, [and] thus it violates the characteristic of the self.³⁷²

The same idea is spelled out by Manorathanandin:

[What is] called a self is the agent and experiencer. But if what [supposedly] belongs to the self no [longer] exists, for which purpose is an action to be performed, or what is there to be experienced? [And] since there [can] be no agent and no experiencer, one must accept that there is simply no self. Consequently, if there is a self, [there is] what [supposedly] belongs to [this] self; [and] if there is attachment to it, etc., *saṃsāra* cannot be annihilated at all.³⁷³

The Ātmavādins thus absurdly defend the existence of the self while seeking to reach a state where the self as they define it ceases to exist. As a consequence – or, as Devendrabuddhi puts it, “since thus, the perception of selflessness alone is the path in order to reach the city of *nirvāṇa*,³⁷⁴ [and] not another one [like] the cultivation of pain, etc.”³⁷⁵ –

³⁷¹ BC 12.80–81: *kṣetrājño viśarīraś ca jño vā syād ajña eva vā / yadi jño jñeyam asyāsti jñeye sati na mucyate // athājña iti siddho vaḥ kalpitena kim ātmanā / vināpi hy ātmanājñānaṃ prasiddhaṃ kāṣṭhakuḍyavat //*.

³⁷² PVP D110a2/P127b2–3: *gañ gi tshe las rnam mi byed ciñ las byas pa rnam kyi 'bras bu ñams su mi myoñ ba de'i tshe de bdag med pa ñid yin pa de ltar na / bdag gi mtshan ñid las śin tu 'das pa yin no //*.

³⁷³ PVV 98,7–10: *kartā bhoktā cātmocyate / yadā cātmīyam eva nāsti kimarthaṃ karma kartavyaṃ kiṃ vā bhoktavyam / kartṛtvabhokṛtvābhāvād ātmābhāva eva svīkṛtaḥ syāt / tasmāt saty ātmany ātmīyaṃ tatsnehādisattve 'nuccheda eva saṃsārasya //*.

³⁷⁴ On the city of/which is *nirvāṇa*, see above, fn. 6, p. 3, Venkataramanan 1975: 294, AKVy 721,25–30 (where the compound is analysed *nirvāṇam eva puram*) and Bhattacharya 1973: 58, fn. 3.

it is the belief in a permanent, substantial living being that must be eradicated in order to escape *saṃsāra*.

As for this false view itself, it is nothing like a permanent, substantial entity, but rather, a series of momentary beliefs arising in a beginningless causal series. Devendrabuddhi explains:

The [intended] meaning is: each subsequent [moment of nescience] arises in dependence on each preceding [moment of] nescience, [and this] from a beginningless time.³⁷⁶

As Dharmakīrti has shown, the only way to break this series consists in cultivating painfulness as consisting of the conditioning factors; i.e., salvation lies in the cultivation of the thought that all conditioning factors are produced in dependence on causes and conditions. Or, as Devendrabuddhi concludes:

If you desire liberation from worthless *saṃsāra*, uproot the personalistic [false] view by cultivating the perception of selflessness with great effort!³⁷⁷

³⁷⁵ PVP D110a5–6/P127b7–8: *gañ gi phyir de ltar na mya ñan las 'das pa'i groñ khyer thob pa'i phyir / bdag med pa ñid mthoñ ba ñid lam yin gyi gñan sdug bñal la sogs pa bsgom pa ni ma yin pa /*.

³⁷⁶ PVP D110a7–b1/P128a2–3: *ma rig pa sñā ma sñā ma ñid la brten nas phyi ma phyi ma 'byuñ ba ste / thog ma med pa'i dus nas [...]* /. Cf. PVV 98,14–15: *sattvadarśanam avidyāsvabhāvaṃ pūrvapūrvam uttarottarasya sattvadarśanasya hetur ity arthaḥ* /. “The [intended] meaning is: each preceding perception of a [substantial] living being, which consists in nescience, is the cause of each subsequent perception of a [substantial] living being.”

³⁷⁷ PVP D110a6/P127b8–128a1: *gal te khyod 'khor ba sñiñ po med pa las grol bar 'dod pa de bas na 'bad rtsol chen pos bdag med pa mthoñ goms pas 'jig tshogs su ni lta ba dag rtsa ba ñid nas bcom par gyis /*.

